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1. Introduction 
 
“Angola! Angola! Angola! Angola!” October 2005. The national football team has 
miraculously qualified Angola for the World Championship 2006. “This is peace!” yells an 
ardent fan to the TV-reporter, “This is Angola!” It has been three and a half years since four 
decades of continuous war in Angola finally came to an end. 2006 will, apart from the 
championship, most probably also witness Angola’s first general elections since 1992. Things 
are changing, Angola is rising from the ashes; Angola may hold the best chance ever of 
becoming a real democracy.  
“Democracy – this? Oh no! The Government is doing bad because they need 
benediction. They put unqualified people to undertake important positions: It is like making 
a doctor build a house – it will become uneven!”, says a member of the Tocoist Church in 
Luanda. But the Angolan government is not building a house; it is building a nation. And the 
nation may well run the risk of becoming uneven, or more accurately: of staying as uneven as 
ever. Peace is indeed a unique opportunity for the Angolans, but the control of the country’s 
immense natural resources rests firmly within the hands of the government; a government 
which has used the last 30 years to centralise its grip on power, which has no intention of 
letting go, and which may well succeed in being re-elected in 2006. The Angolans know very 
well that their government is not representing the interests of the people and is not living up 
to its responsibilities. They know that they have to come up with new responses to get a say 
in the creation of their perhaps prosperous future, but do they know how?  
Some believe that the answer lies within the idea of civil society. ‘Civil society’ may 
not be a bad idea at all for the Angolans, but it is a contested and multi-faceted idea, which 
has not always held its promises of popular political influence in emerging democracies. 
 
1.1 Motivation  
1.1.1 Civil society – a status quo 
Recent decades have witnessed the transformation of a theoretical concept with a long and 
polemical European history into a very empirical field of intervention in developing 
countries. With the end of the cold war and the shift away from a state-centred perspective 
on international development, the idea of civil society as a powerful, socio-political actor in 
the creation of a new democratic world order – and all its new democratic nations – has 
grown strong and almost hegemonic. Along with the rise of the idea, billions of dollars, 
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Euro, etc. have been channelled out to these particular civil societies from international aid 
agencies in order to support their development and strengthen their capacities. Where civic 
organisations and movements that matched the donors’ idea of civil society did not exist, 
they soon appeared. And where these have not been able to deliver a democratic equilibrium 
towards the state, most evidently in Africa, it has roughly been explained by the lack of 
efficient organisational structures and institutional maturity. A huge empirical field has in this 
sense been constructed on an old theoretical idea, during quite a short period of time. 
Scholars in the civil society debate have questioned, and some have severely 
criticised, the concept as being based in a line of normative, Eurocentric assumptions, which 
are highly problematic to transfer to very distinct contexts. Fewer contributions to the 
debate seem to question the circumstance that these assumptions draw attention away from 
popular forces in the given societies, which may actually possess resources for influencing 
social and political change, even if they do not fit into the imported, structural model of an 
efficient civil society. In particular, donors’ confidence in African actors’ ability to act on 
their own seems unimpressive.1 Despite the exponential growth of partnerships with civil 
society organisations in receiving countries, these partnerships are largely aimed at capacity 
building2 the African partner. This, I suggest, creates an unfortunate imbalance. Especially 
when seeking to transfer a theoretical concept into the social realities and constructing the 
empirical field with billions of dollars, attention to existing resources in the field should seem 
relevant. Historically, the idea of civil society has been quite concerned with popular forces 
for social change, but the perspective seems to have “moved from membership to 
management over the last 40 years.”3 Hence today’s emphasis on institutional capacity. 
 
1.1.2 Angola – looking for the strength of civil society 
In 2003, I embarked for Angola for the first time in order to effectuate an internship in the 
Danish development NGO, Ibis, which was implementing an extensive civil society 
                                                 
1 In this work, I do not distinguish between different actors on the donor and expert side. Even though some of the points 
of critique may be more relevant to the policies and practices of some donor institutions than others, none in particular can 
be highlighted as adhering to comprehensive bottom-up approaches. While critiques of hierarchical and bureaucratic 
structures and long distances (concretely and figuratively) to the beneficiaries are most often directed towards large, 
multilateral donors and aid agencies, small northern NGOs working directly with local actors in the field, may often be 
those to create and implement politics or attitudes of inequality and lack of confidence in the capacities of local NGOs.   
2 By capacity building I refer to strategies applied by donors and international aid agencies, which entail a one-way 
strengthening of local institutions and structures by foreign experts. I am aware that this is a simplification and that the 
strategies are often more nuanced, enabling local actors to be much more instrumental in ‘developing their own capacity’.       
3
 Edwards, 2004:35 
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programme aimed at “building strategic and operational capacity of local partner NGOs to 
empower them to carry out advocacy and lobbying”4 in Luanda, capital of Angola. I 
completed the internship with quite wide-ranging experiences and an increased scepticism 
towards the organisational development approach to civil society.5 Angolan civil society was, 
as a whole, constantly articulated as weak in the international community with reference to a 
low level of organisational maturity. But even though considerable capacity seemed to have 
been created among the staff of the partner organisations throughout Ibis’ programme, the 
organisations were, for the most part, left without donors and without means of penetrating 
the centralised power monopoly of Angola’s MPLA government in order to ‘undertake 
lobby and advocacy activities’ at any significant level. Apart from this, the organisations and 
their trained staff seemed to be somewhat distanced from their presumed popular base, their 
members. Inspired by a (perhaps old fashion) idea of civil society as a broader representation 
of popular forces working to influence social conditions concerning their own lives, I started 
wondering what ordinary Angolans actually do in this respect. Would it not be relevant to an 
effort of supporting civil society in Angola to know what resources the Angolan population 
possesses for influencing social conditions and which factors inspire them to act?   
 But where does one start looking for such resources in a country that has been 
tormented by brutal civil wars all through its independent life, which is carrying an extremely 
repressive colonial legacy, and where socialist discourse has been used to build up the strong 
power monopoly of a presidential regime constructed on dense clientelist networks? What 
you mainly meet when confronting Angolan civilians with the question of what they can do, 
are frustrated people that have been terrified into silence and passivity and seem to have only 
small hopes that the cessation of the military conflict will change anything radically.  
 Consequently, instead of looking for social or political movements or other radical 
actors, I was interested in ordinary people’s everyday responses to their unsatisfactory living 
situations. And actually, the question of What do people in Luanda do? in response to their 
unsatisfying situations has a quite obvious answer: They go to church!  There may be various 
explanations and analyses to this in relation to colonialism, the wars, urbanisation, migration, 
poverty, despair etc., but the fact remains that that is what people do!6 I decided to take my 
                                                 
4 Ibis, 2001:17 
5 For an elaboration, see a debate on the particular programme and situation on www.ibis.dk/debat.pfd  
6 Whenever socialising in Luanda, you are frequently asked what church you belong to – not if you belong to one. 
Birmingham (2002:175) estimates that 90 % of Angolans belonged to a church in 1992. The number today has certainly not 
decreased. Furthermore, people do not only go to church service on Sunday mornings. Most people go to church more than 
once at week and many are involved in church groups, choirs, etc. See e.g. Robson and Roques, 2001. 
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point of departure in this observation; not in order to investigate why people go to church, 
but presupposing that the simple fact that they do so, and that many get involved in 
ecclesiastical activities, represent conscious acts fulfilling some kind of desire to influence the 
course of their lives. The great willingness to invest time and money, even when both are 
always lacking in most people’s lives, proves how important the spiritual dimension of life is 
and how it guides peoples’ actions. Adding to this the fact that churches historically have 
been strongly involved in issues of social development, there seems to be a fair chance that 
people’s involvement in the churches may influence social change and the creation of a 
better and more just Angolan society – on more subtle levels than as direct ‘lobby and 
advocacy activities towards the state’.  
 
1.2 The Tocoist Church – a case study 
Consequently, in order to search for existing resources for social change and transformation 
within a religious context, I decided to carry out a field study in a church, which was 
undertaking some kind of concrete social activity. After some research, the choice fell on the 
Igreja do Nosso Senhor Jesus Christo no Mundo (Church of Our Lord Jesus Christ in the World) or 
‘The Tocoist Church’ as it is more popularly known after the Angolan prophet Simão Tôco, 
who founded the church and to date guides and constitutes the heart of the Tocoist faith. 
The church has a considerable number of devotees all over Angola and some branches 
abroad. Currently, the headquarters in Luanda is constructing a huge public school solely by 
the financial contributions and voluntary manpower of its members. For an intense period 
of about six weeks I engaged in these construction activities on a daily basis as a participant 
observer seeking to understand the reasons, rationalities and expectations that drive the 
church members to invest their time and money in this project. This case study, 
complemented by a few informal interviews7 and a limited number of secondary sources, 
forms the basis for my discussion of how collective action, motivated by religious unity in 
the Tocoist Church in Luanda, offers an important way to understand and work with 
popular agency as a means for social transformation – and therefore as a resource for a 
popularly rooted civil society in Angola.  
 
                                                 
7 See appendix 1 
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1.3 Cardinal question 
The overall objective of this study is to draw attention to the relevance of applying broader, 
more context-sensitive and actor-oriented perspectives to civil society research and practice, 
with specific emphasis to the agency and resources of local actors. In this way, I hope to 
contribute to the theoretical rethinking of the idea of civil society and its applicability in 
international aid interventions; a rethinking that has sought to challenge the ‘conventional’ 
approach throughout at least a decade, but has scarcely touched upon the aspect of local 
actors’ agency. Specifically, the thesis aims at answering the following cardinal question: 
 
In the light of the problematic, conceptual status of civil society, how can the case of 
the Tocoist Church in Luanda suggest an alternative way of understanding the 
potential that civil society in Angola, as an empirical field of social actors, possesses? 
 
The following working questions guide my investigation: 
Why is the conventional use of the concept of civil society problematic in the Angolan context?  
What kinds of agency exist in the Angolan Tocoist Church and in what ways can this agency influence social 
change in Angola?  
How is the agency of the Tocoist Church relevant to the debate on civil society as an empirical phenomenon? 
 
1.4 Structure 
The thesis consists of two relatively separate parts, which are brought together at the end.  
The first part (chapters 2-3) aims at answering the first working question. Chapter 2 
briefly outlines the most important aspects – to this study – of the critique that has been 
directed towards the civil society paradigm in recent decades. The chapter further seeks to 
reveal how this paradigm, and the ways in which it has been used in aid interventions, has 
impeded an actor-oriented perspective on civil society. Finally, it outlines how churches and 
religious actors have generally been viewed in the debate. Chapter 3 relates this discussion to 
the Angolan socio-political context and argues that churches in Luanda are social actors 
relevant to this discussion.  
The second part (chapters 4-6) aims at answering the second working question. 
Chapter 4 introduces the analytical and conceptual framework I am going to apply in 
analysing my case study and presents my field methodology. Chapter 5 is a background-
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chapter, presenting the church and the concrete conditions of the work with the school 
construction. Chapter 6 analyses the results of my case study in the Tocoist Church by tracing 
different forms and levels of agency among the church members. It analyses how the 
process and the results affect their capacity as a group to create and influence social change 
inside and outside the church. Finally, the chapter seeks to locate the power and potential of 
the agency at stake in the case study in a broader societal perspective.  
The final discussion in chapter 7 brings the two parts together in order to answer the 
third question. It discusses the relevance of my field study in relation to the critique of the 
conventional civil society approach presented in chapter 2 and the Angolan context as 
presented in chapter 3.  
 
1.5 Theoretical considerations  
1.5.1 Civil society literature 
The theoretical field of civil society is immense and diverse. My approach is concerned with 
some recent critical perspectives to the theoretical schools and the manner in which the 
concept has been applied by international aid agencies. First, massive critique has long 
challenged the paradigm that counterposes civil society to the state and sees it as the solution 
to the shortcomings of the latter in creating democratically accountable development. In 
recent years, a critique of the tendency to treat civil society almost exclusively as NGOs, has 
followed. At the same time, the inclination to use the concept as a universally valid recipe, 
despite its clear European philosophical roots has been severely questioned. My aim in this 
context is not to discuss the concept in depth theoretically, but rather to outline some 
problems and constraints related to the present conventional use of the concept through a 
discussion of an existing body of literature criticising this paradigm.  
Therefore, my approach rests on these critical interrogations in the civil society 
debate, but departs from a perspective which emphasises the aspect of popular responses to 
unsatisfactory social conditions and local forms of agency for change, as being perhaps the 
most crucial point to address when seeking to understand the potential of civil societies in 
non-western contexts, especially in Africa, and particularly in Angola. In his 1995-
interrogation on civil society in Africanist studies, Mahmood Mamdani stated that:  
…the real abstraction that mars the writing of the whole corpus of Africanist theory is 
the tendency to side-step the process of popular resistance. A marked tendency in 
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Africanism is to consider its object as incapable of making history as of 
comprehending it. (Mamdani, 1995:611)  
 
Ten years later, the balance does not seem to have switched much in favour of the ability of 
African ‘agency’ to count as a valid force for change; neither in Africanist literature or in aid 
interventions. A few texts on Angola are concerned with an actor-perspective to processes 
of social change; Comerford (2004) and Christoplos (1998) apply some interesting 
perspectives, which I will present and draw on.  
 
1.5.2 Analytical frame – agency and collective action 
My case study is aimed at locating the specific kinds of agency at stake in the Tocoist Church 
as a result of their collective action, in order to discuss how this agency can influence social 
transformation in its particular context.  
My use of the term agency draws on the post-colonial, theoretical framework of Bill 
Ashcroft. Ashcroft seeks to counter the tendency to ‘side-step the process of popular 
resistance’, as expressed by Mamdani, and emphasises the existence of African agency by 
introducing the notion of subtle resistance. While nationalist binary resistance to colonial 
repression evolved into just as repressive post-colonial regimes in many African countries, 
Ashcroft argues that African agency and thus capacity for change, exists within ”ordinary 
people” with their ”pragmatic and mundane array of living strategies.”8 This perspective is 
relevant to the Angolan context, where factions of nationalist resistance movements have 
kept the country in conflict ever since independence and popular responses to this situation 
have not been very visible.9 I will argue that the intense activity in the churches can be 
interpreted as subtle resistance by the civil population and I will attempt to locate results of 
this subtlety.   
Furthermore, I will clarify my use of the term collective action as a complementary 
analytical tool. I draw particularly on the African scholar Amadiume, who has concerned 
herself with movements that seek autonomy rather than effective citizenship and political 
influence. These thoughts compliment the idea of subtle resistance and will be relevant for 
my discussion.  
 
                                                 
8 Ashcroft, 2003:20 
9 I have used Ashcroft’s conceptual framework in an earlier study on Angolan national identity, and I will shortly present the 
conclusions of this study and outline how my present approach draws on it. 
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1.6 Methodology 
1.6.1 Semi-constructionist eclecticism  
Consequently, my approach is eclectically constructed, with theoretical and analytical 
contributions from diverse scientific fields. Basically, my position in relation to the theory of 
scientific method is ‘semi-constructionist’. My point of departure is that the concept of civil 
society has been constructed through a historical process of theoretical appropriation. This 
conceptual status has been adopted by international aid agencies and complemented by a 
constructed picture of the African population as powerless victims, which has severe 
consequences for the concrete interventions. It is my intention, via a case study, to exemplify 
how this picture can be reconstructed, and how subjects are not necessarily determined by 
discursive constructions. My study is, as mentioned above, based in a theoretical critique of 
the conventional paradigm that has been guiding international aid interventions since the end 
of the cold war. But the point of departure for my empirical study is that this critique misses 
the point about the constructed picture of the powerless African, which seems to impede aid 
interventionists from seeing the actual resources existing in their ‘targeted’ civil societies. 
Consequently, I had to turn to another theoretical field to construct an analytical framework 
for my purpose. In post-colonial studies, the discursive construction of post-colonial 
subjects has been in focus since Said’s path breaking Orientalism opened the discussion. In 
this field, Ashcroft’s approach constitutes a controversial contribution that I have found 
useful in relation to the Angolan context in an earlier study, even if it also has some 
weaknesses. One of these is the fact that the theory is based on a literary approach and that 
it does not sufficiently deal with the complications in transferring this approach to a social 
context. This circumstance does, to some degree, affect my use of the concepts, as I will 
clarify in chapter 4. Furthermore, I add a social-movement dimension to my analytical 
framework to support the actor-oriented perspective I seek to promote. This study does not 
allow me to include a discussion of the advantages of integrating different theoretical 
spheres, but I will briefly suggest the relevance of such a perspective and let my eclectic 
approach support work in practice.  
Finally, it is important to clarify that my ‘semi-constructionist’ approach is limited to 
the theoretical discussions. The point of departure for my fieldwork was to achieve an 
understanding of the reasons, rationalities and expectations motivating the Tocoists to 
engage in collective action, of the religious worldview underlying their choices, and of their 
perception of themselves as social actors. I wanted to acquire my information on their 
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premises and not on the premises of my theoretical focus or with a constant reminder of the 
civil society dimension at the back of my mind. This means that I apply a descriptive-
analytical perspective for my case study and that my use of the concept of agency becomes a 
very concrete expression of people’s capacities. As my analytical tool, the concept is 
separated from the constructionist discussion it is taken from. I will only subsequently 
discuss the relevance of my results as a contribution to the structure-actor imbalance in the 
civil society debate. My field study is meant as an example of how descriptive-analytical and 
context-sensitive empirical research can help to recast normative notions and constructed 
pictures of third world realities.   
 
1.6.2 Normativity  
Much of the critique of the civil society paradigm and its transference into an empirical field 
of aid interventions turns on the normative assumptions attached to the idea. This critique is 
an important perspective in my approach. When the expectations to civil society 
organisations are that they should challenge a repressive state, live up to standards of 
democratic organisational behaviour and, in general, be good, dynamic, progressive, etc., a 
large number of actors are not only excluded from the field; the capacity of those included is 
measured according to these fixed standards and all other resources are ignored. This 
normativity, as I will argue, seems to have guided aid interventionist constructions of ‘strong 
civil societies’ towards a structure-oriented perspective based on structures, which may not 
even exist in the given context.  
Advocating an actor-perspective to civil society like I do may, however, be just as 
normative in its construction of the field. The idea that local actors hold strong resources for 
change may glorify all kinds of agency and miss the point that these resources should be able 
to bring about some kind of general impact in a given society in order to qualify for aid 
funds. In order to mediate this normativity, I give preference to the descriptive-analytical 
perspective in my case study. In the final discussion of the relevance of my results to the civil 
society debate, I seek to place my results between the normativity of a structure- and an 
actor-oriented perspective.  
It is not my intention, however, to completely free the concept of its normativity in 
the aid context. It is important to distinguish between a descriptive-analytical approach as an 
analytical tool that can serve to inform and guide aid planning and strategies on a more 
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neutral and realistic ground, and civil society as a force that, in one way or another, can 
contribute to improving social condition for the world’s poor and marginalised people. If 
this latter normative understanding of the concept is not kept alive, it automatically becomes 
irrelevant to the aid perspective. 
 
1.6.3 Working definition 
For the purpose of this study, I define my concept of civil society loosely as a sphere of 
social life outside the state, whose different actors in one way or another hold an 
opportunity of influencing social change at any level.  
 
1.6.4 The religious dimension 
I should underline that my study does not envisage a discussion of the potential of religion 
or churches as actors in civil society in general. My choice to work with a church in Luanda 
comes, as noted, out of the simple observation that these are the only visible spaces in 
Luanda that gather people for collective action in communities beyond the family. This is 
obviously connected to people’s religious faith, and my analysis will consequently emphasise 
this aspect. In order to situate my results within the field of civil society and point to the 
resources they might offer to it, I will outline how religious actors have been viewed in the 
civil society debate and by donors in general and in Angola in particular. I will also deal with 
the religious characteristics in my final discussion. But my aim is to illustrate with this 
example that people’s actions and incentives to participate in processes that can create social 
change are neatly tied together with the rationalities that guide their lives and connect with 
their history – and not to models and structures which are imposed from the outside and 
only to a limited extent take the specific context into consideration.  
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2. Civil Society – a theoretical account   
 
This chapter will outline and discuss three components in contemporary critiques of the 
‘mainstreams’ in civil society debate and the way it is applied to and affects international aid 
programmes. These components are: the contested relationship between the state and civil 
society; the tendency to see civil society as akin to voluntary associations or, more 
narrowly, only as NGOs, and finally; the inclination to treat civil society with all its 
contested aspects as a universally valid idea, applicable as an analytical as well as a 
methodological tool in any part of the world.  
The distinction of these three different arguments is of course somewhat artificial, 
as the three lines of critique are quite interwoven and they will, accordingly, complement 
and draw upon each other. On the other hand, this composition allows me to situate the 
arguments historically in relation to the exponents of these lines of thought, instead of 
seeking to give an overall account of the conceptual history and place all the important 
theoreticians in relation to one another. Such attempts often seem to me to be partial and 
shaped by an often only implicitly articulated perspective of the author. But more 
artificially, they often seem to push all the very different proponents of the debate with all 
their different purposes into an aimed linear theoretical evolution of the concept. 
A fourth component that I will discuss in relation to the use of civil society in 
development interventions in Africa is that of agency or the capacity of local actors to 
promote social change on their own account, so to say. But this component receives a 
different status in my account, as it is not, as such, a disputed issue in the civil society 
debate. I argue that the civil society debate has been captured in a kind of structure-
perspective which pays very limited tribute to the agency of the actors it seeks to promote, 
or support, out in the real world. 
The dimensions of the civil society debate that I refer to here are chosen in order 
to elucidate some problematic forms that the concept has taken in international aid 
discourse and interventions lately, particularly in Africa. I find that the more specific 
aspects and empirical consequences that I highlight here have a particular relevance to the 
Angolan context, as the next chapter will substantiate. This account of the civil society 
debate must, accordingly, be read as partial and context-specific.  
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2.1 State vs. civil society 
One of the most contested relationships that occupy the debate on civil society nowadays 
is that between state and society. The idea of civil society as distinct from, and later as 
opposed to, the state, is a result of a long history of appropriation of European thinking 
which, it has been alleged by critics for more than a decade, it is rather inappropriate to 
apply to an African context. 
Most contemporary scholars start their accounts of the history of civil society with 
the names of Locke and Hobbes, underlining the notion of the social contract and the 
beginning, with Locke, of the distinction between state and society.10 Some have found it 
useful to start as early as Cicero and Aristotle in order to show how state and society were 
seen as indistinguishable in classical thought.11 As dealt with by Hobbes, civil society 
represents a system of social order in contrast to the ‘uncivil’ society, characterised by 
uncertainty, brutality and ‘survival of the fittest’. Humans living in the natural condition or 
according to natural law will be faced with endless fear and incivility because of the 
“general inclination of mankind, a perpetual and restlesse desire of Power over power, that 
ceaseth only in death”12. Social order and security, according to Hobbes, must be upheld 
through “unlimited power to the sovereign to protect civil society from its demonic 
impulses”13. State and civil society is in this understanding seen as indistinguishable. The 
relationship involves a form of social contract, where citizens give up a part their freedom 
in return for protection and security.  
Locke’s works touched upon the conflicts inherent in this contractarian 
relationship and laid the ground for the separation of the state from society14, but the clear 
distinction is drawn with the philosophy of Hegel. In Hegel’s dialectical worldview civil 
society was a historically produced, contradictory sphere of life in continuous conflict with 
the state. This view was in sharp contrast to earlier thinkers, who perceived of it as a 
natural condition or a realm of freedom against the state.15 Out of Hegel’s philosophy grew 
the Marxist tradition, on which Gramsci built his ideas of civil society and hegemony, 
which have had profound influence on the way civil society is perceived of today as a 
counterforce or opposition to the state and used in international aid. With Gramsci’s 
                                                 
10 E.g. Van Rooy, 1998, Young, 1994, Hann, 1996. 
11 Edwards, 2004, Mamdani, 1995 
12 Hobbes, quoted by Young, 1994:34 
13 Young, 1994:34 
14 Van Rooy, 1998:9, Young, 1994:33. 
15 Mamdani, 1995:603 - 605 
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political philosophy, the state became a “potential instrument of domination by the forces 
of capital”16, and civil society the force to encounter its domination, as I will return to 
below. Nevertheless, Mamdani argues, it is the view of civil society as a ‘natural condition 
of freedom’ and as such existing against the state that:  
is reflected in what is today the dominant tendency in Africanist thought, one which 
considers the process of democratisation as synonymous with the coming to life of 
civil society. In turn, civil society is conceptualised as existing against the state. This 
tendency involves nothing less than a one-sided anti-state romanticisation of civil 
society. (Mamdani, 1995:603)    
 
This romanticisation involves a range of aspects, the imagining of the harmonious and 
non-conflictual nature of civil society in itself, despite the celebrations of its plurality, as 
well as in its relation to the state, being the most tenacious. According to Young, it 
appeared along with a gradual displacement of the much looser referent ‘society’ with ‘civil 
society’, which in turn reflects:  
a veritable paradigmatic mutation from a vision of African politics as primarily state-
centered to one of state and civil society as highly distinctive realms, conjoined yet 
separate, in theory potentially cooperative but in the dismal empirical realities of the 
1980s frequently antagonistic. (Young, 1994:36)  
 
With this ‘mutation’ well under way, the collapse of state socialism supposedly cleared the 
way for civil society to unfold its democratising potential. With the now unrestricted 
development of the market economies, a third agent entered into the structural relationship 
to form the triadic model of state, civil society, and the market which, according to its 
critics, further serves to idealise civil society’s democratising promise and shape donor 
policies on that account.17  
 
Maina, writing from the Kenyan context, but like Mamdani contesting the overall 
Africanist ‘paralysis of perspective’ about civil society in Africa, suggests that this 
perspective rests on a line of untested assumptions without basis in African empirical 
reality. First, Maina argues, the assumption that civil society constitutes a countervailing 
and democratic power to the state, rests on the presupposition that political resources are, 
on the whole, fairly distributed in society and that the state is a largely passive and generally 
                                                 
16 Van Rooy, 1998:10, quoting Bobbio, 1988 and Thomas, 1997. 
17 E.g. Marcussen og Bergendorff, 2003. This account does, however, not allow me to enter further into the 
discussion of the trinity. 
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indifferent bystander. This presupposition is basically wrong for Africa, as most analyses 
will reckon, yet without seriously taking into account the consequences. But what is all the 
more misleading for the idea about the potential of civil society in Africa, is the general 
assumption about the weak and incompetent African state:  
Generally seen as incompetent and often described as deinstitutionalized, neo-
patrimonial and sultanist, the State in Africa has been written of as an artefact of 
research, a museum and period piece to be occasionally dusted off to surfeit the 
fancies of political archaeologists. This is rash. Much of the weakness of civil society 
in Africa has to do with the active role the State has played in fragmenting and 
dissipating the energies of those it distrusts. Behind its dour, turgid and seemingly 
lifeless aspect, the African State is alive and well. (Maina, 1998:136)      
 
Yet, Maina’s argumentation misses the point that the active African state is also highly 
dependent on its relations with society via the dense clientelist networks within which most 
of its economic activity evolves. According to Chabal, these networks consist of a set of 
very complex links which tie, rather than oppose, state and society together and maintain 
or reinforce reciprocal dependency:  
Because the state survives only insofar as it is in symbiotic relation with society, its 
capacity to change that self-same society by means of social and economic 
‘engineering’ is most severely limited. (Chabal, 2002:39-40)  
 
This relation also disproves the assumption that civil society groups are only those that are 
self-organising and relatively autonomous of the state. But even if dependency is dialectical 
the state remains in control, and formal groups distrusted by the state therefore hold very 
little power and must often “torture language into euphemisms that the hatchet man from 
the Office of the president finds acceptable” in order to maintain their formal status.18 
When it comes to funding, the idea that middle-class forces, or businesses one might add, 
will put their money into causes that they would like to advance, is just as erroneous. In 
Africa, much of the emerging middle class – and the market forces as well – have gained 
their way with the help of the state. And even those that have not been nurtured by the 
state are well aware that the state’s capacity to harm them is considerable. Formal civil 
society organisations thus remain dependent on foreign funding, and sandwiched between 
the demands of the donor and the control of the state, their autonomy and self-
organisation becomes severely restricted.  
                                                 
18 Maina, 1998, p. 136 
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In analysing civil society in Africa, therefore one must explore not only civil society’s 
pluralizing potential but also the ways in which the State uses the civic sphere and 
some civic institutions as vehicles for its hegemonic project. (Maina, 1998:135) 
     
Maina, like many Africanists, applies a rough generalisation in his singular use of the 
African State. His points are, nevertheless, highly relevant to the Angolan context, as I will 
show in the next chapter. 
  
2.2 An NGO-approach 
Many scholars concerned with the aid perspective in the civil society debate, point to the 
problems inherent in the fact that donor agencies almost exclusively define civil society in 
terms of voluntary associations, and most commonly also restrict these to NGOs.19 This 
organisational emphasis may be a concrete answer to the difficult task of operationalising 
the practical work with a civil society approach, but it constitutes a range of problems, 
among which the exclusion of all those actors who do not fit into such a formalised 
framework is perhaps the most serious.  
 The so-called associational approach has its solid roots in the tradition started with 
the writings of Alexis de Tocqueville in the 1830s, who has given the later exponents of 
this line of thought the designation of neo-Tocquevillians.20 De Tocqueville’s extensive 
work on US democracy set the scene for the pervasive idea of voluntary, associational life 
as the democratic power of society. The most prominent exponent of the neo-
Tocquevillian line of thought in contemporary debate is Robert Putnam. Putnam’s writings 
have been heavily criticised for idealising associational life and its political potential, as a 
clear expression of the above-mentioned romanticisation, which has “roots in Americans’ 
rather mythicized Tocquevillian conception of their own society, but it entails a gross 
oversimplification of the makeup and roles of civil society in other countries around the 
world.”21 Putnam’s work adds to this romanticisation the aspect of ‘new institutionalism’, 
which is ultimately concerned with “the conditions for creating strong, representative, 
effective institutions” for securing democracy.22 This institutional emphasis and the ‘liberal 
establishment’ have, according to Edwards, drawn the concept of civil society away from 
                                                 
19 Edwards, 2004, Howell and Pearce, 2001/3, Sampson, 1996 
20 Edwards, 2004, Howell, 1999. 
21 Carothers, 1999, quoted in Howell and Pearce, 2001:3. Edwards, 2004:18 – 36  
22 Putnam, Robert: Making Democracy Work, 1993:6, quoted in Howell and Pearce, 2001:3 
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grassroots activism and progressive social movements. He states with Skocpol that US civil 
society has “moved from membership to management over the last 40 years”.23 This shift 
has had severe implications for the application of the concept in the international aid 
perspective, for as Edwards points out: 
If concentrated power is bad for democracy in general, it is difficult to argue that it is 
good for civil society, yet some of the trends in associational life over the past decade 
have come dangerously close to this effect. There has been a worldwide 
professionalization of the non-profit sector and a gradual distancing of associations 
from their social base – in part the result of foreign aid and government funding that 
is driven by strong neo-Tocquevillian tendencies among donors. Funds have gone 
overwhelmingly to NGOs in capital cities, while Northern NGOs have dominated the 
emergence of transnational advocacy networks. This is not strengthening civil society, 
but promoting certain associations over others on the basis of preconceived notions 
of what civil society should look like. (Edwards, 2004:35)   
 
But can Alexis de Tocqueville really be held solely responsible for this development? (He 
might just turn in his grave if he knew.) While many, mostly American scholars, seem to 
claim so, Young relates a great deal of present international aid rationalities concerning civil 
society in Africa to the Gramscian legacy: 
Not the least tribute to the originality of the Italian communist theoretician is 
international aid agencies’ unacknowledged (and unconscious) appropriation of his 
reading of civil society as being defined by structuration. (Young, 1994:36)   
 
For Gramsci, a civil society took form and grew into a counter-hegemonic force through 
its organisational and ideological structuration. This structuration, Young argues, is 
indispensable to charting contemporary uses in Africa. It is expressed as the ensemble of 
”institutions, ideologies, practices, and agents (…) that comprise the dominant culture of 
values.”24 At the early stages of this process, civil society is perceived as in a condition of 
latency, which is neither at the service of a bourgeois hegemony nor challenges a dominant 
state. After the fall of state socialism, Young argues, the challenge was: 
… building a civil society in the Gramscian (or Tocquevillian) sense, an infrastructure 
of corporate structuration to permit civil society to assume command of its own 
destiny – and, in a Gramscian irony, to reinvent a market economy whose 
“hegemonical” values it might mediate. (Young, 1994:37)    
 
While Young suggests that the resonance of Gramsci’s structuration in present aid 
discourse has come into being through unconscious appropriation, he does not develop the 
argument on how this has had consequences for the targeted civil societies. But in this 
                                                 
23 Edwards, 2004:35.  
24 Young, 1994:35, quoting Martin Carnoy, The State and Political Theory, 1984.  
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perspective, it seems obvious where contemporary aid interventions’ endeavours of 
strengthening ‘latent’ third world civil societies’ institutional capacities through capacity 
building according to western models and blueprints, have assumed their legitimacy. 
Hence, if the associational approach inherited from de Tocqueville determines 
today’s emphasis on citizen groups – that is NGOs – Gramsci’s structuration seems to be 
just as important to the attempts at operationalising the approach to concrete civil society 
policies in Africa.  
The excluding nature of this approach also becomes apparent from the above. 
Structuration as institution-building must necessarily take place within a framework of 
formalised organisations, even if efforts of community mobilisation and empowerment, 
etc. have been broadly applied. But these efforts have not been so much related to the idea 
of civil society in general, but rather to that of participation strategies. This feature alienates 
the idea of civil society further from ordinary people in Africa, for as e.g. Maina points out, 
much associational life in Africa takes place outside of formal groups.25  
The UN website states that:  
The United Nations system has significant informal and formal arrangements with 
civil society organizations, collectively known as non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs). More and more, NGOs are UN system partners and valuable UN links to 
civil society. NGOs are consulted on UN policy and programme matters. 
(www.un.org/issues/civilsociety) 
 
Here, NGOs are a collective term for civil society organisations and a link to civil society at 
the same time. This indicates that civil society still refers to a large and not easily definable 
sphere of social life with its organisations as its representatives. The EU, on the other hand, 
proposes a sort of reconceptualisation in introducing the notion of ‘non-state actors’ as an 
overall designation to which civil society becomes an under-categorisation and to which 
NGOs again designates but one kind of organisation.26 Whether or how NGOs or civil 
society organisations represent a wider civil society consisting of informal structures and 
actors is seldom discussed. Nor does it seem to be an issue how donor demands about 
formal constituencies, methods, strategies, policies, etc. to these organisations correspond 
to the cultures that they are seemingly representing.   
 
                                                 
25 Maina, 1998:136. 
26 EU, 2003:4   
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2.3 Universality  
I have already touched upon the features of Western bias, preconceived notions and 
unacknowledged assumptions about civil society which are uncritically applied to settings – 
in this case Africa – where their validity must be questioned. This is one side to a context-
oriented argument. The other side rejects the overall theoretical, and well acknowledged, 
idea that civil society is a universally valid notion.  
Tracing the origins of the idea of civil society in order to unmask how they 
influence the present use of the concept in development and aid interventions, quite 
unpolemically reveals as a mere fact how European and North American intellectuals have 
constructed and developed the concept over the centuries. Civil society was, until its 
physical birth by development interventionists in the 1980s, a theoretical idea about human 
relations, developed and discussed in order to produce generalised knowledge in the field 
of social science. The universality of the idea seems convincing when civil society referred 
to a system of organisation of human co-existence, as no human beings around the world 
seem to have existed without any form of organisation according to social rules and norms. 
But it becomes highly problematic when the concept today has reached its narrow and 
almost hegemonic representation as democratic organisations of marginalised, but 
harmonious citizens, who are expected to both challenge the power of corrupt and 
patrimonial states and make up for their shortcomings in terms of service delivery.  
Hann, defending an anthropological approach to the study of civil society, 
highlights the Scottish Enlightenment thinker, Ferguson, in order to trace the roots of the 
universalist paradoxes of civil society. Ferguson dealt with the tension between the selfish 
goals of individual actors and the need for some basic collective solidarity in a moral 
community, which has remained critical up until today’s debates. But while Ferguson 
resolved the tension through his view of the moral community as based in a kind of shared 
realm of sociability, the modern tension is rooted in the industrial age and a consequent 
twist in perspective towards rights and the “virtues of a pluralism that is founded on equal 
and autonomous individual citizens.”27 This “impoverished understanding of social 
relationships”28 is, according to Hann, reflected in neo-classical economics and rational-
choice theory, as well as in the Marxist tradition, which merely aggregates individuals to 
form social classes. From this stance, the concept of civil society has received its current 
                                                 
27 Hann, 1996:3  
28 Ibid. 
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overall definition as a sphere between the family and the modern state, which leaves no 
room for including small-scale societies and other modes of social organisation.29 On the 
contrary, the actors operating in this sphere must be free individuals brought together by 
common social interests or ideologies; not by pre-modern groupings.      
It has recurrently been highlighted in Africanist studies how African communities 
and ‘African mentality’ are not based on an individualist worldview, but rather adhere to 
ethnic-, kin- and family-oriented ontologies. This is in turn reflected in Maina’s point, 
referred to above, that the different forms of African associational life often fit badly into 
the formal NGO framework designed to strengthen it.  
Finally, recent years have demonstrated an increasing theoretical and empirical 
interest in the notion of the global civil society, which has inevitably called for common 
denominators and drawn attention away from contextual analyses. Global civil society 
organisations are increasingly understood and taken into consideration as actors on the 
global scene and as partners to the traditional multi-lateral donor institutions, as the UN 
quote above indicates. Global civil society calls for formal institutions and is, therefore, 
most often exclusively understood as NGOs. A few scholars tend to direct attention 
towards social movements in the global civil society.30 The normative tendency to see civil 
society as something which is good, progressive, and humane per see, seems alive and 
perhaps even reinforced in the debate on the global civil society.   
 
In sum, the use of the concept today, in theory as well as practice, is not only deeply rooted 
in western sociological and philosophical thinking. It is also to a very large extent detached 
from its original intention to explain and understand human action and relations (as e.g. 
Hobbes and Ferguson). It seems to have evolved from an exclusively philosophical idea 
over sociology to a highly operationalised and practical term in today’s international aid 
industry with all its very real projects aimed at strengthening real-life civil societies, alias 
NGOs. While many contemporary scholars are ready to dump the concept as hopelessly 
vague and contested, still more funding from international donors is destined towards 
developing countries’ empirical civil societies. It seems that the practical use of the concept 
has reached a point of operationalisation which demands a more explicit detachment from 
its theoretical and normative conceptual history to refer exactly to one set of actors on the 
                                                 
29 Hann, 1996:3-7  
30 E.g. Castells, 1997 
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social scene, as proposed by the EU in the above. Or perhaps it is still possible to let 
NGOs mean NGOs and (re)expand the practical scope of civil society to encompass a 
broader set of social actors with a much broader scope of capacities than institutional 
maturity and advocacy and lobbying potential – shaped by the experiences and 
circumstances in their specific contexts?   
What I have sought to emphasise in this short account of only a few contributions to 
contemporary civil society debate, which in turn seem relevant to international aid 
interventions in Africa, and particularly in Angola, is the need for context-oriented 
approaches instead of a constant search for a general framework in which all the peoples of 
the world and their actions can be situated and structured. In other words: 
This means moving beyond blueprints for realising normative visions of civil society 
towards contextualised social and political analyses that can better inform donor 
interventions. This in turn will require deconstructing the fetishised notion of the 
NGO as the prime organisational form and manifestation of civil society and 
historical relations. (Howell and Pearce, 2001:15-16) 
 
In this way, civil society as a ‘great European idea’ might still be highly relevant in showing 
the potentials of real empirical powers for social change in African realities – and even in 
suggesting ways of international co-operation with, and support of, these local actors. My 
case study for this thesis aims at such a contextualised analysis – and at showing that agency 
exists within associational forms constructed by local actors themselves, but in a quite 
different form than that sought after within pre-manufactured ideal types imported from a 
far-away continent.   
 
2.4 An actor-structure antagonism? 
But is local actors’ agency relevant to the discussion about civil society? Most scholars, and 
even more practitioners, would probably agree that it is. Yet, strangely few contributors to 
the debate touch explicitly upon the issue. It should seem relevant to at least query this 
circumstance when seeking to strengthen civil society through partnerships aimed at 
capacity building the Southern partner as a social actor. If strengthening civil society means 
building its institutional capacity, is it then implicitly assumed that ‘ideologies, practices and 
agents’31 are the contents of this institutional structure that will eventually unfold its 
agency? As ‘raw material’ to be put into the strengthened framework?  
                                                 
31 See note 24 on Gramsci’s structuration.  
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 In a sense, the above unravelling of Gramscian structuration in current civil society 
thinking indicates that present aid discourse has been captured in a structural perspective, 
downplaying the actor dimension to almost nothing. If we suppose that Young is right in 
his assumption about unacknowledged appropriation, as outlined above, it could seem that 
Gramsci’s structuration, undoubtedly an inspiration to present aid discourse in Africa, has 
been drained of its nuances and scope to mean only structure and formal 
institutionalisation. With a structural perspective, I am therefore not referring to the 
traditional antagonism between structure- and actor-oriented cause-effect explanations of 
social phenomena. I am referring to the discussion about capacity and whether structural 
capacity is of so great value in itself. Constructing structural capacity in accordance with a 
universal blueprint may well miss out on context-specific structures of power and 
organisation at both local and state levels.   
Hence, if Gramsci’s civil society held the key to revolution and to challenging 
repressive features of the state, it could appear that his structuration, coupled with 
Putnam’s harmonious, institutionalised associations, has been twisted into present day’s 
NGO-approach among donors.32 Perhaps this appropriation has taken the sting out of the 
transformative agency and power of civil society inherent in both Gramsci’s and de 
Tocqueville’s interpretations – thus legitimising international donor’s project of structuring 
and capacity building a civil society from the outside, where it seems absent or ‘latent’? In 
this way, it has been leaving many actors of civil society organisations as the scarce filling of 
the sandwich dominated by the state on one side and the donors on the other, as 
mentioned above – and further left out all other actors who were originally included in the 
idea of civil society. This also seems to be an implicit consequence of Edwards’ observation 
about the shift ‘from membership to management’ that has distanced associations from 
their social base.  
In searching for the actor-perspective in the civil society debate, one feels 
prompted to turn to social-movement theory and at the same time wonder why these two 
theoretical fields seem to be so neatly separated in Africa-oriented literature. In the vast 
Latin American literature on social movements, and particularly new social movements, the 
link to civil society is increasingly recognised and disputed.33    
                                                 
32 This should of course be understood as an overall observation/inspiration, as the process of operationalising a theoretical 
concept into a methodological tool anywhere in the world obviously faces a wide range of challenges and paradoxes, which 
will call for practical solutions rather than theoretical explanations.  
33 E.g. Alvarez, Dagnino, and Escobar, 1998, Castells, 1997  
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In the introduction to Mamdani and Wamba-dia-Wamba’s widely referred-to 
collection, African Studies in Social Movements, Mamdani queries the role and meaning of civil 
society, but without positioning it in relation to the social-movement dimension. The 
anthology is more concerned with the dichotomy of traditional vs. modern.34 In the 
concluding chapter on civil society Mamdani notes, however, that:  
the real abstraction that mars the writing of the whole corpus of Africanist theory is 
the tendency to side-step the process of popular resistance. A marked tendency in 
Africanism is to consider its object as incapable of making history as of 
comprehending it. (Mamdani, 1995:611)      
 
Is this perhaps why African social movements have been of limited interest to the civil 
society debate? Are they simply not considered actors with legitimate agency and 
knowledge that can be combined with structure and institutionalisation? Or are they 
broadly equated with political parties or at least considered as infiltrated with the state?35  
 Whatever the reasons for this theoretical tendency, it is probably closely connected 
to the colonial histories of the continents. While Latin American social movements had had 
another century to grow into being and position themselves in relation to states and elites 
before the civil society paradigm became empirical and institutionalised, the African civic 
populations still seem to be viewed and treated mainly as poor and powerless victims; first 
to colonialism and then to African patrimonialism and tyranny; a circumstance that I will 
elaborate in chapter 4 in relation to my post-colonial conceptual framework.36 In order to 
advance an alternative to this view, which I find to be an unfortunate construction, and 
eventually relate it to the debate on civil society in the aid perspective, I will concentrate my 
analysis around the idea of agency, understood as constructive and somewhat autonomous 
contributions to processes of social change, as will become clear in chapter 4. From this 
perspective, social-movement theory becomes only partly relevant and I will, consequently, 
leave the theoretical ‘synthesisation’ of the two fields for another occasion and concentrate 
my study around my empirical research in the Angolan context.  
 
                                                 
34 Mamdani and Wamba-dia-Wamba, 1998:3-5. 
35
 After all, most of the nationalist movements which fought for independence turned into those incompetent state leaders, 
who fuelled civil wars over the continent and today constitute the greatest challenge to African civil society, did they not? 
36 In this context I am referring mainly to the views and discursive constructions of African powerlessness by international 
aid agencies and Africanist scholars, as expressed by Mamdani. I am hereby not saying that African elites and nationalists 
have not had important says and interests in constructing such views and that civil populations themselves have not to some 
extent contributed to constructing their own victimised positions. I am merely emphasising and questioning a theoretical 
tendency which seems to have gained profound influence in present-day international aid interventions.  
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2.5 Religious actors and civil society  
As mentioned initially, I chose to undertake my empirical research within a church 
environment in Luanda, because I found that particularly this sphere of Luanda social life 
seemed to gather and mobilise people for social, collective action. A short account of how 
churches and religious actors are positioned in the civil society debate will therefore be 
necessary before I proceed.    
Churches and religious organisations are sometimes highlighted as important 
partners on the civil society scene because of their local knowledge and anchoring. But this 
recognition is not mirrored on the theoretical side. The particular qualities of religious actors, 
and the significance of these qualities for the participation and inclusion of ordinary people 
in processes that can promote social change, remain largely obscured: 
Despite [religious groups’] importance to human services provision, civic life, 
and the nonprofit sector, neither secular nor religious researchers have 
specifically addressed the ways in which faith-based organizations differ from 
their secular counterparts. (Hall, 2001:80,37 Quoted in Petersen, 2004:8) 
 
In spite of this apparent theoretical vacuum, religious actors are often associated with a line 
of qualities that are found more or less incompatible with civil society. One explanation to 
this can be found in the legacy from the secularisation thesis that for many years dominated 
religious science with its essentialist understanding of religion. This thesis viewed religion as 
inextricably tied to tradition, anti-modernity and reactionary activity. Even though the thesis 
has been rejected long ago, there seems to be a tendency to continuously view religious 
actors as conservative per see, which matches the idea of civil society as progressive per see 
badly. The extensive amount of literature on fundamentalist religious actors like the 
Pentecostal movement, Muslim extremists, and the religious right wing in the USA supports 
this picture.38 Also Mamdani, as one of the few to advocate an actor-oriented perspective to 
civil society, treats religious and fundamentalist actors as one and the same.39  
Another recurring argument against churches as matching the idea of civil society is 
the notion that they function on vertical organisational structures, which is considered bad 
for democratic development. Furthermore, the notion that churches often encourage certain 
rivalries impeding them from engaging in constructive collaboration is often heard.40  
                                                 
37 Hall, Peter Dobkin (2001) Historical Perspectives on Religion, Government and Social Welfare in America. In: Andrew 
Walsh (ed.): Can Charitable Choice Work? Covering Religion’s Impact on Urban Affairs and Social Services.  
38 Petersen, 2004:9 and 25 
39
 Mamdani, 1995:26-33 
40 Robson and Roque, 2001:141 
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Religious NGOs have, however, received some recognition and have been taken into 
consideration as partners by donors and aid agencies, while attention to churches as civil 
society (implementing) partners has been very limited. Their local anchoring and knowledge 
seem to have been considered useful only in relation to implementing service delivery 
activities and other charity work traditionally associated with churches, i.e. fields of 
humanitarian assistance where conservatism is probably considered less harmful.  
Various empirical factors do, however, point to the relevance of studying and 
including religious actors and churches in studies of social change and in the particular field 
of civil society. A World Bank publication, Voices of the Poor, finds that religious 
institutions play a crucial role to most poor people and that many have more confidence in 
religious organisations and their effectiveness than in other organisations and institutions.41 
Also Maina’s survey on civil society in Kenya, finds that the Church is the most trusted 
grassroots organisation and that its status in the civil society debate is unclear.42 Religious 
institutions have been seen as mediators in conflicts because of this confidence and because 
of their historical presence and knowledge of their localities. An example is the important 
role the Catholic NGO Sant’Egidos played in mediating between the combatants in the 
Mozambican civil war.43 Other examples of influential religious actors are the liberation-
theological movement in Latin America, the active role played by South African churches in 
the fight against apartheid, and the support the Catholic Church in Poland offered to the 
liberation movement. These examples show how religious actors have played important roles 
in events and phenomena that are traditionally associated with the strengthening of civil 
society.44 On the global stage, events such as the World Faith Development Dialogue programme, 
enhanced in 1998 by the World Bank, and the Millennium World Peace Summit of Religious and 
Spiritual Leaders, held in the UN headquarters in 2000, point to the increasing influence and 
cross-institutional organisation of religious actors.  
There are, however, indications of an increasing recognition of the significance of 
religion to social processes in social science and interdisciplinary studies, and more research 
                                                 
41 World Bank, 2000:222 
42
 Maina, 1998:139-152 
43 The organisation had, through its close contact with local leaders and the Catholic Church in local communities, 
profound knowledge about in the rural localities in Mozambique where RENAMO operated, and became an 
important conciliator in relation to the urban-based FRELIMO. Petersen, 2004:74 and 82 with case example from 
Donini, Antonio (1995): The Bureaucracy and the Free Spirits. 
44 Berger, Julia (2003): Religious Non-governmental Organizations, referred by Petersen, 2004:25 
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and theorising on the matter may be coming up.45 This may be highly welcomed, considering 
the weighty empirical evidence that religious actors have something to offer to civil society 
thinking. It seems somehow odd that a theoretical field is trying to stay free of a religious 
dimension, which seems to permeate much of its empirical field.  
Berger, among others, notes how new religious currents like the Evangelical 
churches in Latin America, and to some extent also in Africa, have gained enormous 
attendance. These new Evangelicals have thrown aside many of the traditions that have been 
obstacles to modernisation, e.g. machismo, so that women and laypersons in general have a 
much greater say in decision-making concerning their own lives.  
…this lay operation of churches necessitates training in administrative skills, including 
the conduct of public meetings and the keeping of financial accounts. It is not fanciful 
to suggest that in this way Evangelical congregations serve – inadvertently, to be sure 
– as schools for democracy and for social mobility. (Berger, 1999:14) 
 
The power that religious institutions hold in mobilising and engaging people for collective 
and charitable action may, in this manner, even advance the democratic course that capacity 
building from the outside is supposed to serve. As Berger suggests, it may be difficult for 
advocates of democracy to ascribe such abilities to institutions that are traditionally 
perceived as undemocratic.      
 
2.6 Sub-conclusion  
Civil society as an empirical field of aid interventions has grown considerably during the last 
decades. The creation of the field is based in a long theoretical history; a history that has 
transformed the concept into a highly normative idea about a sphere of the population that 
can challenge bad state governance and secure a democratic equilibrium towards the state. 
This sphere has increasingly been seen as akin to voluntary associations, which have again 
turned into development NGOs, with a primary focus towards the institutional capacity of 
the organisations. This recipe of a good and democratic society has been found valid for 
implementation anywhere in the world, but several factors point to the fact that this recipe is 
not particularly applicable in many African contexts. Moreover, the focus on structural 
capacity seems to have superseded the interest in local actors’ actual capacities and resources. 
Critiques of this conventional, normative understanding of civil society have, however, not 
addressed this aspect in relation to Africa. Contrary to e.g. Latin American approaches, 
                                                 
45 E.g. Herbert (2003), Berger (1999) 
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studies of social movements have not been combined with a civil society perspective. This 
can perhaps be seen as a consequence of Africa’s recent decolonisation and a general picture 
of the civil Africans as poor and powerless victims. 
 A sphere of civil life that has largely been excluded from the civil society debate as a 
result of the normative assumptions that permeate it, is religious actors and, in particular, 
churches. This exclusion seems problematic in the face of weighty empirical evidence that 
show churches as both important social actors in a macro-perspective, eminent at reaching 
and mobilising local populations, and as ‘schools for democracy and social mobility’.  
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3. Angola – an empirical account 
 
This chapter serves to relate the above theoretical and general considerations to the 
Angolan empirical scenario. As the above account, this must be read as partial and specific 
aspects of Angola’s history, where state formation and social fabric are highlighted. This 
account, therefore, presupposes a reasonable knowledge of the historical and political 
situation in Angola.     
 
3.1 The Angolan state and civil society  
The independent Angolan state was born in the dawn of the 11th of November 1975 after 
almost 15 years of intense independence war against the Portuguese colonial regime. The 
MPLA has been sitting heavily on the central state institutions ever since, not least after the 
formal transition to multiparty democracy in 1991. When the Marxist-Leninist doctrine 
adopted at independence was abandoned at the end of the cold war, the MPLA succeeded 
in using the privatisation of the economy to maintain and even reinforce its control of all 
central institutions. This is mainly due to two factors: The continued war against UNITA 
and the government’s control of the immense oil resources in the country:  
Hence, in contrast to some other cases, and to the numerous analyses which represent 
the privatization of the state as a sign of impotence caused by pressure from above (in 
the form of demands by international financial institutions) and from below (in the 
form of civil society), Angola demonstrates the strengthening not of the state as such, 
but of the power which occupies it. This power, moreover, is increasingly connected 
to international interests, and in this relationship the Angolan side enjoys substantial 
bargaining power. (Messiant, 2001:289)    
 
This ‘occupying power’, from which a dense clientelist network has been developed and 
reinforced dialectically, is an utmost central feature of the state in Angola. With power 
exercised largely by ignoring or subverting the formal institutions defined by law and with a 
strong grip of both legal and illegal sectors of the economy, the government’s systems of 
redistribution has effectively penetrated most spheres of society. At the same time, power 
has increasingly been concentrated around the presidency to create a strong neo-
patrimonial system based on a personality cult. Furthermore, the government has been able 
to continually promote an image of itself, and particularly of President dos Santos, as a 
peacemaker in contrast to UNITA’s and Savimbi’s bellicosity, despite the fact that the 
interests in maintaining the conflict, and the inhuman methods of warfare, have been 
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equally applied from both sides. It has even been suggested (well before the end of the 
armed conflict) that President dos Santos should be nominated for the Nobel Peace Prize.46  
In the face of the abject misery of the great majority of the population, and coupled 
with systematic political violence and persecutions of suspected opponents, the 
government has by these means been able to apply a politics of co-optation or 
neutralisation of independent forces. According to Messiant, this is the government’s most 
basic strategy. The co-optation includes support of selected NGO’s, clubs, associations, 
etc., the creation of the Council of the Republic47, and notably, the president’s private 
charity foundation, the FESA.48 
The MPLA is, on the whole, backed by a variety of very active groups like its youth 
wing, the JMPLA, its women’s wing, the OMA, and the Spontaneous National Movement, 
which are promoted as NGO’s or popular movements. Recent years have also shown how 
vast campaigns involving all spheres of social and cultural life have been used as political 
means to show the popular foundation of the MPLA and the government’s efforts of 
consolidating peace and promoting sound development in harmonious collaboration with 
civil society.49 Some of these campaigns have eventually been transformed into actual 
associations and heavily promoted by the state media.50 Moreover, the last two years have 
witnessed the appearance of additional ‘NGOs’ that are both formally and openly founded 
by state institutions.51 Finally, the strategy of co-optation has, from the beginning, involved 
traditional leaders (sobas) who are very influential in rural areas and in some urban or peri-
urban zones. The sobas have been offered positions in, and have been incorporated into, 
                                                 
46 Messiant, 2001, p. 289 -291, Chabal, 2002, p. 58, Birmingham, 2002, p. 177-178 
47 This council was formed as a body of consultation to the President of the Republic and consists of various members 
appointed by the President himself as representatives of civil society.  
48 Messiant, 2001. Messiant’s article, with the eloquent title The Eduardo Dos Santos Foundation: Or how Angola’s regime is taking 
over civil society, analyses in depth how the FESA, created in 1996, in turn consolidates this governmental strategy, supports 
the transfer of power to the presidency, and further blurs the boundaries between public and private. The foundation’s 
finances come from government taxes on foreign businesses working in Angola, but it is neatly tied to the private person of 
the president via ‘FESA-week’, which is overwhelmingly celebrated each year around the birthday of the president and 
during which he travels around the poor neighbourhoods, hospitals, prisons, etc. of Luanda and hands over gifts and 
charities personally.  
49 Particularly national music and sports personalities are extremely popular among the youth (which constitute by far the 
largest group of the voter force) and have been heavily promoted as the people’s representatives in these campaigns to 
propagate the government’s version of ‘National Unity and Reconciliation’ in the post-conflict period.  
50 The most prominent example is the ‘Criança Futuro’ (Children [and/are our] Future) campaign launched in 2004 with 
concerts and CD-releases with the participation of most of Angola’s young popular musicians and other public events in 
favour of orphaned children. The campaign has in 2005 been transferred into an association, which continuously launches 
new activities. Two days after the national football team qualified Angola for the Word Championships in 2006, and the 
people went crazy in national ecstasy, the football team was officially made patrons sponsor of the association. According to 
critics, very few children have benefited from the surplus.  
51 Lately ‘Causa Solidária’ ([For] Reasons of Solidarity), formed by a group of parliament members, is being promoted as a 
prolific NGO working in shared initiatives for the social development of the country.    
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local government structures.52 Lately, however, an NGO – O Nosso Soba (Our Soba) – has 
been formed, which is systematically approaching the sobas in rural areas in order to knit 
them more tightly in to the clientelist webs. The power ascribed to formalised associational 
life certainly seems to have been a most effective tool in the hands and discourse of the 
government as an important post-war strategy to maintain its control parameters. The basic 
strategy identified by Messiant in 2001 therefore, seems to have been ingeniously 
sophisticated to appropriate the present international discourse of civil society to the 
government’s own advantage in times of peace and the ‘consolidation of democracy’. It is 
perhaps most correct to refer, as more authors do, to the Angolan power holders as the 
‘regime’, as it is continuously difficult to distinguish the boarders between the government, 
the state, the MPLA and the higher spheres of society and the market.53 These blurred 
boarders match Chabal’s point about the state being as dependent on society as the other 
way around (see 2.1). Even if it could be in the state’s interests to improve its performance 
on the social scene (for reasons of legitimacy, if nothing else) it has to consider the interests 
of all the different links in its clientelist structures first in order to secure its own survival.   
In short, three and a half years after Savimbi’s death and the signing of the Luena 
Memorandum that finally brought the armed conflict to an end, nothing indicates that the 
regime is loosening its centralised grip on state power.54 President dos Santos is today 
repeatedly referred to as ‘The architect of Peace’ in the state media55, while he has still not 
appointed a date for national elections. While it was broadly expected that elections would 
be held in 2004 or early 200556, the prospects are now that it will perhaps not be until 2007. 
And even if the regime of fear and violent repression is largely over, and freedom of speech 
is much greater today than only a few years ago, the censorship does not hesitate to show 
its firmness and power: in 2004 a prominent and outspoken opposition leader was 
mysteriously killed.57 
                                                 
52 Robson and Roque, 2001, Aegisson, 2001.  
53 In the following I will apply the term government in my analysis and discussion when referring to the power elite, as this the 
term church members and ‘ordinary Angolans’ generally use when they talk about the power holders in their country.  
54 I have not been able to locate any detailed available analyses of the post-war situation in this perspective. 
55 Private media is still only accessible in Luanda. The private press has a quite limited circulation, but the radio stations, 
particularly the Catholic Radio Ecclesia, has a wide audience in all parts of Luanda. Continuous attempts at broadcasting the 
channel all over national territory has to date been obstructed by the government. The last 3-4 years have, however, showed 
a marked increase in the amount of critical journalism in the private media that the government’s censorship allows to pass.  
56 Grobbelaar, Mills, and Sidiropoulos, 2003, p. 42 
57 The killing of the PDP-ANA leader and member of parliament M’fulumpinga N’landu Victor on July 2nd 2004, was 
greatly regretted by the government and explained as an unfortunate attempt by bandits at stealing his car.  
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The Angolan state is indeed alive and well and in continuing control of the 
relations which keep the machinery going – despite the loss of the war as the great 
justification for the misery of the people.     
 
3.2 NGOs, international aid and universalisms  
While some independent civic organisations had existed prior to 1991, they had been 
virtually incapable of operating under the socialist state. With the transition to political 
pluralism following the peace agreement signed in Bicesse, and the arrival of international 
donor agencies with the new post-cold war agenda, the first generation of modern NGOs 
was conceived in Luanda. While many of these NGOs emerged as a result of the political 
opportunities now opening up to them, presenting potential and coherent objectives, many 
others arose as, or turned into, interest organisations as a direct consequence of the 
availability of foreign funds and the extreme lack of means of survival in the urban 
environment of Luanda. With the return to an ever more violent war following the 
elections in 1992, Luanda, already overpopulated and chaotic, experienced the most 
concentrated migration-flow ever from the provinces, resulting in an exponential growth in 
urban social deprivation and disintegration of the social fabric. The challenges to and the 
constraints upon these new NGOs were overwhelming even before they had been 
formalised.58  
The international community has generally been indisposed at channelling finances 
into a country which possesses great wealth – and consequently a regime which is largely 
independent of foreign aid and reluctant to co-operate on anything but its own terms. But 
the humanitarian imperative has enforced the need to supply international emergency 
assistance and the few local organisations that achieved funds from, or partnerships with, 
international institutions for the most part remained in the service delivery sector. The 
result was a situation where the Angolan state left all concerns for the population to the 
international aid agencies, occasionally taking the credit for their work.59 Today’s 
reconstruction phase does, to a considerable extent, function within a similar framework. 
Between 1994 and 1998, when prospects for peace were slightly more optimistic, a 
few donor agencies began to support the development and work of national NGOs with a 
view to strengthening civil society as an actor in the peace process and a promoter of 
                                                 
58 Comerford, 2005, Robson and Roque, 2001 
59 Christoplos, 1998 
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human rights. A few organisations have grown influential and the Forum of Angolan 
NGOs (FONGA) has also been an important actor and mouthpiece of the organisations as 
a whole.60 But the struggle for survival has all along remained intense and the scarce funds 
available have almost exclusively been in the form of short-term project funding. The 
majority of Angolan NGOs have to a high degree suffered the consequence of having to 
‘dance to the donors’ music’, as they often express it.61 They have seldom been able to 
specialise and maintain a line of continuity in their work, as they have had to adapt to 
donor’s changing agendas. Ibis’ civil society programme was, in part, designed to meet 
these constraints, and was apparently the second in Angola to embark on a direct 
organisational development strategy with its development objective of:  
building strategic and operational capacity of local partner NGOs to empower them 
to carry out advocacy and lobbying on behalf of the poor and marginalized men and 
women in the Angolan Society. (Ibis, 2001:17) 
 
This formulation epitomises international aid discourse and its universalist ambitions; such 
an objective is indeed commendable and applicable anywhere according to the prevailing 
expectations to third world civil societies. Local NGOs in Angola, like anywhere else, are 
understood as the actors who can make the idea of civil society happen.  
Yet, the increasing global professionalisation of the NGO field that these 
organisations have been born into, coupled with the bitter struggle for individual survival, 
have largely deprived them of the voluntary aspect, which has in turn distanced them from 
the population in general. Most people, who volunteer in an organisation, do so with the 
hope of being offered a salary in a not too distant future. The relatively poor performances 
and results of the NGOs in the face of the power monopoly of the government have 
certainly not added to their legitimacy as social actors in the eyes of the population. But I 
will hold that their lack of popular support is also, to a considerable extent, a result of their 
attempts to constitute themselves within a liberal democratic framework as demanded by 
donors and recommended by experts; a framework based on rationalities which make 
limited sense to people in a society where it is the rules of personal relations and favours, as 
well as rather vertical hierarchical structures, that count. In a close experience with a rather 
                                                 
60 Comerford, 2005, chapter 4 analyses how these organisations have had important says in the peace process and how they 
have exercised their influence.  
61 This observation and the following are primarily based on statements and information achieved from the 10 national 
Luanda-based NGOs which were partners (in the sense of apprentices) to an extensive civil society capacity building 
programme, PRONA, in Ibis (large Danish NGO) from 2001 – 2003. I entered the programme as an intern at the end of 
the process when the 10 organisations were becoming increasingly frustrated as it became clear that Ibis would not continue 
its partnership with them and few had any other donor contacts.  
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well-established and recognised Angolan NGO, I observed how the organisation began to 
disintegrate after a new leader had been elected by the members at a general assembly, until 
the dynamics and people that had held it together disappeared. The former leader and 
founder had been a strong personality with the capacity to gather and inspire people, and 
the organisation had been built up and grown into its prosperous condition, despite the 
fact that he had long abused and stolen from the organisation’s finances.62   
 The example shows how a ‘universal’ democratic imperative like elections can be 
alien and even destructive to associational life in settings like the Angolan, where e.g. 
notions of leadership and respect of authorities are rather different than in their Northern 
counterparts. Members and activists may be united by a common social concern, as 
presupposed by the ‘liberal individualist’ approach in Hann’s words, but this does not mean 
that e.g. horizontal power structures and other western, normative assumptions about 
voluntary associations and their inherent dynamics, are at stake. Another example, 
concerning the declining power of the sobas in urban environments, epitomises this point. 
Asked about the soba’s influence in organising collective action in an urban 
neighbourhood, an informant gave the following statement: “Years ago the whole 
neighbourhood cleaned up together. Now they don’t accept the idea. There’s too much 
democracy.”63 In this case, the notion of democracy becomes directly negative to the 
informant. The idea that people should make decisions in common, instead of obeying an 
authority, becomes akin to a state of anarchy where collective action is not possible because 
everyone is thinking of their own interests.       
 
3.3 Informal associational forms  
Attempts to meet and understand more traditional Angolan organisational forms and to 
adopt them into a civil society approach have been made. The Canadian NGO, 
Development Workshop (DW), which has worked with peace building activities, among 
other things, in Angola since 1982, has tried to foster a community based approach to civil 
society assistance in peri-urban areas of Angola.64 In the above quoted research in Luanda 
and two other Angolan cities, two DW consultants set out to trace forms of collective action 
and bonds of solidarity which have survived the migration flows from rural communities to 
                                                 
62 I worked directly in this organisation for one month at the end of my internship. See case description in appendix 2. 
63 Robson and Roque, 2001:152 
64 Aegisson, 2001  
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the peri-urban setting. Their hypothesis was that these values and structures may have been 
eroded by forced and uncontrolled migration, but can be reconstructed to form a base for 
civil society to arise from the grassroots. Unfortunately, their conclusions are not optimistic; 
the social fabric has been destroyed by the uncontrolled migration that has separated 
families and people from the same geographical areas. Bonds of trust and solidarity, as well 
as collective action, are virtually non-existent even among close neighbours. In order to 
proceed with a community-based approach, they argue, it is necessary to create social capital, as 
it will not be created on its own.65  
Even if the findings of the study are correct, it fails to grasp new or appropriated 
forms of collective action and solidarity that may have appeared in the new urban settings 
where people have had to construct their new lives. An example of such a new form is the 
micro trade unions termed Kixikilas, formed, for example, by a group of five women 
vendors at the markets. In these unions, the vendors gather all the surplus of a day or a 
week in poolfunds and take turns in using it for investments to improve their base of 
revenue. The system is obviously based on high rates of trust and has also been expanded 
to other spheres of economic activity in the urban setting, such as wage earners.66 Aid 
agencies have used these structures in income-generating activities like rotating funds in 
micro credit schemes, but apparently never in relation to civil society analysis; perhaps 
because of the economic and profit-oriented sphere they comprise or perhaps because of 
their informal status. Whether relevant to the civil society debate or not, the example 
shows that people act and organise in order to achieve a common goal, even when the goal 
is mere survival and every kwanza (the Angolan currency) is desperately needed. This, even 
in the tough environment of Luanda, where trust among neighbours is scarce and the most 
commonly cited proverb is “God for everyone, everyone for himself”.67      
  
3.4 Agency and the colonial legacy in Angola 
Hence, already engaged in the question of Angolan agency and collective action, it already 
seems clear that opinions on these matters are generally not optimistic. The number of 
events or occasions of popular manifestations or grassroots activities in Angola’s 
                                                 
65 Robson and Roque, 2001:160 – 170. According to the study, the churches constitute an exception to this, but even so, do 
not offer potential to the community approach. I will return to this point below.  
66 Information acquired and confirmed from various private statements and sources.  
67 ”Deus para todos, cada um por si” 
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independent history is arguably limited, which is commonly and naturally explained by the 
aggressive war environment.  
In analysing popular agency in Angola, however, it should not be underestimated 
that the country’s colonial legacy differs significantly from that of other African countries. 
The Portuguese fascist dictatorship of Salazar, which lasted for half a century and was the 
longest of the European totalitarian regimes, not only controlled its African colonies with 
highly repressive means; it also depended economically on the colonies to an extent that 
made the process of decolonisation an extremely violent and lengthy war between interests 
with no openings for negotiations. When the wave of decolonisation swept over Africa in 
the early 1960's, and the European democratic powers started to prepare their colonies for 
independence, the Portuguese only enforced their grip on the colonies, among which 
Angola was the last to gain independence; more as a result of the collapse of the dictatorship 
in Portugal than as a military victory. The colonial policies applied by the Portuguese had 
further advanced the creation of deep divisions among the population, as I have analysed 
elsewhere.68 These conditions created no room for the development of democratic 
institutions or political culture, nor did they allow for the civil population to engage in any 
kind of public or social action. The nationalist movements that were left in control of the 
country at independence were, as a consequence of the intense resistance war, heavily 
militarised. They were divided ideologically about national identity, and were already 
strategic tools in the hands of the cold-war superpowers. Ironically, the new socialist regime 
of the MPLA-government seemed to reproduce the fascist mechanisms of repression in its 
fight against the UNITA rebels and also to repress factions within its own ranks.69 As I have 
argued elsewhere, the legacy from the colonial regime was probably an important factor in 
the reproduction of binary hostilities between the combatants in the Angolan civil wars, 
even if it has been appropriated and abused by the warlords to legitimise their hegemonic 
projects. This legacy and subsequently these diverging nationalist projects have seemingly 
kept the civil population in a position as passive victims ever since independence.70 The 
specific Portuguese colonial legacy should not, however, be overestimated either.71 The way 
in which Maina’s general observations on the African state in general (see 2.1) fit the 
Angolan context provides further evidence of this. Furthermore, such an emphasis adds to a 
                                                 
68 M. Hansen, 2003. See also Chabal, 2002.  
69 E.g. Birmingham 2002, Chabal, 2002.  
70 M. Hansen, 2003. I will elaborate on these results in the next chapter.  
71 Chabal, 2002:34. 
 39 
general inclination among scholars to ignore pre-colonial cultural influences (other than 
ethnic rivalries) in the post-colonial African conflicts. Heywood (1998) analyses how 
Savimbi’s political ideology and strong means of domination of the rural population, draw 
on pre-colonial features and discourses.72    
Colonial as well as post-colonial wars, brutal repression, and systematic persecutions 
have, as noted above, created a very profound culture of fear within the Angolan civil 
population.73 Particularly after the coup attempt in 1977 by a military faction of the MPLA, 
the regime tolerated no signs of opposition. In the UNITA-controlled countryside the 
scenario was the same. The premise of ‘Either you are with us or you are against us’ has 
guided both sides in the civil wars, and until the elections in 1992, intense manipulation 
largely succeeded in dividing the population along these lines. The results of the elections 
showed a clean divide between the cities and the countryside.74 After 1992, however, when 
the war moved to Luanda and further flows of war-displaced people followed, it became 
increasingly obvious to the population that the war was being kept alive solely by ambitions 
of wealth and power, and even more violent means of repression were taken into practice.75 
Even though people recognise that the environment has changed considerably with the 
peace agreement in 2002, the culture of fear does not easily loosen its grip.  
Finally, the idea of civil society in Angola should perhaps primarily be measured vis-
à-vis the militarised society.76 For decades, young men have had to choose one of the two 
armies and engage in the brutal repression of the population, or they have had to flee the 
country. Viewed from this perspective, it becomes all the more clear why people have been, 
and continue to be, afraid to engage in activities affiliated with civil society. This is also 
evident on a linguistic level: in a context of war, the word civil is naturally first and foremost 
understood as contrasted to the military forces.   
                                                 
72 Heywood, 1998 
73 Angolans are generally very critical and very aware that their misery can be blamed on the political regime and the two 
parts in the civil war. But whenever asked what they, the people, can do about it, they still seem resigned and often use 
words like “hopeless”, “it is too dangerous” etc. despite the well-recognised fact that the war is over. Also Messiant, 
2001:291 and Comerford, 2005 note how creating and maintaining fear in the population has been, and to some extent 
continues to be, a most powerful means of control exercised by the Angolan regime as mentioned above.   
74 Birmingham, 2002:172 
75 The literature on resent Angolan history does not mention this change in the civil population’s awareness about the 
motivation of the conflict and the struggle for power. However, it is clear when talking to the Angolans (see also note 73), 
that 1992 represents a considerable shift in their understanding of the conflict, and this is an important perspective to the 
question of popular agency.  
76 This perspective was presented to me by the Bishop of the Methodist Church in Luanda, Reverend Gaspar, in an informal 
interview I conducted with him (see appendix 1). 
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Yet, a few scholars adopt a more nuanced approach to the study of Angolan agency. 
Comerford (2004 and 2005) has analysed public discourses or peace narratives, as he terms 
his study objects, showing how the civic population in different public spaces have 
constructed their own responses to the seemingly hopeless conflict. Even if the conflict was 
resolved militarily, the research which, as the author points out, is probably the first detailed 
attempt to apply a perspective from below, provides evidence of the active responses and 
increasing collaboration across spheres and institutions of the people of Angola towards the 
formation of the peace movement.  
Christoplos (1998) applies a more aid-related perspective and directs a harsh 
critique towards ‘developmentalism’ and its dogmas: 
Exasperation is the emotion which overwhelms development planners in Angola. 
Their traditional goal of a Weberian ideal-type bureaucracy is so obviously off the 
short and mid-term agenda that anomie takes over. A cloud of thinly veiled doubts 
about developmentalism engulfs Luanda. (Christoplos, 1998:10)  
 
Instead, he advocates a highly actor-oriented approach. While he affirms that social capital 
appears to be low in Angola, he shows how the term ‘social energy’ tells us more about the 
collective action and day-to-day survival in the Angolan emergency environment. The 
female vendors’ kixikilas seem to be a good example of such social energy. Christoplos 
examines how local actors in emergency assistance services, financed by foreign 
institutions, create autonomous ‘schemes’ in order to work as brokers in the war 
environment and he borrows an Angolan concept to exemplify this: “In Angola, the term 
esquema refers to the ingenious, creative and often devious ‘schemes’ individuals are forced 
to find to survive and, in the case of a few, to enrich themselves”.77 The negative 
perceptions of such schemes by developmentalism, Christoplos argues, stems from the 
“terrifying private immorality” of the African warlords which:  
… is not an excuse to ignore the perspectives of those who have their morals intact. 
One way to do this is by realising that a health post or a Red Cross branch is not a 
mere project implementation unit. It is a group of moral individuals with an esquema 
for peace. It is these sorts of individuals, and the institutions in which they run their 
esquemas, which must lead Angola out of its mess if anyone is to do it.78    
 
Even though Christoplos’ perspective is concerned with actors in complex emergencies, he 
also makes a link to the civil society debate. A developmentalist assumption, he argues, is 
that civil society is to guarantee equilibrium at the local level through the robustness of the 
                                                 
77 Christoplos, 1998, p. 18, quoting Minter, B.: From War to Peace in Angola: Increasing chances of Success. Review of 
African Political Economy 23(6-7), 1996   
78 Christoplos, 1998:18 
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social fabric. Yet, he argues (with Tendler) “the strength of civil society lies not in its 
equilibrium, but in ‘dynamic adhocracy’ (…) This is the ability to pull together human and 
material resources in ephemeral organisations when confronting crisis.”79    
Both Comerford’s and Christoplos’ perspectives point to the importance of 
understanding Angolan agency as processes going on under the surface, so to speak.80 This 
is perhaps not surprising, considering how it has been highly hazardous business to raise a 
critical voice at literally any point in Angola's history for just about the last century. Some 
actors may consciously have applied ‘ingenious and devious esquemas’, as can be seen in e.g. 
nationalist literary discourse during the struggle for independence and later in hidden or 
disguised system-critical literature and music lyrics.81 Others – ordinary people – have more 
likely developed their esquemas of survival through more unconscious processes; processes 
which, as my case aims to exemplify, have enabled people to act – together – in ways which 
are, or may become, instrumental in creating social change in post-war Angola. As 
mentioned, the churches in Angola may be fruitful places to explore in the search for 
ordinary Angolans’ resources and agency.   
 
3.5 Churches and religious actors in civil society 
In Angola, there has been a considerable degree of recognition on the part of donors and aid 
agencies working in the country, of the importance of religious actors to social processes. A 
large number of the Angolan NGOs are faith-based and the importance of the church 
alliances in the peace movement has also been recognised and valued. Faith-based NGOs 
have enjoyed a degree of the scarce funding available82, but the churches have found it 
difficult to combine their values and ways of functioning with the changing demands of the 
donors. This has largely prevented them from receiving financial aid for community projects 
etc., except for aid coming from ‘traditional partners’, i.e. church based donor institutions.83         
                                                 
79 Ibid. 
80 I will return to these approaches in the final discussion of my results in chapter 7.  
81 Peres, 1997:8-10 
82 In the 10 partner organisations to Ibis’ civil society programme, 3 were faith based with the word ‘Christian’ as a part of 
their name. It was, however, not clear at all to what extent this base affected their actual programmes, principles, and 
performances. Nothing in Ibis’ programme paid attention to this dimension and it was never mentioned. Consequently, the 
members of these NGOs hardly ever articulated anything related to their religious base.   
83 This preoccupation was articulated by Bishop Gaspar of the Methodist Church in Luanda in an informal interview. The 
Bishop lamented how earlier attempts at cooperating with international donor agencies had failed due to the difficulties of 
combining perspectives and expectations; many meetings were held and the potential donor would talk and talk and collect 
information from the church, as he put it, only to eventually engage with other partners, who were found more suited to 
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There are no clear-cut answers to whether some or all of the Angolan churches are 
considered, or consider themselves, as full-born members of civil society. But the attention 
given to (and taken by) churches and religious institutions in relation to the growing 
preoccupation with the strengthening of civil society, and of course the great popular 
support they possess, have naturally urged the Angolan government to deepen its 
endeavours to co-opt these actors in the neatly controlled networks it calls civil society. The 
first half of 2005 therefore, exposed Angolans to a television campaign which praised the 
participation of churches, religious actors, and their popular forces in the achievement of 
peace and ingeniously attached this praise to its modernist discourse of national 
reconciliation. At the same time, general secretary of the Inter-Ecclesial Committee for 
Peace in Angola84, Daniel Ntoni Nzinga was suggested as the ideal person to chair the 
National Electoral Commission that is to ensure free and fair elections.85   
 
There is a variety of reasons why the churches of Angola enjoy overwhelming popular 
support and attendance. Despite suggestions of outlawing the churches when the MPLA 
adopted its marxist-leninist ideology, the old historical churches remained the only legal 
institutions independent of the government. They were largely ignored by the government, 
which calculated that they would vanish over time.86 This was obviously far from being the 
case, and during the years of socialist control the churches were the only public spaces 
accessible to the population and where public discourse and reflection occurred.87  
The quality of the churches as public spaces served, however, an even more 
important role to the rapidly growing population of Luanda, pieced together by all the 
different peoples of the Angolan territory. As mentioned above, a careful study revealed 
how spontaneous and uncontrolled migration to the capital created an urban structure 
where families and people from the same areas became dispersed all over the city, which 
largely destroyed traditional forms of social organisation and values based on trust and 
solidarity. The extreme scarcity of means of survival added to an urban culture of ‘everyone 
for himself’.88 In this environment the churches became the only spaces where moral values 
                                                                                                                                                                  
work exactly with the kind of activity their particular funds were aimed at. One day it would be water, another human rights, 
then HIV-AIDS, gender and so on. The Bishop referred to these frequently changing foci as ‘fashion themes’. 
84 COIEPA, see description on the next pages. 
85 Angolense Semenário (private newspaper), 7.-14.5.2005 
86 Henderson, 1990:402 
87 Comerford, 2005:23 and 129 
88 Robson and Roque, 2001 
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were nurtured and where new bonds of solidarity and human interdependency were 
formed to provide the only systems of social security available to the population. 
All this leads us to conclude that the level of social capital is high inside churches. 
There is a high level of structural social capital (rules and established procedures) and 
a high level of cognitive social capital (norms, values, beliefs and trust) and this is 
reflected in the attitudes of solidarity and cooperative behaviour of members. In a 
context where solidarity inside communities is weakened and in which other 
institutions (particularly the institutions of the State) that should offer collective 
spaces and services in substitution for community solidarity (employment, health and 
education services, assistance to the old and to children) do not exist or are so 
degraded and corrupt that they cannot be trusted, the churches have become the only 
functioning collective space. (Robson and Roque, 2001:140)  
 
In these spaces, ordinary people have gathered to engage in numerous social and collective 
activities, in spite of the culture of fear that prevails, and they probably best represent a 
collective expression of the ‘social energy’ and esquemas traced by Christoplos. Even if some 
churches have gathered people from particular areas and ethnic affiliations, others have 
brought people together across such boundaries. As expressed by one of the protagonists on 
civil society in Angola: “A large number of churches, sects and other forms of religious 
organisations are rallying the energies of the people right across the social strata.”89         
 Even so, Robson and Roque do not find that the churches represent a resource for 
fostering collective action at the community level because they are divided by rivalries in 
their quest for members and are constructed on vertical social relationships. The social 
capital they possess, it is argued, is of a ‘bonding’ and not a ‘bridging’ character, which 
impedes collaboration between the churches. In general, solidarity bonds are so weak that 
“social capital will not be created on its own: specific action to this end will be needed.”90 I 
shall contest these viewpoints during my analysis and discussion, but first I will argue that 
the lack of collaboration between churches was already changing considerably and visibly 
prior to the investigation of Robson and Roque.   
The three main Protestant churches in Angola are widely known to have been the 
birthing places of the three main nationalist parties.91 Resentment against the Catholic 
Church for its close collaboration with the colonial state was, however, revised after 1991, 
                                                 
89 Country Report: Angola, 2001:35. From an interview with Fernando Pacheco, who was one of the founders of the 
perhaps most prominent Angolan NGO, ADRA (Action for the Rural Development of Angola) and has been a leading 
figure of the organisation and of Angolan civil society/NGO field since. 
90 Robson and Roque, 2001:141/167. The argument draws on Putnam’s works, which argues that bonding social capital 
creates linkages between people in a group and bridging social capital allows linkages among groups and organisations.    
91 The Methodist, the Baptist, and the Congregationalist churches ‘nursing’ respectively the MPLA, the FNLA, and the 
UNITA. Comerford, 2005:22  
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when the government fostered alliances with the Catholic Church, approving of its 
authoritarian hierarchy.92 The Catholic Church is today considered the most important 
religious partner to the government. Rivalries rooted in such tensions had long prevented 
the churches from standing together when finally, in 1998, the ever more urgent need for a 
shared claim for peace brought the churches together to form the Inter-Ecclesial 
Committee for Peace in Angola (COIEPA), formalised in 2000. But COIEPA further saw 
the need for co-operation with other civil society actors in the appeal for peace, and in 
2001 COIEPA co-ordinated the foundation of a Rede de Paz – The Peace Network, an 
alliance of 50 civic, religious and secular organisations, which campaigned heavily for peace 
and to date keep working actively in the effort to consolidate peace.93  
Even if these changes are occurring primarily at the macro level, there is no reason 
to assume that rivalries in community contexts will remain the same perpetually. In his 
fieldwork concerning community responses in the peace process, Comerford was surprised 
to find that all the significant community organisations were associated with a church.94 His 
analysis underlines the role of local churches as ‘places of interpretation’ and ‘centres of 
civic education’, a role that “guides individuals and communities to a vision of a better 
Angola that seeks a strengthening of the fabric of society based on civic and family 
values”95    
 
                                                 
92 Birmingham, 2002:175-176 
93 COIEPA understands peace as a condition when all people are living in harmony and justice, and is therefore not 
achieved simply with the ‘silence of the arms’ – o calar das armas. Furthermore, the continuing conflict about the oil-rich 
province of Cabinda, where an enclave is struggling for a breakaway, preoccupies COIEPA and impedes peace from 
consolidating. COIEPA’s general secretary Daniel Ntoni Nzinga explained this to me in an informal interview (see appendix 
1). Similar information is available in an interview at www.all.africa.com (Ofeibea Quist-Arcton, 2005) and in COIEPA/ 
FES, 2002. COIEPA was founded by the Protestant alliances CICA (Council of Christian Churches in Angola) and AEA 
(Angolan Evangelic Alliance) and the Catholic CEAST (Episcopal Conference of Angola and São Tomé). COIEPA’s efforts 
have been honoured internationally with the awarding of the EU’s Zakarov human rights prize to its president, Bishop 
Zacarias Kamwhenho, in 2001. COIEPA was instrumental in forming The Peace Network, which laid the ground for an 
actual peace movement, as analysed in depth by Comerford (2005). Also Birmingham reckons the power of the alliance in 
its promotion of the most outspoken claim for peace ever, which brought the people to the streets to demonstrate and 
“regardless of the wrath of dos Santos and his Government (...) had finally broken the silence of fear and launched an open 
public debate about Angola’s future.” (Birmingham, 2002:176)   
94 Comerford distinguishes community based organisations from NGOs by underlining that community based organisations 
generally have deeper roots within Angolan society and little or no access to international donor assistance. Comerford, 
2005:166 
95 Comerford, 2005:69 
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3.6 Sub-conclusion 
The state in Angola, or rather the regime that occupies state power, is based on the 
complete control of the country’s oil resources and dense clientelist networks. An effective 
politics of co-optation or neutralisation of independent forces, combined with the concrete 
creation of popular movements and NGOs from within the regime, has enabled the regime 
to adopt and manipulate international civil society discourse for its own purposes. In this 
environment, many ‘real’ NGOs have had a hard time getting by. Even those who have 
received funds and training have found it difficult to be heard and to maintain donor 
contacts, and while struggling to live up to demands and expectations of professionalism, 
they sometimes seem to have lost their popular base of support along the way. 
With a view to a highly repressive colonial regime, substituted by a ditto socialist 
state, constant brutal wars, and the cultivation of a ‘culture of fear’, it is explicable that 
limited popular agency and organisation seem to have taken place. If looking underneath 
the surface, however, ordinary people indeed seem to come up with responses to their 
difficult situations. For this purpose, the churches have served an important role; during 
the socialist period they were the only public spaces independent of the state, and 
furthermore, they seem to have been the only places to offer migrants from rural areas a 
local community in the city where relations of trust, social networks and moral values exist. 
Even if the many different churches in Luanda have traditionally had their rivalries, the 
latter years of the military conflict witnessed new and powerful inter-ecclesiastic co-
operation that even managed to set up an alliance with other civil society actors in the 
Peace Network. 
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4: Analytical framework and field methodology 
 
The first part of this chapter gives an account of the conceptual framework I use for 
analysing my field study in an actor-oriented perspective and for its relevance to the above 
discussion. The second part outlines the methodological choices concerning the field study.     
 
4.1 Conceptual framework 
4.1.1 Agency 
My use of the concept of agency refers broadly to the ability of different actors or groups of 
actors to perform actions, which may have consequences on different levels such as private, 
public, local, national, political, cognitive, spiritual, etc. But in order to analyse how agency 
works and when it is at stake, I draw on post-colonial theorist Bill Ashcroft’s conceptual 
framework. In post-colonial studies, the issue of post-colonial subjects’ ability to act 
independently or despite their colonial legacy has long been disputed. As the above chapters 
outline, the poor tribute paid to African agency in international aid and in civil society 
discourse today, can be seen as closely connected to Africa’s recent decolonisation. The still 
prevailing picture of the African “object as incapable of making history as of 
comprehending it”, in Mamdani’s words (see 2.4), which may have legitimised donor 
policies’ emphasis on capacity building of local actors, resembles the colonial picture of the 
Africans as incapable and passive objects in need of someone to control and civilise them. 
Now the legacy from the colonial project has just become a part of the problem to be solved 
instead of the solution; but the Africans are still considered unable to solve it.96 Like 
Mamdani, Ashcroft points to the constructed and misleading nature of this picture. 
Ashcroft’s theory is based on an optimistic notion of post-colonial subjects’ abilities 
for agency. The discussion about agency in post-colonial studies is based on Said’s 
Orientalism about how European colonisers have constructed the other, the binary opposition 
between ‘them’ and ‘us’, which to a large degree has contributed to legitimising imperialistic 
                                                 
96 E.g. Rasmus Hylleberg argues in an article in the Danish newspaper Politiken 20.8.2005 that the only way forward for 
Africa is a regular administrative re-colonisation (Holm, 2005). In a comment in Politiken 12.9.2005 I oppose this stance 
and suggest that a colonial mentality is still influencing much present development work and prevents partnerships between 
‘North and South’ from being equal constellations drawing on the knowledge and expertise of both partners, as they ideally 
seek to be. (M. Hansen, 2005)  
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projects.97 The discussion has drawn on, and to some degree contested, post-structuralist 
theories of subjectivity. Ashcroft opposes Althusser’s ideas of ideology, while he to some 
degree draws on Foucauldian discourse theory; a perspective particularly represented by 
Homi Bhabha and Gayatri Spivak in the post-colonial debate.98 Ashcroft’s view on 
discourses differs significantly from the Foucauldian school in regard to his strong emphasis 
on the abilities of agency that individuals, and in continuation hereof also societies, possess. 
While Foucauldians understand subject positions as thoroughly constructed and post-
colonial subjects as significantly limited in their capacity to act freely, Ashcroft holds that 
subjects possess a much greater autonomy and capacity to oppose repressive structures, 
which he substantiates in his analysis of resistance. Moreover, he holds that post-colonial 
subjects possess the capacity to appropriate and transform colonial structures and discourses 
to their own advantage and thus overcome determining relations of power that the colonial 
discourse would otherwise subject them to.99 This capacity to transform becomes 
instrumental in the post-colonial society as a whole and must be understood as the alteration 
of discourses, perspectives, life patterns, etc.  
 Central to Ashcroft’s theoretical framework is his rejection of a simple binary 
understanding of resistance. When a subject yields resistance against a concrete oppressor, he 
ends up reproducing his own position as the oppressed in the relationship, as the other in 
colonial discourse. By responding to colonial discourse with an anti-colonial discourse, by 
rendering counterforce, the binary myth is reinforced:   
The most tenacious aspect of colonial control has been its capacity to bind the 
colonized into a binary myth. Underlying all colonial discourse is a binary of 
colonizer/colonized, civilized/uncivilized, white/black […] The idea that 
’counterforce’ is the best response to the colonialist myth of force […] binds the 
colonized into the myth. This has often implicated colonized groups and individuals in 
a strategy of resistance which has been unable to resist absorption into the myth of 
power, whatever the outcome of their political opposition. (Ashcroft, 2001:21) 
 
The essential quality of resistance thus becomes the capacity to avoid absorption into the 
myth; the capacity to generate change which is not simply the opposite of the prevailing 
state of affairs, but which advances autonomous suggestions of an interpretation of the 
world and the composition of a society. Such a form of resistance is thus not representative 
of revolutionary movements and political opposition. Ashcroft calls it subtle resistance and 
                                                 
97 Ashcroft, 2001:38, 2000:2, Ashcroft, Griffiths, and Tiffin, 2000:167-173 
98 Ashcroft, Griffiths, and Tiffin, 2000:8 
99 Ashcroft, 2001:35 - 36 
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ascribes it to ”ordinary people” with their ”pragmatic and mundane array of living strategies, 
to which imperial culture has no answer.”100  
 Colonial subjects’ capacity for agency becomes possible through their cultural capital, 
which is understood, with reference to Bourdieu, as an accumulated base of personal 
experiences from all the cultural contexts the subject has engaged in, such as family, school 
and different spheres of society. Hence, cultural capital is constantly accumulated, revised, 
and expanded during life when subjects consume and appropriate experiences, influences, 
etc. with and to the already existing base of cultural capital. Cultural capital therefore 
contrasts Robson and Roque’s notion of social capital, which disappears when not ‘used’ 
and cannot be reconstructed by subjects themselves (see 3.3).  
With Ashcroft’s understanding of cultural capital, it becomes clear how the somewhat 
passive notion of subtle resistance becomes an active appropriation of discourses seeking to 
control and dominate subjects. Ashcroft denotes this capacity for positive transformation 
and appropriation of, among others, colonial discourse as interpolation: 
This term ’interpolation’ ironically reverses Althusser’s concept of ’interpellation’ by 
ascribing to the colonial subject and, consequently to the colonial society, a capacity 
for agency which is effected within relationships that are radically unequal. 
Interpolation recast our perception of the trajectory of power operating in 
colonization. Rather than being swallowed up by the hegemony of empire, the 
apparently dominated culture and the ’interpellated’ subjects within it, are quite able to 
interpolate the various modes of imperial discourse to use it for different purposes, to 
counter its effects by transforming them. (Ashcroft, 2001:14) 
 
The quote demonstrates how Ashcroft, in the face of interpolation, ascribes surprisingly 
little weight to power structures as determining the agency of subjects in comparison to 
other discourse-theoretical approaches. Exactly because agency is possible ”within 
relationships that are radically unequal”, Ashcroft can advance this rather unorthodox view 
on power, which is closely tied to subtle resistance and cultural capital. This perspective is 
elaborated with the determining power-knowledge relation that has been paramount in some of 
Foucault’s works. The challenge for the Africans, is according to Ashcroft, to construct ”an 
autonomous framework of knowledge”, through which their access to power becomes real. 
Interpolation is the key to solving this problem.101 
In my study on the construction of Angolan national identity, I used Ashcroft’s 
conceptual framework to analyse how the negatively formulated nationalist resistance against 
the colonial repressors was reproduced in the civil war as a result of the absorption of the 
                                                 
100 Ashcroft, 2001:20 
101 Ashcroft, 2000:1-5  
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combatants into the binary myth. It seemed that subtle resistance had had little or no effect 
and that popular agency consequently had been limited to almost nothing because 
discourses of national identity seemed to mirror political discourses to a considerable 
extent.102 Looking at the churches and people’s religious identities, however, this picture 
looks slightly different. A strong religious identity may reject party political ideological 
interpretations and allow agency to unfold from within the religious worldview.  
If agency exists within ordinary people and enables them to recast trajectories of 
power and repression through subtle resistance, how do these capacities manifest concretely 
to influence social change? Ashcroft gives no explicit suggestions, except for his emphasis 
on post-colonial literature as a key feature and a starting point. His analyses are based on a 
study of post-colonial literary writers that have interpolated colonial discourse primarily 
through their appropriation of the colonial languages. Literary interpolation will, he argues, 
be transferred to the social level through allegorical means, but he gives no examples of how 
this transfer can be seen as concrete social agency. The connection in practice seems rather 
vague. But what about ‘actual’ ordinary people’s responses? The participation in some form 
of collective action would seem like a relevant suggestion.  
 
4.1.2 Collective action  
Collective action can refer to a wide range of very different phenomena as distinct as 
fashions, panics, sports events, rock concerts, acts of terrorism, political, social, and cultural 
group activities, etc.  A first distinction which is relevant to draw when using the concept in 
relation to agency, is that it should comprise a group of people acting consciously as a 
collective for some end; an entity which perceives of itself as a collective actor. This kind of 
collective action is often analysed in relation to social movements, which can be 
conceptualised as a group aimed at changing some kind of perceived social injustice and 
challenging an existing system in some form.103 In relation to agency as a result of subtle 
resistance, these groups or movements are, however, not the main groups of interest. On 
                                                 
102 M. Hansen, 2003. In the study, I examine national identity through an analysis of political and literary discourses in the 
post-colonial Angola through Ashcroft’s conceptual framework and conclude that the concept of the binary myth is very 
relevant in the context. Subtle resistance and interpolation may have been taking place in literary discourse, but have been 
unable to challenge the hegemonic position of the binary hostilities holding the country in conflict. This is likely to be the 
case because literary discourse has been heavily politicised. Yet, I criticise the theory for providing quite weak links on the 
connection between literary and linguistic forms of interpolation and actual social transformation. But the concepts do open 
a path for analysing agency in other discourses and spheres of Angolan society.  
103 Anker, 2000:20-23. Many distinct views and definitions of social movements are of course in dispute, but in relation to 
development studies, I believe that it is fair to say that such movements have received most attention as agents of change.  
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the contrary, they are formed in opposition rather than positively proposing or defending a 
given set of values, a way of life, etc.  
Amadiume (1995) uses the concept of ‘anti-power movements’ to analyse a set of 
less investigated movements which, rather than “seeking to control the state or seeking 
effective citizenship in a state system; (…) simply seek to defend and maintain their 
autonomy.”104 Amadiume shows how indigenous women’s movements in Africa are 
examples of such ‘anti-power movements’. In her analysis the struggle of the women’s 
movements largely becomes a defence of rights to preserve ones culture and traditional ways 
of organising. This form of resistance may not be particularly ‘subtle’, according to 
Ashcroft’s definition. Yet, the defence of autonomy is an important point in relation to the 
churches in Luanda, which to some degree seem to substitute, to their members, rather than 
challenge, a societal structure and a state, which have no legitimacy as social regulatory 
systems, as I will argue.  
 Yet, the form of collective action I shall emphasise in relation to the church is one 
that takes a further concrete shape than that of defending ones autonomy. The kind of 
collective action I am interested in is one which is performed by groups or movements as a 
productive action out of rationalities coming from an inner logic or worldview, which is exactly 
possible because the group’s autonomy is more or less intact. It is a concrete action or piece 
of work that people decide to participate in with the expectation of achieving some kind of 
benefit on a personal, altruistic or societal level, or perhaps at all of them; actions aimed at 
producing some concrete output that in the end may enhance social change on various 
levels; actions that allow peoples’ agency to unfold on more concrete terms.       
 
4.2 Field methodology 
“Qualitative research is a field of inquiry in its own right. It crosscuts disciplines, fields, and 
subject matters.”105 Methods applied for field studies depend largely on the particular study, its 
goals, circumstances, and the researcher’s subjective experiences and reflections. Even though a 
variety of rules and guidelines for conducting good field studies can be identified in order to 
increase the validity of the studies, the tendency is more and more that the researcher uses 
himself as a tool and constructs his methods along with the process of the research in order to 
                                                 
104 Amadiume, 1995:35 
105 Denzin and Lincoln, 2003:3 
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counter the specific complexities of the case.106 In the following, I will clarify how I planned and 
conducted my field study and made my methodological choices in the process.    
 
4.2.1 Selection of case 
After having traced the churches as the field I wanted to investigate for ‘existing resources’ 
in Luanda, I defined the specific case I wanted to work with as a church initiative of collective 
action for social change. It should be a church that was undertaking a type of activity that 
included a concrete objective, in which church members volunteered to participate. What 
kind of initiative or activity was undertaken was less important to my focus.  
I contacted COIEPA in order to obtain information on, and contact to, possible 
initiatives and I was warmly received. Over a period of approximately four weeks I was 
referred on to different people, responsible at different levels, always kind but very busy, 
until I finally managed to meet up with a community group working with human rights in a 
parish of the Methodist church, which is very influential in Angola. However, the group 
did not have any particular activities in the nearest future. Further, the group functioned 
under a larger human rights entity in the church, which described itself as a kind of NGO 
and underlined the fact that it needed funding; an aspect I was seeking to avoid by turning 
to the churches.107 Finally, the Methodist church in Angola is known for having close ties 
to the MPLA, a fact the Bishop was rather explicit about in a conversation I had with him. 
I was not interested in having to relate my investigation particularly to this dimension.  
During the same period, I had visited the Church of Our Lord Jesus Christ in the 
World108 with my Angolan mother-in-law, who is a devotee of the church; both out of my 
new interest in the Angolan churches and out of interest and respect for my family-in-law. 
The church is an extensive Angolan founded church with its huge headquarters in Luanda. 
Here I was warmly received, and the impressive school construction project that the 
church is currently undertaking with the participation of all church members was proudly 
presented to me. First, I had immediately rejected the thought of working with my family-
in-law’s church due to standard considerations on separating professional and private 
spheres. But I soon saw some very clear advantages, which made me reconsider the 
                                                 
106 Denzin and Lincoln, 2003:3-11 and 29-30 
107 Faith based and church related organisations undoubtedly enjoy some of the dynamics and popular support that secular 
NGO’s may be missing, but the fact that they are organisations with more or less specific organisational objectives, makes 
people join them for more specific reasons than that of ‘simple faith’ and hence exclude a considerable number of people.    
108 Igreja do Nosso Senhor Jesus Cristo no Mundo, abbreviated I.N.S.J.C.M., which I will apply in the following. 
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situation. First, the initiative was embracing all church members instead of only a small 
group, which meant that there was a solid core of popular support and an inclusiveness 
that I found important for my purpose. Secondly, the activities were proceeding on a daily 
basis, which meant that the project was an integral part of the participant’s daily lives and 
practices and further, it made it easy for me to work continually with them. Finally, the 
initiative of constructing a school in relation to e.g. protecting human rights from being 
violated (primarily by the state) seemed to constitute a more ‘neutral’ field, which would 
not expose participants to the conscious choice of opposing some perceived injustice.  
 
4.2.2 Mixing private and professional spheres 
In relation to the problem of mixing personal relations with my field of investigation, the 
consequences seemed to be relatively surmountable, as my mother-in-law was not 
participating in the construction work due to weak health, and the church is so big that few 
members actually know her and the rest of the family. They are more active in their local 
parish church and not in the headquarters, where the school construction is taking place. 
On the contrary, the people I met in the church seemed to be all the more open towards 
me and consider me family, when they learned that I had been brought there by my family-
in-law. 109 This obviously also meant that I became a target of heavy missionary pressure; to 
many people it was obvious that God’s will had sent me there, and many also argued that I 
was chosen to bring the church to Denmark. Depending on the contact and the level of 
understanding that I felt I was met with, I would explain my purpose of being there more 
or less thoroughly. Some would accept and understand; to others it would make little sense.  
During the process, I decided to adapt to the most important rules of the church, 
so as to not wear trousers and wear a scarf at church service to show my respect, because 
many people recommended it to me, even though it was not expected from visitors. They 
highly appreciated this gesture, but it also caused some confusion because some people 
thought that I had converted. But they all said that it would take the necessary time for me 
to convert and that eventually, it would happen when I was ready, so in the end the 
                                                 
109 My husband was brought up within the church, and has withdrawn from it in his adult life; not as a direct rejection of the 
church, but rather as an expression of a change of interests. He is now a moderate Christian, with no specific church, like 
myself. He is today critical of some aspects of the I.N.S.J.C.M, most of which I myself would have questioned. It would be 
dubious to claim that I have not been influenced by his opinions to some degree, but I believe that his critical insider 
knowledge has also provided me with some valuable perspectives. I have, however, mostly consulted him with practical 
questions of clarification, and I have taken the precaution of seeking other sources of verification whenever he provided me 
with information that was relevant to my investigation.    
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pressure always became moderate and I never faced any unpleasant demands or 
expectations. In sum, despite pressure and some long and sometimes useless explanations, 
I found that my private relation to the church was more advantageous than it was 
problematic; I believe that the intense openness, trust, and familiarity, as well as the 
thorough explanations to help me to understand, would not have been the same had I 
presented myself as a Danish researcher investigating resources in Angolan civil society.  
 
4.2.3 Timeframe  
I first began visiting the church in April 2005, about three weeks before I began to work 
with it on a daily basis. I had participated in three church services, among which one was a 
special visit to a sacred place where the church’s prophet had a historical meeting with God 
in 1935. I had already acquired a range of information and contacts during these visits. I 
asked permission to carry out my study and it was given without formalities and with much 
appreciation.110 From then on, I worked with the church on a daily basis, Monday to 
Sunday (Construction activities from Monday to Saturday and church service on Sundays) 
during a period of four weeks. Some days I worked with them the whole day and others 
only half a day. Ideally, the period should perhaps have been a few weeks longer, but for 
practical reasons it became impossible to prolong my stay. On the other hand, toward the 
end of my stay a few church members began expressing the view that they felt that it was 
about time that I took the full step and converted. Even though I explained myself and was 
always defended by other members against this view, it did not seem to convince them.111 
 
4.2.4 Data collection 
I decided to primarily collect my data through participant observation in the construction 
activities, reunions, and church services and through conversations with the participants. I 
decided to use such an informal conversational interview-form as it relates the interview to 
the concrete situation and builds on or emerges from observations. The situation is natural 
and the questions will seem relevant to the interviewees and can be matched to individuals 
and circumstances. In practice, this meant that many interviews were conducted in small 
                                                 
110 This is a quite rare phenomenon in Angola, where the legacy from the socialist bureaucracy usually occasions a long and 
complicated process at many levels of achieving permission to do anything, within the state system as well as outside it.   
111 It probably seemed to these church members that someone who was working so intensively must be very eager to earn 
God’s salvation, as my analysis will show. It, comprehensibly, seemed odd to them that I did not accept the whole message.   
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groups where informants interfered when they felt like it. This gave the interviews a 
character of both focus group- and community interviews, even if almost unstructured, 
where the informants corrected and complemented each other.112 I was mostly interested in 
ordinary church members’ interpretations of the Tocoist faith and their reasons for 
participating, which I found that I fully captured in my long or short, individual or group 
conversations with the participants.113 Most of the conversations emerged when we worked 
together and the group conversations particularly during the breaks. I did not, with a few 
exceptions, note any particular divergences in the kinds of information I acquired from 
group conversations and individual conversations.  
In addition, I carried out key informant interview with the church leader, to which 
I will refer to a limited degree in relation to the more formalised ideas and rationalities 
behind the initiative. I formulated a set of focal questions around which I would 
concentrate my investigation in order to focus the topics and serve as guidelines for my 
conversational interviews. For my interview with the church leader I prepared some 
specific questions on which I wanted him to comment.114  
 
4.2.5 Language and communication 
All verbal communication took place in Portuguese. All informants spoke fluent 
Portuguese, and whenever they would use a word from a local language, they would explain 
to me what it meant. Church members, as Angolans in general, are quite conscious about 
their appropriation of the Portuguese language with words from local languages (in the 
Luanda region mostly from Kimbundo and within the church also from Kikongo due to 
the church leader’s origins). Whenever I would adopt and use such a word, they would be 
amused or at least notice it in some way. Generally, this use of African words in Portuguese 
language is rather limited in Luanda (slang excluded) and most of the African words used in 
daily language were known to me before I started the field study.115  
                                                 
112 Mikkelsen, 1995:102-107 
113 Consequently, direct citations of informants in my text are not always a 100 % word-for-word. But any expression or 
word which seems to have the slightest importance for the contents are the informants’ own. Whenever it has not been 
possible to reproduce these, I refer the informants’ statements instead of citing them.  
114 For focal questions and interview-guide for this interview, see appendixes 3 and 4. 
115 Even though my formal Portuguese studies only amounted to one year before this study was carried out, my 
practical knowledge and use of the language is fluent due to exchange studies in Portugal, internship, job experience, 
and my personal relations in Angola, amounting to 16 months prior to the beginning of the field study.  
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I did not adhere to a specific technique in relation to how I would pose my 
questions, as I expected that I would learn along the way which ways of asking would make 
most sense to my informants and thus supply me with the most useful information. 
Furthermore, my 16 months of presence in the country with close contact to ‘ordinary 
people’ in the shape of my family-in-law, friends, and colleagues, had provided me with a 
certain degree of ‘communicative capital’ that I trusted to guide me towards the best ways 
of acquiring information. This calculation seemed valid as I proceeded. Obviously, 
questions would have to be asked in a concrete and direct way, but this came rather 
naturally as I needed to ask about very concrete matters in the beginning, to find out how 
the church and the work was functioning structurally and which rules and norms were at 
stake. I made the choice, however, to use a Christian register in order to communicate on 
their terms. I felt that it inspired trust, and I avoided those long and tiresome missionary 
speeches from church members who thought that I was not a Christian and desperately 
needed to be saved.     
 
4.2.6 Informants  
Due to the very large number of participants, which varied every day, as I will explain, and 
my emphasis on informal conversational interviews as data, I have not worked with specific 
key informants. Rather, I have chosen to present and quote some informants more in 
depth than others, according to statements and observations with particular relevance for 
my analysis. These informants I present by name116 and relevant information. Details about 
other informants than these are only supplied when relevant for the context. In the course 
of my text, I make use of a limited number of textboxes in which I apply a more narrative, 
linguistic register than elsewhere in quoting and portraying some informants. I have chosen 
this from of representation for the purpose of depicting a few informants and 
circumstances in a more sensitive manner, which I find fruitful in my attempt to describe 
subjective and personal matters such as peoples’ faith or a spiritual environment.  
                                                 
116 All names are, however, changed as my choices of methodology, as outlined above, did not allow me to inform all the 
informants sufficiently about my purpose and intentions of quoting them.  
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5. The church of the African prophet – Background 
5.1 History  
On the 24th of February 1918, a child was born in the locality of Mbanza Zulumongo, the 
most northern spot in Angola, with his feet first in order to walk the ground. His mother 
gave him the name of Mayamona, meaning “that which I have seen, that which I have been 
seeing along the way”117. This child, who at the age of 8 was given the name of Simão 
Gonçalves Tôco and sent to a Baptist Missionary school, was to become the founder of 
‘Tocoism’ in Angola; the prophet to lead the people towards the return of Jesus Christ and 
the manifestation of the Kingdom of God on earth.118 
 
The Tocoists believe that the I.N.S.J.C.M. was founded by Jesus Christ at the time when he 
walked the earth and laid the ground for Christianity, and that it was brought back from 
oblivion – relembrada (literally re-remembered), by Simão Tôco in 1949 when the Holy Spirit 
descended on earth. This descent was the culmination of a long chain of events and actions 
that proved the divine contact and the chosen character of Simão Tôco. From that day in 
1949, Simão Tôco was the spiritual leader of the I.N.S.J.C.M, who guided the church and 
its members toward the Kingdom of God via direct messages from the Almighty and in 
strict adherence to the Bible.    
Prior to1949, Simão Tôco had already been subject to some degree of persecution 
due to his remarkable character and outspokenness, but it was not until he left the Baptist 
Church to re-inaugurate the I.N.S.J.C.M that he came to be seen as a direct threat and a 
rebel by the Portuguese colonial regime. He was imprisoned, transferred around Angola 
and deported to the Azores, where he was held prisoner for 11 years until the Portuguese 
revolution in 1974. He was even killed in various manners, but each time he miraculously 
brought himself back to life. He was run over by a tractor and cut into pieces, he was 
thrown into acid, he was thrown out of a helicopter and he even had his heart torn out119. 
Many devotees of the Church lost their lives and were imprisoned and tortured during the 
years of colonial rule, but the activities and worship of the Church went on and grew 
clandestinely.  
                                                 
117 ”O que eu tenho visto, o que eu andei ver”. Slightly different versions of this meaning are expressed by different church 
members. 
118 This section is based on Quibeta, 2002 as well as statements and stories from different church members, which have 
been articulated and repeated by my informants to an extent that makes them general knowledge about the church. 
119 For the most famous of these stories, see textbox 1. 
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Textbox 1: The tearing out of Simão Tôco’s heart 
During the last year of his imprisonment in the Azores, Simão Tôco discovered a small tumour in 
his chest. Consulted by doctors, he was told that it was malignant and he was submitted to an 
operation. During the operation, the surgeons cut his heart out and put it in a bowl. Then Simão 
Tôco raised his voice and reclaimed three times: “Where are you taking my heart? Put it back!” 
Terrified, the surgeons operated the heart back in its place, but Simão Tôco had lost so much blood 
during the operation that it was necessary with a transfusion. The people present there stretched 
out their arms and said: ”Take our blood and give it to him, because he is a great man and since he 
came here he has never harmed anyone”. And so it was done.  
This story is told without divergences by all Tocoists.     
 
After Angola had won its independence in 1975, Simão Tôco tried to counsel the leaders of 
the three nationalist movements to join efforts and build the new Angolan Government 
together in reconciliation, and he told them that if they did not listen, the country would be 
tormented by wars much worse than that which had just ended. The president and MPLA-
leader, Agostinho Neto, told him to keep out of politics and in the following years he and 
other church members were again persecuted and imprisoned by the new nationalist 
regime. The church was again forced to function in a clandestine manner and its devotees 
to practice their religion in the dark. Yet, the number of members kept growing. 
Before the death of Simão Tôco in 1984, he prepared the church members and told 
them that he would leave, but that he would come back to them again after a time of 
absence. After his death, the church soon started to divide into smaller units due to 
conflicts about leadership etc. Some church members seemed to become weaker in their 
faith and started acting in discordance with the message of God and the Bible.  
In 1991, the Angolan Government abandoned the Marxist-Leninist doctrine under 
which it had been functioning and elections were held in 1992. Even though the war broke 
out again immediately after and became ever more violent, the political environment had 
started to change in favour of an acceptance of the church. In the year 2000, which to the 
Tocoists is the year 000, marking the beginning of ‘The Millennium of Christ’, the spirit of 
Simão Tôco returned to the I.N.S.J.C.M. in the body of a young devotee. The prophet had 
chosen to revestir (literally re-dress) in the body of this young man to bring the church back 
together and lead it towards peace and the Kingdom of God. At first, many church 
members were sceptical, but soon they learned and accepted that it was really their prophet, 
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who was talking to them through the young Afonso Nunes.120 In this shape, Simão Tôco 
succeeded in bringing the divided church back together and he started to promote the 
appeal for peace in Angola, which was finally won in 2002. He also managed to embark on 
the construction of the huge temple, which had been planned already before his physical 
death in 1984, but had been impossible to carry out in the environment of persecutions and 
repression. The work has been carried out entirely by the church members and is financed 
via the church’s own means. In 2003, however, the construction was put on hold in order 
to proceed with an ambitious school-construction project instead. The school, which will 
serve some 3000 pupils a day, is almost finished as I write. Other ambitious construction 
projects of a social character are planned to succeed this one.  
 
5.2 Definition and faith 
According to the church’s statutes, it defines itself as:  
a Christian Community, without lucrative, political, or subversive ends, constituted by 
men who, inside the Christian Doctrine, profess Tocoism, announce the Message of 
salvation, the Light of the Holy Bible, transmitted through the Holy Spirit by His 
Sanctity the Prophet Simão Tôco. (…) The Church of Our Lord Jesus Christ in the 
World has always existed since the time of the Patriarchs and the Prophets. It is the 
Church that Christ remembered and established when the Holy Spirit descended in 
Jerusalem on the day of Pentecost, S. Matthew 16:18, Acts 2:2-4. It is the same church 
that the Venerable Prophet Simão Tôco re-remembered in Africa on the 25th of July 
1949 … (I.N.S.J.C.M: Estatutos da Igreja, 2000: Capitulo 1, Artigo 1&2121)  
 
It is important to note the distinction that is drawn between the Church, the Doctrine, and 
the Profession. The Church and the Doctrine are perceived as Christian in a classical sense, 
while the Tocoist profession refers to the specific role of Simão Tôco as the Prophet who 
was chosen to guide the children of God, particularly the Africans as left behind in 
Christian world history, the last piece of the way to the Kingdom of God. When the 
church is popularly referred to as The Tocoist Church, not least by Tocoists themselves, it 
is actually a confusion of spheres.         
Confusion also seems at stake when it comes to defining the position and 
importance of Simão Tôco in relation to Jesus Christ. Tocoists often say directly that 
Simão Tôco is Christ, born in Africa to lift the African people out of their darkness. The 
                                                 
120 There is, however, a small group of Tocoists who have not yet accepted Afonso Nunes as Simão Tôco and they keep 
living as a separate group of Tocoists waiting for the real Simão Tôco to return. So far, Afonso Nunes, alias Simão Tôco, 
has accepted this, but I was told that this acceptance will not last forever. At some stage, they will have to join the church 
and accept Afonso Nunes or they will have to choose another name for themselves. 
121 See original text in appendix 6. 
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Church is, together with the Church of Simão Kimbangu, a Zairian born Prophet, often 
designated as a ‘Messianic Church’ by outsiders, underlining the feature that the prophets 
are interpreted as Messiah by their devotees.122 Henderson puts forward the view that the 
Prophets of the two churches substitute Christ for their members, and he substantiates this 
by citing a (Swiss) member of the Kimbanguist Church: “in the Kimbanguist Church there 
are simple people to whom Kimbangu means much more than Jesus Christ”.123  
Simão Tôco’s life and mission do to a large extent mirror that of Christ, which is 
certainly an important point; his birth was foretold124, he performed miracles, he suffered a 
great deal for his faith and for the announcement of God’s Word, but he refused to die for 
it. His mission was to live to guide the people. This is the crucial point missed by 
Henderson and others. Simão Tôco’s role remains that of the guide and the direct link to 
the Almighty, where Christ always represents the Saviour, who died on the cross for 
humanity. And only Christ is the Messiah who will open the door to the Kingdom of God 
for humanity on the day when he will reappear on earth. The return of Simão Tôco in 
another man’s body in the first year of The Millennium of Christ125 does, however, seem to 
add further confusion to the picture. Yet, once I asked an elder, influential informant 
whether Simão Tôco was the Messiah, I was answered with a long and heartfelt laughter –
and a strict affirmation that Messiah was Jesus Christ returning to earth when the moment 
was ready. To the assertion raised by Henderson, I should add the point that Tocoists (as 
well as Kimbanguists, according to the Tocoists) believe that Africa has had four important 
prophets leading them towards the Kingdom of God. Kimbangu was the third and Simão 
Tôco is the forth – the one who will take them the last bit of the way. There seems to be 
no conflicts between the two churches and their faith, and they seem to have a certain 
friendship and interconnectedness. 
The analogy between Christ and Simão Tôco must, therefore, be understood as the 
role of leading the people towards God and the true Word and in this way saving them. 
The death of Christ on the cross is absolutely unique and it is constantly articulated in 
                                                 
122 Henderson, 1990:468, Robson & Roque, 2001:131 
123
 Henderson, 1990:468-469 
124 The Tocoists interpret the famous Message of Fatima, describing how virgin Maria manifested herself to three devoted 
Catholics in Portugal on the 13th of May 1917, as a foretelling of Simão Tôco’s birth 9 months later. According to the 
Tocoists, the virgin revealed three secrets to the devotees, which were hidden by the Vatican. One of them was the re-birth 
of Christ on the African continent. It is even told that Pope John Paul 23 should have sent a secret delegation to Angola at a 
later point to investigate whether Simão Tôco was really the manifestation of this secret.   
125 The Tocoists call the new millennium O Milénio de Cristo because of the predicted return of Christ and they have reset the 
calendar so that they are presently living in the year 006.  
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prayers, hymns etc. in the church as the salvation. Many Tocoists, including the General 
Secretary of the church, Simão Quibeta, in his book on Simão Tôco’s life and work, 
compare the prophet directly to Moses and not to Christ. Quibeta cites Acts 3:22-23 in his 
introduction:  
“In fact, Moses said, ‘Jehovah God will raise up for you from among your brothers a 
prophet like me. You must listen to him according to all the things he speaks to you. 
Indeed, any soul that does not listen to that Prophet will be completely destroyed 
from among the people.” (…) Within this framework, arises the following, great 
question: Is Simão Tôco a Prophet that God roused in Africa? For a solid and 
consistent answer, the reading of the book you have in hand will contribute greatly in 
the search for understanding and conclusions. (Quibeta, 2002:10)126  
 
Further, analogies are often drawn to the role of Noah, as many Tocoists compare the 
construction of the school and the temple with the construction of Noah’s arc.  
Even though the way shown by Simão Tôco is universal and will lead all faithful 
people to the Kingdom of God, the prophet’s African origins do, however, seem to hold a 
further key for the salvation of the people of Africa from an Old Testament legacy. The 
Tocoists interpret the Jacob’s betrayal of his older brother Esau as an analogue to the 
betrayal of the white man upon the black. When Jacob cheated his father, Isaac, to give 
him the benediction meant for Esau, he threw Africa into the darkness and backwardness 
that kept the continent in the shadow of the white man and away from the Word of God 
until Simão Tôco was born to rescind this heritage. It was Simão Tôco who brought the 
benediction back to Africa.    
It is certainly not easy to clearly reveal the degree to which Simão Tôco is the same 
as Christ, Moses or Noah, but I find it fair to say that Simão Tôco represents an African 
version of Christ who holds important keys to the spiritual liberation of Africans, but that 
he in no way substitutes Jesus Christ, who was the first and true saviour. No informant has 
ever claimed that Simão Tôco was the reincarnation of Christ. One informant said that 
Christ has been born several times in several different parts of the world. 
Even though Jesus Christ is the one who is always praised and worshipped in 
prayers and hymns, it is in a sense right, as Henderson argues in the case of Kimbangu, that 
Simão Tôco seems to be more important to many church members than Christ in their 
daily life. There is no doubt that Christ represents the most important savoir to them, but 
Simão Tôco is there with them now to talk to them, to lead and protect them. While the 
                                                 
126 Translation of the Bible citation: from New World Translation of the Holy Scriptures, 1984. See original  
Portuguese texts in appendix 6.  
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Holy Bible is their law and their guide on how to behave, Simão Tôco tells them how to act 
in relation to their concrete lives, problems, and realities.  
This point is fundamental to the relationship that this study set out to examine. At 
the heart of the Tocoist faith is the belief that the end of the present world(order) is very 
near and that the Kingdom of God is about to be installed on earth. Every person on earth 
is responsible for his own survival and transfer into the Kingdom of God through his faith 
and actions – in a very direct way. Statements such as “I work because I want to save my 
life” are very commonly heard among church members working on the school 
construction. Faith and behaviour are prescribed in the Bible, and the church adheres to a 
very strict set of rules.127 But only through Simão Tôco’s direct instructions from God do 
the Tocoists know what they have to do to actively gain their access to eternal life. 
Through this direct channel they were told that they have to build the school and that their 
physical participation in the construction is their direct source of access along with their 
spiritual faith and compliance with the demands of the Bible. To this latter source, Simão 
Tôco serves a second important role. He controls them and helps them to comply with 
these demands, as they live with the recognition that man is small and weak in character 
and too easily falls into temptation.  
 
5.3 Worldview  
It is important to note that the colonial regime regarded Simão Tôco as a rebel, but when 
the Tocoists use this same term about him, it is not to be understood in a nationalist 
fashion. According to the Tocoists, Simão Tôco did not speak and fight for the 
decolonisation of Angola in any direct manner. He worked for the altruistic liberation of 
Angola and Africa thoroughly within a Christian doctrine, which may have been 
appropriated by African culture and beliefs, but this is another point I will return to later. 
The point here is to underline that the colonisation, to the Tocoists, is but one feature of a 
whole range of circumstances that have held Africa in darkness and underdevelopment. It 
is primarily a Biblical heritage (Jacob’s betrayal) and the wrath of God that has left Africa 
                                                 
127
 The church adheres very strictly to the Bible, including the demands of the Old Testament. A long line of strict 
rules in addition to the Ten Commandments are being neatly complied with. No consumption of alcohol is tolerated; 
women cannot wear trousers or jewellery, they must cover their hair with a scarf, and cannot enter holy places during 
their period. Men must shave their face every day; everybody must wear white and green at church service where 
crossed arms or legs are prohibited; no black or red clothes are permitted ever, etc. Sex before marriage is punished 
by six months of suspension and adultery by two years. 
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behind in history. Jacob’s betrayal, expressed by Tocoists as the betrayal of the white man 
upon the black, is clearly an allegory of colonial exploitation, even though this connection 
has never been made explicit by any informant. Exactly this lack of explicitly indicates that 
the colonisation cannot account for the complete interpretation of the betrayal – and much 
less for the violent history of Angola. After national independence, few things actually 
changed for the church in terms of liberation. The oppressors simply became Angolans 
and the discourse used to control and subordinate subjects became socialist. Simão Tôco’s 
rebellion was against all those things in both humans and society that lead people away 
from God’s word and hence restrict spiritual liberation.    
This view can be interpreted as underestimating the significance of colonial and 
post-colonial repression, thus leaving people as completely accountable for their own 
misery – or worse, as constant (innocent) victims of God’s punishment, which strikes all 
Africans on behalf of the ‘bad’ majority. Seen a little differently, such a view supports the 
conviction that everyone is responsible and can change their own destiny through their 
actions and, as such, embraces great potential of agency: No one is determined by powers 
beyond their reach; no one is a victim. Everyone is responsible for their own destiny 
through their own actions, including in this the expansion of the message of God to those 
who are doing wrong or evil – i.e. repressing other people. In this sense, my case seems, at 
first, to corroborate Ashcroft’s position with regard to agency as relatively independent of 
the colonial legacy. It certainly seems that a degree of subtle resistance could have been at 
stake in the Tocoist church, even if Simão Tôco’s rebellion was indeed not understood as 
subtle by his oppressors and decolonisation did not set the potential agency of this 
resistance free (Cf. note 102). But before I can proceed into the analyses of these 
dimensions, a presentation of the church setting will be in place.  
 
5.4 Composition of the church 
The I.N.S.J.C.M. has its universal social, administrative, and ecclesiastic headquarter in 
Luanda, capital of Angola. It has representations in all of Angola’s 18 provinces and in 
several countries around the world, such as The Democratic Republic of Congo, South 
Africa, Brazil, France, Portugal, and even Sweden. Quibeta estimates that the church 
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comprises 800.000 members.128 Between 5.000 and 10.000 join the church service in the 
headquarters in Luanda every Sunday, where the prophet Simão Tôco, in the body of 
Afonso Nunes, gives the sermon whenever he is not prevented by travels etc. Most church 
members belong to the poorest parts of the population and a small majority comes from 
the northern province of Uíge, Simão Tôco’s natal province.  
The church owns a piece of land in the ‘Golfe II’ Municipality in the outskirts of 
Luanda, which comprises the universal social, administrative, and ecclesiastic headquarters. 
Here, church services and other activities such as education, rehearsal of choirs etc. take 
place under a huge open shed as they have done for decades, while the temple and the 
school are being constructed on the same spot. There are also some modest buildings 
comprising the administration, workshops, church committees, and counselling services. 
Further, there are local representations of the church in 18 parishes in Luanda. 
 
5.4.1 Structure and organisation 
The church is politically organised in a strictly structured hierarchy of organs with decisive, 
consultative, autonomous, and executive powers129. The highest decisive organ is the 
Congress, which is held every 4 years, or extraordinarily if necessary. At the Congress, all 
the organs of the church are represented. The direction and key members of each organ are 
spiritually elected by Simão Tôco, who occasionally unites with them to follow their 
activities and counsel them. The actual decisive character of the decisive organs seems 
unsure vis-à-vis the fact that all important decisions are made by the prophet, but their 
symbolic importance is considerable. The bodies of elders enjoy great respect. The 
autonomous organs are also executive. Their autonomy seems to be considerable and they 
execute extensive activity and deal with the specific interests of their group. The executive 
organs are backed up by the organs of support, which are those controlling the concrete 
activities and the daily functioning of the church. Below the formal organs, the church 
comprises a myriad of different councils and groups undertaking all sorts of practical or 
spiritual activities. 
 
                                                 
128 Quibeta, 2002:13. Viegas (1999:151), in a bibliographical survey over all the registered churches in Angola, states a 
number of 240.000 members. None of the accounts develop further on what basis they achieve these numbers. 
129 Appendix 5 shows the hierarchy of the organs.  
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5.4.2 Tribes, classes, and areas  
The church has divided the country into 16 geographical zones, tribos –  tribes – with 
reference to the Biblical tribes of Israel. All national church members belong to a tribe, 
according to their geographical origin, not their ethnic affiliation. The tribes serve primarily 
as administrative sub-divisions of members in the Universal headquarter in Luanda, but are 
also important identity markers. The geographical divisions naturally imply that many 
people of the same ethnicity belong to the same tribes, but in practice this fact seems 
irrelevant. I have not once heard anyone in the church using the normal ethnic designations 
of e.g. Bakongo, Ovimbundo, and Kimbundo, which are very common in public language use. 
Church members identify themselves and others solely by their church tribe.  
As already mentioned, people from all of Angola’s provinces have fled to Luanda, 
which was a relatively safer place to be, during the whole of the military conflict, but 
particularly since 1992. The tribes serve the important purpose of receiving newcomers 
from their own localities and helping them to integrate into their new urban setting. An 
elder man, responsible for his tribe, explained to me that this is the most appropriate way 
of organising, simply because newcomers are received by people who share the same habits 
and understandings and eat the same food. Each tribe has a centre somewhere in the city 
where it receives guests, gathers in reunions and carries out activities. 
Apart from the tribe system, each church member also belongs to an area, a class, 
and a sucosal, all referring to the locality in Luanda where they live. Each class is akin to a 
parish and has a local church where members go to church service on Thursday nights and 
send their children to Bible school, and engage in other activities. Finally, all members are 
part of a sucosal, which is a small group of neighbours, who gather every night at 7 o’clock 
in one of their homes to pray together.          
In effect, these different groupings dispersed over the city constitute a rather 
complex net of more or less self-directed, decentralised structures and activities around the 
highly centralised Direction of the church, as I will return to below. Within tribes, areas, 
and classes there are choirs and many different interest groups, and many people are active 
within several groupings. For the church members frequenting the headquarters and 
participating in the school construction, the tribe is by far the most important category to 
which they belong; a fact they often express explicitly.130  
                                                 
130
 There seems to be a large number of more ‘moderate’ Tocoists, many of whom are grown-up children of the more 
devoted members, who content themselves with attending the local church services every now and then, do not participate 
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5.4.3 The organisation of the school construction 
When the church first embarked on the ambitious construction of the temple, which will 
be the largest in Angola, or in the Southern African region some even claim, a team of 
professional and semi-professional artisans was put together consisting of Tocoists from all 
over the country. People moved to Luanda from the provinces in order to take part in the 
construction. Most of these people are still part of the present school construction team, 
called the ‘efectivos’ – effectives, referring to their full-time (up to 60 hours pr. week) 
occupation. The team consists of about 70 workers, who all receive a monthly economic 
subsidy, which varies according to abilities and position, but can never compensate for an 
actual wage. The overall organisation of the work and the finances are managed by the 
organ of support called the Universal Secretariat for Technical Support and Construction 
Works, which consist of four members.  
Ordinary church members work one day pr. week, with their tribe as assistants to 
the efectivos. Each tribe has a specific weekday, which is their day of work. In principle, 
every church member living in Luanda is supposed to give this one whole day of work to 
the construction every week. In practice, few people have the opportunity to show up 
every week, but there is never a lack of hands. A day’s team comprises between 50 and 200 
persons.131 Women often bring their babies and work with them tied on their backs or 
leave them with someone who is taking a rest. Some also bring their older children, who 
participate in the work whenever they want.  
There are one or two people responsible for each tribe who co-ordinate the work 
with the efectivos and the management team. Women bring a bucket to work and are 
primarily responsible for carrying water and sand to the spots where it is necessary to 
produce the mortar mass etc. Men carry the heavier material, mix the mortar, produce the 
bricks and blocks, etc. No machines, lift mechanisms or even wheel barrels are used; 
everything is purely manual power, as they say proudly. Efficiency is, however, less 
important than co-operation and team spirit, and the working process can sometimes seem 
a little inert. However, people are most often quick at organising and dividing effectively 
                                                                                                                                                                  
broadly in activities and live less strictly in accordance with the rules. But as my study was restricted to the Universal 
headquarter and the people participating in the school construction, I never met these ‘moderates’ and their practices and 
forms of participation are not reflected and allowed for in my analysis. 
131
 According to informants, those with a permanent job (who are a minority) sometimes get permission to take the day off 
to give their contribution to the school construction, depending of the comprehension and goodwill of their boss. 
Elsewhere, they come and work on public Holydays and in vacations, like the students. 
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into smaller groups according to the concrete task to be performed, and they are always 
eager to finish up what they are doing. Once a young man who was shovelling sand into 
the women’s buckets started putting less and less sand in each bucket as the pile of sand 
was shrinking, so that there would be enough for everyone, as he said. To this the women 
objected firmly, and the young man had to slightly revise his concept of justice and equality 
in team-work.  
 
5.4.4 Systems and significance of contributions 
The school construction is financed exclusively by the contributions of church members. 
Most contributions are collected at the Sunday church service in the shape of tithe, but 
every morning when that day’s tribe arrives to work, each person gives a further amount of 
money to buy the cement and sand to be used that day. Often, people give all they have 
and sometimes walk very long distances to get home when the day's work is over, because 
there is no money left for the public taxi-busses. There is also a collection system 
encouraging members to buy one or more sacks of cement and donate to the construction.  
Every person supplying a donation is registered by name and the lists are handed 
over to the prophet, who also inspects the work on a daily basis. It is very important to 
anyone contributing money or work, that they are neatly registered. Even though the 
Tocoists believe that you have earned your place in the Kingdom of God as long as you 
remain firm in your faith and contribute whenever it is possible, many seem to have a 
rather quantitative perception of their salvation. The harder you work and the more you 
give in economic terms, the ‘more’ salvation. Laziness is a rather non-existent 
phenomenon, even though many humorous accusations of the same are made during a day. 
All types of church-related activities are considered equal contributions, meaning that if 
you have a choir rehearsal or a reunion that impedes you from working on the school 
construction, they are counted equally in ‘God’s protocols’ for your salvation. 
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6. Agency in the Tocoist Church – Analysis 
 
The following chapter analyses the findings of my field work with the Tocoist Church. 
First, I engage in the question about which kinds of agency are at stake among the church 
members and secondly, in part 6.10, I seek to trace the influence that these kinds of agency 
have, or may acquire, on processes of social change.   
6.1 Faith, rationalities, and action  
Textbox 2: The basics of Tocoist faith    
The sun is throwing long shadows over the large empty area in front of the school as we wash 
ourselves at the water tank after my first day of work with the Tocoists. The spot still has some 
grass after the rainy season and the church’s untethered goats and sheep gather close to us. It is 
easy to forget that we are right here in overcrowded, noisy, chaotic Luanda.  
I lament that I only got to carry four buckets of sand today. “But God registered it”, Mana* Sara 
says. “God registers all the work of each person?” The women confirm. “And He orders the work 
to be carried out?” Mana Sara and Mana Lídia answer spontaneously: “Yes, of course! Otherwise 
you wouldn’t come here and work!” And Lídia goes on: “God entered into your heart, that’s why 
you come and work”. God told “o nosso pai” – our father – as they always refer to the prophet in 
daily speech, that they should postpone the construction of the temple and build a school, as 
‘bodily’ learning is just as important as spiritual learning. “How are we to understand and read the 
Bible, if we do not learn how to read first?” they ask. “This is the reconstruction of the House of 
David, which was destroyed”, says Mano* José and urges me to read Acts of the Apostles 15:14; 
then I will understand. “O pai is fulfilling the same work as Moses did in his time”, says Mana Sara.  
I listen to their devoted stories about miracles, spirituality and how everything humanity is 
experiencing is foretold in the Bible; I feel their pride and gratitude to be a part of God’s great plan 
and their eager to make me understand how it all connects. “It is a long story”, they say “but you 
will understand little by little”.  
* Mana/Mano are informal, appropriated forms of the Portuguese irmã/irmão (sister/brother), used widely before a 
given name in everyday language, connoting intimacy. Generally, the more formal irmã/irmão is used in relation to 
people who possess an official position in the church hierarchy.   
 
6.1.1 Spirituality as proof 
The notion of spirituality is key to understanding the Tocoist faith. Through spirituality you 
are in contact with God; you can feel Him in your heart and you know that what you are 
doing is right. His direct orders are transmitted through the prophet, but if you did not feel 
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God’s presence within you and received signs from him along the way, the prophet’s words 
would be worthless. It is also spirituality, in the form of miracles (e.g. the heart of Tôco, 
box 1), feelings, parables (e.g. the feeling of God in your heart and the House of David, 
box 2), and secrets (e.g. The Message of Fatima, footnote 123) that prove the sanctity of 
the prophet. Some informants, mostly women, state that they never doubted that it was 
really Simão Tôco who had entered the body of Afonso Nunes, because they could feel it 
in their hearts, while other informants, mostly men, have more ‘technical spiritual’ 
explanations related to the notion of miracles. One informant told me that Simão Tôco had 
been very clever and had given some secret items to some of the important, elder church 
members, which he referred to individually and claimed back, when he returned in the 
body of Afonso Nunes. Another man referred to an incident when some very sceptical 
Tocoists poisoned Afonso Nunes shortly after he had started claiming that he was Simão 
Tôco, because if it was true, he would survive, they said. And he did survive, even though 
his state was very critical and he recovered extremely fast, which, according to this 
informant, convinced everybody. Most people, however, say that several of the elder, 
important church members were informed directly from the Prophet via dreams, and when 
they went to inform Nunes about this he first refused and only later accepted that he was 
the chosen body. Prior to 2000, all members say, several false prophets had appeared trying 
to make people believe that they were Simão Tôco, but they have never succeeded in 
convincing anyone.  
Regular church members also receive individual messages directly from God 
through dreams and visions, and sometimes they even hear Him speaking directly to them. 
In this way, each church member has his own explanations and evidence and his own 
encounters with the divine power. Generally, with some exceptions, they do not seem to 
uncritically accept given truths before they find meaning and logic in them. I seldom 
received answers like “because the prophet says so” or “that is the way it is”. On the other 
hand, I very frequently received the answer that “the Bible says so”, and then a reference to 
the specific place in the Bible which explains or has relevance to the matter in question (As 
e.g. box 2, The House of David). This does, on the one hand, show a blind trust in God 
and the Bible, but on the other hand it shows a high level of reflection towards how the 
Bible, as the Word of God, connects to their everyday life and problems.  
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6.1.2 Spirituality as the reason to work 
Simão Tôco told the Tocoists that it was their task to construct a school, and they obey 
because he has proved to them on numerous occasions that he is the direct link to God. 
But, as outlined above, they also seek and find direct confirmations from God as well as 
logical explanations for their task. They know that they must read the Bible in order to 
understand the message and their salvation and, as box 2 shows, that a school is their 
children’s direct access to this end. They are also painfully aware that education is the only 
way to a good job and thus a materially decent life, and there is a general effort towards 
educating one’s children. Yet, they rarely make a connection between this effort and the 
fact that they are building a school. Whenever I tried to make them comment on this point, 
I would have to ask very direct questions, and they would confirm that the school would 
serve for educating their children and then they would leave the subject; it was obviously of 
little interest to them. The same would happen when I tried to make them express anything 
related to an idea of changing their present living conditions. They would confirm that the 
government is not doing a good job and that the leaders are selfish and corrupt. Some 
would even say that they are building the school, which should really be the government’s 
job, because the government is not doing it. But in the end, they find all that unimportant, 
because when the day comes, he who has worked for himself will loose and he who 
worked according to God’s demands will be rewarded with eternal life. The simple thought 
of it will light up their faces and make them appear so strong that they will be able to live 
with their earthly suffering until then with no problems. In the end, they will be the 
winners. In a conversation with three women, this source of energy and strength became 
very clear. The more they got into the subject the higher they spoke, the more they 
laughed, clapped their hands, interrupted each other with better examples or said “no, 
explain it better!”. One referred to a sermon held lately by the prophet, referring to John 
16:20-22, saying: “We will be crying and suffering, but afterwards happiness will come to 
us”. Further, they referred to the school construction as their ‘Noah’s Arc’, on which they 
want to be aboard when the day comes. Another woman explained to me that the 
important thing now is the preparation. Every 2000 years God makes a big change, and 
that is how they know that it is near now; within some 10 years it will happen, she stated. 
For these reasons, Tocoists constantly returned to the fact that their contribution 
to the school construction is the direct way to salvation and not to a concrete piece of 
infrastructure to improve their current educational situation and lives. Comments such as 
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“I want to save my life”, “I work for my salvation” etc. are heard every day. This 
conviction is their hope in the future132, complies with their idea of justice, constitutes their 
logical explanation of the course of history and all the suffering they have been put 
through, and finally; is their major incentive to act as they do. What seems to motivate the 
Tocoists to participate is thus largely a set of rationalities based on faith, rather than on a 
desire to change social conditions. In the following, I will refer to these as rationalities of faith 
in order to distinguish them from other reasons and rationalities, which I will locate below.   
Moreover, the aspect of being personally chosen for the task inspires some church 
members. An old man at the age of 70, who works at least 50 hours pr. week, told me 
proudly, emphasising the spiritual value, how Simão Tôco had already told him 30 years 
ago that he would one day construct a very important building. There is a rather individual 
satisfaction to this conviction, as if the informant was building the school himself, which is 
uncommon, but occasionally evident among church members. The example nevertheless 
synthesises the aspects of spirituality as proof and as incentive to work. 
This does not necessarily mean that the meaning and the consolation this 
conviction gives are unconscious processes. As one informant said: “The church is our 
refuge – the poverty is too much”. But this recognition does not constitute a contradiction 
to her faith, as she points out, laughing: “The work you do for God does not tire you – you 
can work all day and you never get tired! And what you loose because you do not go to the 
market and sell on the day you work with the church, you earn double the next day! God 
gives to those who work”.       
Finally, the most direct link between faith and action was expressed by the church 
leader himself in the interview I carried out with him. Asked about why the church is 
building a public school, his immediate answer was to pick up the Bible and tell me to read 
James 2:14-26, a part that states that faith is worthless without labour in action. None of 
the informants mentioned this reason for their engagement; a quite surprising fact, 
considering how they usually quote the prophet and the Bible for explanations to anything 
they do and say.  
 
                                                 
132 The word hope (esperança) is very often used in a way that seems equivalent to promise or faith: “We have hope, the fear 
(angustia) will disappear”, “The prophet is our hope”. 
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6.1.3 Other incentives to participate 
As mentioned, the Tocoists’ idea of working for God is not restricted to that of physical 
contributions. Being a part of an organ or a local committee, singing in a choir, visiting sick 
church members, etc. are all equal contributions to the overall objective of praising and 
serving God. All these contributions are understood as an organic whole, which do not 
separate work from joy, because work is deeply meaningful and joyful when you work for 
God. The joy is in the promises about the future and the feeling of being among the 
chosen (through your faith and choices) as expressed by the three women above, and in the 
immediate relation and reward that keeps you from getting tired or loosing income, as 
expressed in a humorous way in the above quotation. This statement, and the laughter with 
which it was delivered, hold a trace of a self-ironic attitude, which is characteristic for the 
Tocoists; they do not take themselves too seriously. It may be that they work for their 
salvation, but had it not been for the humour, the laughing, singing and dancing which is 
always a part of the Tocoist agenda, it is perhaps questionable whether the church and its 
projects would have the attendance it has. 
 
Joy and humour Joy is a very important aspect of the Tocoist faith, as in most Angolan 
churches. The prophet and other preachers at church service will often ask if the audience 
is happy, and ceremonies will almost always end in virtual parties with vivid music from the 
church’s band and highly dynamic dancing. For the Tocoists, God certainly wants to see 
his children happy and enjoying themselves. Humour is always welcomed in the working 
situation, even if it sometimes requires that someone takes a lead in creating the 
atmosphere for it. Few things seem to be too sacred to joke about. An example of the self-
ironic attitude among the members is a situation where some women were discussing 
whether the water in the waterhole from which they collect water for the construction, is 
rainwater or comes from a tank. No one is sure, and in the end one of the women exclaims 
“ask Simão Tôco!” with everybody laughing heartfelt. They were clearly laughing at their 
own inclination to often expect answers to everything from the prophet, instead of figuring 
it out for themselves.    
Humour, as well as dancing and singing, serve the double purpose of pleasing God 
as well as the church members, and creating a dynamic atmosphere that eases and 
encourages the physical work.  
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Social networks and solidarity Being a part of the religious community obviously also serves the 
purpose of securing the church members within a social network and creating bonds of 
reciprocity. As mentioned earlier, this function is particularly important in relation to the 
uncontrolled migration from the provinces to Luanda during the war, which has split 
families and dispersed people from the same localities all over the city and left them with 
fragile relationships to their neighbours.  
As already mentioned, the tribes are responsible for the integration of guests or 
newcomers and of visiting and supporting ill members, and must therefore be understood 
as their closest network of security and reciprocity, at least formally. In relation to other 
church activities, the tribe seems to become less paramount, as many group activities take 
place in the local parish churches. One informant told how women gather every week in 
the local churches to undertake the important task of educating the younger women in 
domestic duties as well as personal hygiene and the relationship to their husbands. If a man 
is not satisfied with his young wife, he can rightfully go to the women’s group and 
complain. Youth activities also seem to be blooming in local groups. A young girl 
confirmed to me, after a little reflection, that she considered her church friends to be the 
closest, even though she had many friends from outside the church.  
In relation to the school construction, the tribe is crucial, as work is organised 
according to tribes. During a day of work the women will mostly gather with their own 
tribe even though different tribes work on the same day. Once, two women from different 
tribes, but working on the same day, found out that they belonged to the same local church 
and wondered why they had never met there.133 The tribe system thus seems to somehow 
encourage members to ‘stick to their own kind’, but I never observed or sensed any kind of 
unfriendly attitudes towards other tribes. Church members tend to defend the division as a 
rather pragmatic constellation (see 5.4.2), as a way to organise. Generalisations about 
people from different tribes were seldom heard and never in a negative way.134 I found no 
basis for assuming that the tribe system encourages ‘tribalism’ in a conflict-related sense.  
                                                 
133
 It is possible, however, that those members who come to work on the school construction almost every week are not the 
same as those who are active in local committees or thematic groups. I did not get an opportunity to attend any local church 
activities, but whenever I talked to women or youth representatives or members of the organs of support in the 
headquarters, few references to tribes were made.   
134
 Yet, after asking quite directly to the matter, I was told that the divisions of the church during the 16 years of absence of 
the prophet were brought about by the tribes. Especially one tribe had been pushing to assume the leadership. But these 
hostilities are certainly nothing the members are proud of, and everyone seems to have understood and accepted the 
importance of unity, when the prophet returned with the main purpose of bringing the church back together. 
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The church does, beyond much doubt, constitute the most important source of 
group identification and reciprocal ties beyond the family to most church members. All in 
all, the scope and size of the church seems to form a small society in itself, which fulfils 
most of the functions its citizens require, and in any case, many more than the broader 
Angolan society offers. Furthermore, the territory in itself, with its calm atmosphere, the 
open space, the animals and vegetation (see box 2) is in sharp contrast to anything Luanda 
can offer and may represent a sort of ‘lost paradise’ and hence ontological security to many 
of those church members who have fled the provinces and left their villages behind.  
 
The apparent lack of interest, as well as recognition of the capacity to influence 
transformation of the present social realities that people are living under, despite the great 
proportions of work, money and personal engagement they actually invest in the church, 
must be understood in relation to this analogy to a society. Many Tocoists seem to have 
rejected the broader society that offers them nothing and leaves no room for their own 
involvement, in favour of the church. Here, they feel that their contribution makes a 
difference and that they are generously rewarded. Much agency seems to be unfolding 
within the church environment, but few things indicate that it is a form of agency which 
can promote social change beyond the boarders of this society. And in the end, this society 
cannot fulfil the most important function of a society either; it cannot assure them an 
income on which they can survive.  
Their rejection or apparent lack of interest must, however, be seen in relation to 
the importance and role of the prophet and the view on leadership. But before I turn to 
this dimension, another aspect of the rationalities of faith is important to the analysis of 
church members’ understanding of their capacity to influence social change.  
 
6.2 Other forms of agency 
As box 3 shows, at least some church members feel a strong responsibility and capacity to 
change social conditions. According to Mamá Ester, the achievement of peace was the 
result of a long process of prayers that culminated with the return of Simão Tôco to finally 
install peace in the country. And even though the informant states that they are free now 
and the only thing left is waiting, she provides a strong social critique and has a firm and 
immediate answer to the question of a solution: to pray. Peace, and the acceptance of the 
church by the Angolan authorities, might have liberated them, but it is also understood as 
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the first steps, because much is still to be achieved for people to live a good and just life. 
But these first steps are also the proofs that their prayers are being heard. Other informants 
have expressed similar views on prayers. Elections are recognised as a potential way of 
influencing social matters as well, but the idea is seemingly somewhat alien to her, even if 
she seems to draw a sort of comparison between voting and praying as she switches over 
to the conviction that they are always being heard and change will occur in the long term. 
 
Textbox 3: Mamá Ester on the church in society 
Mamá Ester has been very lucky in life: Her son gained a scholarship and is now studying in 
France. But that is no surprise, because when he was born, she took him to Simão Tôco, who saw 
in him a very special boy who would do something very important one day. But there came a time 
when everything was difficult and Mamá Ester had forgotten about those words; she left the 
church, but her children stayed. After a while, Simão Tôco came to her in a dream to lead her over 
a high mountain that she could not climb on her own, and he took her down to her children on the 
other side and said to her to follow them. When she woke up, she ran to the church.  
 
“When the war broke out again in 1992, the Government finally realised that it needed the 
churches to pray to God to achieve peace. That was when the persecutions stopped. In 2000, when 
Simão Tôco re-dressed in the body of Afonso Nunes, he went to see the President and said to him: 
“you need to show your people warmth, they need it!” He also went to see Jonas Savimbi, but he 
did not want to listen. The week before Savimbi died, Simão Tôco said in his sermon: “The arms 
will turn into woods for you to cook your beans on”, and so they did. It seems like a lie, but … (…) 
We have been liberated!! – and now it’s just waiting [for Messiah and the Kingdom of God].”   
  
“Democracy – this? Oh no! The Government is doing bad because they need benediction. They 
put unqualified people to undertake important positions: It is like making a doctor build a house – 
it will become uneven! And there is no medicine in the hospitals because the doctors take it to their 
own private clinics and sell it expensively.” And what is to be done about it? “Pray! Only with the 
people praying will God bring good to us!” And what about elections? “Yes, we will vote, because 
the church encourages us to, and with time… it takes time, but we are always being heard, it is 
never in vain.”       
 
Another informant, Victor, who holds an important position within the Youth 
Committee, expresses the same view upon elections, stating that change is a slow process 
that will come about only when we act according to God’s demands. It is necessary to vote, 
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he says, but the choices are guided by God, because only God knows which government 
will rule the country in the best way. In this way, the people get the government they 
‘deserve’, because if they are not listening to God they will elect lay politicians without 
benediction, who will then rule selfishly and abuse the power given to them by the people. 
He says that God is democratic and the church is also democratic, and this is why it is so 
important that all the people accept and obey God. Further, he is the only informant who 
has directly said that it was Simão Tôco who brought peace: ”And then Simão Tôco said: 
”now it is enough with this war”, and then he returned and brought the war to an end”.       
In the views expressed here, the contribution of the people, neatly guided by their 
moral responsibility towards God and thus humanity, is crucial to social change. This life – 
with all its deficiencies – is not considered insignificant and unworthy of the effort to try to 
influence social conditions. On the contrary, it is exactly human beings who bring about 
change, because they act, while God guides them towards the right actions. If they do not 
want to listen, God cannot make them; it is the responsibility within each and every person. 
If a minority listens to God, then the majority will elect lay politicians. This seems like 
some sort of religious-democratic rationale, which I will discuss later. Praying does, 
however, seem to be the way of exercising agency which is most certain, as this is what 
church members are familiar with and know the necessity of.135 Rationalities of faith can in 
this sense surely promote agency which is directed outwards to the social reality the church 
is situated in. In any case, the presence of a spiritual leader is essential in order to bring 
about concrete acts of change and to help people to understand their moral responsibilities.  
 
6.3 The role of the leader – the father, the soba, and the autocrat 
It seems obvious that the leadership of Simão Tôco is surrounded by a deep worship, or a 
personality cult, as it has often been designated in relation to African leaders. The prophet 
represents to the Tocoists the highest living human being since Christ, and after he had 
proved this position to them as outlined above, it is unquestionable that he holds the key to 
                                                 
135
 Praying can, in essence, be seen as a reflective way of dealing with all matters of life, including social matters. When you 
pray and ask for God to make something happen or to guide your way, you are reflectively articulating the changes you wish 
to come about. Whether praying can actually bring about social change is of course another question which I shall not 
engage in here!   
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the truth and thus salvation. He is served like a king in order for him to be able to maintain 
the highest possible level of spiritual concentration and divine contact.136  
In daily language, church members refer to the prophet as O pai – Father; not in a 
religious sense, but referring to the head of the family.137 More formally, he is denominated 
O Dirigente – the Leader. The analogy of a father is highly relevant in practice. Simão Tôco 
keeps an eye on all the church members, corrects their behaviour, concerns himself with 
their well-being, and takes important decisions on their behalf. During the years of his 
physical absence, many people lost focus and started to live in discordance with the Bible. 
When he returned, he found broken marriages and church members living in sin with other 
peoples’ spouses. He made a huge effort of making these people understand that what they 
had sworn to God, they had to comply with, and he succeeded in bringing almost all 
couples back together through kind and patient guidance. In November 2004, 150 couples 
who had been living unmarried together were married in a huge ceremony with 4.500 
testimonies. 
This setting, with a protecting and firm father figure, seems to free the church 
members of a degree of responsibility; they are but children who cannot really know what 
is good for them, their father takes care of them. Their father will also deal with relations to 
the world outside the family and will represent the family’s interests. This is perhaps a 
reason why many church members seem to care little about the social misery in which they 
are living their daily lives: it is the responsibility of the father. It is not without importance 
to them to change these conditions, but it is beyond their capacity to deal with. 
                                                 
136 The distinction between Afonso Nunes and Simão Toco seems to be quite clear in the perception of the Tocoists; 
Afonso Nunes is just a regular church member (with a high position in the church hierarchy, however), and 
whenever he says anything in relation to the church, it is Simão Toco’s voice, which is heard. Sometimes Simão Tôco 
lets Afonso Nunes ‘take a rest’, as expressed by one informant, to be a husband and a father to his family. Usually he 
is referred to as ‘Sua Santidade o Profeta (His Sanctity the Prophet) Simão Toco’, in church documents deepened by 
‘re-dressed in the body of Ancião Conselheiro (Elder Counsellor) Afonso Nunes’. As an official representative of the 
church in Angolan society, he is denominated ‘Spiritual Leader Afonso Nunes’. Afonso Nunes himself presents a 
rather modest attitude to his position, stating in an autobiographical paper available at the Tocoist website about him 
being chosen by Simão Tôco that he knows little about the details, it is better to ask some of the elders, and he signs 
vosso irmão – your brother. (In the second Church Congress held in June 2005 after I had ended my field studies, 
Afonso Nunes was, however, nominated Bishop of the church, thus “being inherently the highest entity of the 
I.N.S.J.C.M at the Ecumenical, Spiritual, and Administrative levels. This decision was made during the Second 
Universal Congress of the Church as a consequence of all the work he has carried out at national and international 
levels.” (I.N.S.J.C.M, 2005. See original Portuguese text in appendix 6)  
137 The word pai in Portuguese refers to a family father; where the word padre means a Catholic father. The word pai is 
also the word for Father in the Trinity, which seems to add further ambiguity to the diversity of representations of 
Simão Tôco to the church members. This ambiguity is, however, purely linguistic, as the word pai is only used for God 
in relation to the Trinity, even though the expression Filhos de Deus – God’s Children is commonly used for church 
members or Christians in general. Church members will always say ‘God’ or ‘the Almighty’ when referring to God, 
because pai clearly refers to the prophet.  
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Many church members have moved to Luanda from villages in the provinces 
where they have had very limited contact to state authorities, where the society was 
controlled by the local chief, the soba, and the interests of that locality were represented by 
the soba in relation to other localities. The sobas have also often been associated with 
spiritual powers, and many stories are told about how the sobas have used these powers to 
protect their villages against colonisers as well as the combatants in the civil wars.138 Only 
one informant compared the prophet explicitly to a soba, stating that every society needs a 
soba. It is likely that the degree to which church members engage in, or leave matters of 
outer representation to the leader, is closely related to their urban or rural backgrounds. I 
will suggest later that the young generation of Tocoists that have been born in Luanda, 
have slightly different rationalities of faith than their parents. It seems clear, though, that 
the church represents a big family as well as a small society (yet with an ambition to 
become universal), and that the leader of such an entity holds some rather traditional roles 
and responsibilities.  
Yet, it is neither Simão Tôco’s position as a father nor as a soba that constitute the 
most important aspects of his authority; it is that of a prophet. It is, as shown in the above, 
his spiritual powers and his sanctity that in the end will assure positive transformation, 
whether it is understood as the social transformation of the world we are living in, or as the 
manifestation of the Kingdom of God, which is sometimes described exactly in terms of 
transformation by church members. The representations as father and soba serve to 
familiarise the prophet to his devotees through making use of some authoritarian positions 
in family and local society which are well-known and make sense to people. When church 
members seem to care little about influencing social matters in their everyday lives, it is 
because of a traditional perception of their leader as someone who will negotiate and 
protect their interests vis-à-vis diverging interests in broader societal contexts. The idea of a 
nation state makes little sense to them, and quite understandably, as all it has brought to 
them is war, poverty, and injustice. Yet, they seem to have a positive perception of the idea 
of democracy, which I will return to below. Church members are very aware and very 
proud of Simão Tôco’s role in politics and society. They tell how he tried to counsel the 
                                                 
138 In a small village in Northern Angola which is sandwiched between two hills, I was told that UNITA soldiers once had 
hidden in the vegetation of these hills in order to take over the village. Then the soba made the hills spin fast around until 
the soldiers were thrown off and ran away to never come back. Another story tells of a soba who made a village invisible 
when troops were passing (Kittelsen, 2004).   
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political leaders at independence and how he has participated in international conferences 
after his return in 2000 and has received the title of ‘Ambassador of Peace’.          
Tocoist rationalities are upheld by the faith that their leader has been spiritually 
chosen by God to guide their actions and protect them. This, in essence, supplies the 
church leader with enormous power, which he could easily abuse to his own advantage.139 
His freedom in ruling is, however, to some degree controlled by the very strong adherence 
to the Bible that the Tocoist profession demands. He refers to the Bible to give reason for 
anything he says and does and the church members do the same thing. The profound 
knowledge of the Bible of most Tocoists does not only help them to place all reason and 
explanation within a Biblical framework, it urges them to do so, as dealt with above. 
Further, the uncontested and divine position of the prophet eases the repressive aspects of 
authoritarianism in the sense that he does not have to protect and uphold his power and 
thus, he does not have any incentive to use repression in his rule. Anyone who does not 
accept his position and his rule is free to leave the church anytime.  
In sum, it seems fair to say that the Tocoists consciously make their important 
contribution to the process of social transformation through obeying and supporting their 
leader actively and unquestionably, but not unreflectively. Some have clear reflections on 
how their contributions fit in on a broader social scale, while others, probably a majority, 
maintain their social conscience within the society that the church in itself comprises and 
understand their own, individual destiny within this social framework.    
 
6.4 The church as an autonomous society 
As much of the above indicates, the myriad of activities, representations, and constellations 
within the church, as well as in its organisation and governance, make it function as a kind 
of small society in the society of Luanda, formally as well as in the perception of its 
members; or perhaps even as a nation within the nation. No informants made these kinds 
of abstractions on a conscious level, but as box 4 shows, they were not unfamiliar with, or 
opposed to, the thought, if confronted with it.140  
                                                 
139 During my stay with the Tocoists I gained no insights, which allow me to analyse whether any kind of abuse of power or 
resources are going on at any levels in the church. 
140 I seldom used this kind of confrontation-like techniques while looking for specific information, but my conversations 
with the men in the management functions, which I came to know quite well as I saw them every day, were almost always 
characterised by a degree of humoristic confrontation and a rather high level of understanding that sometimes encouraged 
me to challenge their level of abstraction in relation to their own faith. As box 4 and my section on humour and self-irony 
show, I often found that this level was high.  
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Textbox 4: A nation in the nation 
Mavimba reproves a younger man for wearing a T-shirt with red print at work. Is he not well aware 
that the colours of black and red symbolise evil, death, and blood and are not to be worn in the 
church? Mavimba is a respected and important member of the management of the construction 
team, but warm and humorous, as are most people in the church. I cannot help asking how the 
national colours – red and black are the colours of the Angolan flag – can signify sin, if the church 
accepts the authorities and the national flag, as the statutes demand? There is no immediate answer, 
and as I ask if that is perhaps why Angola’s history of independence has been so sad and bloody, he 
laughs and appreciates the interpretation. I suggest a further interpretation: It sometimes seems to 
me that the church is almost like a nation itself – inside the nation of Angola? Mavimba smiles 
again and is not opposed to the idea: Yes, in a way this is true, he confirms.  
 
On the other hand, a number of statements from younger church members show a 
conscious comparison of the church with societal structures and functions. As mentioned 
above, a young man compared the prophet to a soba, stating that every society needs a 
soba. Another young man compared the tribes to embassies, while explaining to me the 
importance of the tribes in receiving people coming from the provinces. Finally, a young 
girl said to me “I felt that I was betraying my motherland141”, telling how she had come 
home late from a party, knowing that she had to get up early for a church activity. These 
three informants are all relatively well-educated, which probably has an important impact 
on this point. These informants make abstractions and references and in this way, they 
place the church in relation to the society and the nation of which it is a part. And they do 
so, conscious of the fact that they are trying to make a stranger understand something 
which is common knowledge to them. The first statement compares the church to a 
traditional society with the soba as the highest authority, while the second makes a clear 
comparison with a structure from the modern nation state in a global context: the embassy. 
The third statement describes the church as a motherland. The word stems from a modern 
context, but the importance of the comparison is in the clear indication that the church is 
the primary institutional authority in her life. Whether it replaces the nation state for her, or 
                                                 
141 In Portuguese: Patria, but in translation ‘motherland’ is appropriate as Angola, as well as Africa, is generally perceived as 
female and often associated with a mother. In the church, there was no special indication to neither confirm nor disprove 
this perception.  
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is an integral part of it, is not clear, but it is surely the authority she feels that she should 
respect, and her use of the all-embracing expression underlines this. 
Quite simply, adhering to the society the church offers can be explained with a 
regular faith in God as the most important authority to obey – and the only one to trust, in 
a country where the legitimacy of the governors is as good as non-existent and their power 
is upheld by military power and clientelist structures. As expressed in box 3 and by other 
statements, many Tocoists have strong and critical notions against the mechanism of 
corruption and clientelism that currently rule their country. These mechanisms are 
understood as the factors that hold the population in deep economic poverty. With this 
understanding, the incompleteness of the society in the church is also recognised: the 
broader societal structure must also function in order to provide citizens with the 
possibilities to acquire the means of survival. This is also indicated in the statutes’ emphasis 
on the fact that the church respects the authorities and the national flag; the responsibilities 
of spiritual guidance and earthly, social development must be placed within distinct entities. 
The church is perceived as a party, and it is therefore prohibited to be a member of the 
church and of a political party simultaneously. The spirit of God must guide the governors 
to avoid selfish behaviour and exploitation; hence, the church’s important task of 
counselling and influencing the national governors.  
 
6.5 Notions of democracy 
6.5.1 Democratic ideology 
As suggested in section 6.2, the rationalities of faith also open space for rationalities of 
democracy. In Victor’s explanation, God does not install the government in a given 
country; He guides people’s choices when they vote. If enough people listen to God, the 
right government will be chosen. In this sense the guidance of God represents a strong 
moral responsibility in man to make the right choices and to be part of a democratic 
process.142 
The idea of a free, individual will do not seem to be particularly homogeneous 
among church members. E.g. one woman will proudly state that she entered the church of 
her own free will at a young age, and others will say that everything of importance is the 
                                                 
142
 Unless this should be understood as a direct instruction from the prophet to the church members on how 
to vote, which is unlikely taking the informant’s reflective and informed opinions into consideration.  
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will of God. But whether people’s choices in life are guided directly by God or by their 
knowledge and acceptance of his word as a moral responsibility, they are conscious choices 
made from people’s rationalities in life, which in the present examples are, to a large extent, 
rationalities of faith, as the above analysis has indicated.  
A statement from one informant on the connection between democratic elections 
and rationalities of faith obviously does not allow me to make a general conclusion about 
church members’ views on state democracy, particularly because it has been almost 
impossible to make other informants express anything to the effect. In the view expressed 
in box 3, it seems that praying is a much more important responsibility of the faithful in 
order to bring benediction to the politicians. The informant stated that voting is also 
important, but she was less sure about it and underlined that it takes time to achieve results. 
Victor said the same. Their views support the currently widespread priority in Angola in 
relation to creating and securing democracy: finding mechanisms of securing free and fair 
elections.143 As long as this is not secured, it matters little what you vote or who guides your 
choice. Party politics have to become a matter of moral responsibility instead of personal 
promotion, before democratic principles can become truly relevant. 
 My interview with the church leader revealed the same preoccupations concerning 
democracy. According to the prophet “Democracy is good, if it is well directed. If it is not, 
as there are so many examples of here in Africa, it will end up in frauds etc. In your 
countries there is benediction. The politicians have benediction.”144 This is not to be 
understood as an understanding of politicians as directly guided by God. The notion of 
benediction is very commonly used and refers, again, to the moral responsibility in people 
to do good as dictated by the word of God. Politicians are perceived to have benediction, 
when they take their role as the representatives of the common good seriously.       
  
6.5.2 Internal democracy 
Along with these considerations, I will venture the assertion that the church structure 
contains democratic features, despite the facts that the prophet sovereignly appoints each 
member of every church committee and assumes an autocratic position on top of the 
                                                 
143 Discussions and suggestions about how and who should secure this have occupied the public debate on a daily basis for 
the last two years, even though the date for elections has not yet been set.  
144 See appendix 1. 
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hierarchy.145 First, as noted above, this autocracy never becomes repressive, as it is 
wholeheartedly supported by its members. The prophet was elected by God because man is 
not considered ‘big’ enough and humanity not uniform enough to choose the best human 
leader. In choosing God as their overall authority, devotees have as such also chosen the 
prophet, after making sure that he was ‘real’. When the prophet appoints the members of 
the different councils and committees, the same principle is at stake: God knows best who 
is most appropriate to undertake which tasks. But once chosen for the different 
representations, the appointed are expected to reach informed solutions to their concrete 
tasks in collaboration, which indicates a kind of specialised decentralisation at the  midst of 
the centralised power structure. Decisions of a more important character must be 
presented to the prophet before being taken, but for overall decisions or changes etc. the 
Church Congress must be consulted. The constitutionally founded structure certainly 
resembles that of a politically lead, democratic organisation (see appendix 6). Each ‘layer’ in 
the formal hierarchy refers to and depends on each other. The prophet referred, in our 
conversation, to the formalisation of this structure as an attempt to decentralise power 
within the church. What is obviously not very democratic in this decentralisation is the 
quite vertical hierarchy of this structure and the absence of women in its higher organs.   
 As mentioned in 5.4.1, there is a myriad of local councils and groups below the 
formal structure, but in close contact with the lowest layers of it, undertaking a range of 
different activities and adding to the decentralisation. In the face of the analysis of the 
church as representing a somewhat autonomous society, it actually looks like a society, 
which to a considerable degree, lives up to the normative view of associational life as 
securing democracy in accordance with the Tocquevillian/Putnam approach.      
 
6.6 African appropriation  
Few things point towards the existence of direct traces from pre-colonial African religions 
in Tocoist faith and practices. There is an all-encompassing fear of witchcraft and the risk 
of being occupied by evil spirits, as in most spheres (even highly modernised) of Angolan 
society, which seem to be more rooted in indigenous beliefs than in Christian witch-hunts 
etc., even if they match their understanding of the devil quite well.146 The Church has a 
                                                 
145 Even though the Prophet himself was surprised when I presented the idea to him. 
146 The features of witchcraft, devils, etc. in Catholic faith was strongly imposed on Angola during the time of the 
Inquisition, where the colonial state practiced the policy of sending people accused of witchcraft into exile in the colonies. 
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small centre for spiritual consultations, where people can receive spiritual treatment in the 
form of conversations, healing or in rare cases actual exorcism. The great significance 
Tocoist faith ascribes to the spiritual qualities of magic and the inexplicable spheres in life, 
which are revealed to them through signs and subtly indicated secrets, also seem to have 
roots in indigenous worldviews, which may match earlier times’ European Christian 
interpretations to some extent.  
What is, nevertheless, both weightier in the Tocoist faith and more important to 
the study of agency, is the ‘appropriation’ of the European religion with the feature of the 
African Savoir. The great European Christian narrative has been retold in the African 
context, or rather; it has been expanded and its universal claim has perhaps even been 
made more complete by the Tocoist interpretation. Tocoists do to a large extent position 
themselves (as Africans rather than as Angolans) in relation to the others, the rest of the 
world, which is perceived as more developed, better, more just, in sum: with more 
benediction than Africa. They do so through direct statements and via the parable of 
Jacob’s betrayal of Esau. There is, however, also the possibility that they expressed this 
positioning, particularly in relating themselves to me, as a representative of the other, 
developed world, when they were talking to me. But it is surely the paramount point in 
their religious worldview that the prophet who was chosen by God to guide and 
accompany the people on the last bit of the way to his Kingdom was a black African 
because Africa is perceived to be the last continent to have received the benediction. The 
Tocoist Christian interpretation and worldview explicitly contain an explanation which is 
similar to a ‘world system’ line of thought, which is symbolised by their eight-pointed star; 
the eighth point symbolises the Kingdom of God which is about to come, and the seven 
others are earlier world powers.           
As section 6.4 showed, church members seem to compare the society embodied in 
the church to traditional as well as modern societal structures without facing contradictions 
on that account. It does not seem to matter whether the church is part of a traditional or a 
modern sphere of either society or history. The ‘narrative’ of the African prophet is a tale 
of its own that has grown out of a Christian framework and has been shaped by a quest for 
autonomy; a need to distinguish oneself from the colonial Christians and write ones own 
history of African liberation. It is neither traditional nor modern, and it reaches beyond 
political discourses that seek to construct Angolan national identity, which have been the 
instruments of the combatants during the all of Angola’s independent history. Actually, 
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attention is hardly ever given to the Angolan origins of the prophet. No one, for example, 
mentioned that Tôco, as the last saviour, is Angolan in relation to the Zairian prophet 
Kimbangu. Tocoists are hardly Angolan, but very much African in their self-perception.   
In Ashcroft’s conceptual framework, the Tocoists have interpolated Christian 
colonial discourse, which, at least in the shape of the Catholic Church, was a powerful 
means for colonial repression. This interpolation has served to reconstruct or expand the 
Christian message to enclose a particular meaning-producing narrative of liberation for the 
Africans, which is determined neither by a colonial legacy nor by particular expectations to 
and imaginings of decolonisation and national identity. The recent re-incarnation of the 
prophet, in the first year of what the Tocoists call the Millennium of Christ, is certainly a 
further challenge to Christian discourse. This does indeed all seem like the epitome of 
subtle resistance; what is left to prove is the great capacity for social change that this 
interpolation should comprise, according to Ashcroft’s calculations. If we assume that 
colonial repression was reproduced with the Angolan post-colonial conflict through its co-
optation in the binary myth, then the end of the war and the cessation of binary hostilities 
should provide the opportunity for agency to unfold. The construction project actually 
looks like a very concrete example of this cause-effect relation. Yet, a few circumstances are 
left to be dealt with before a conclusion can be drawn. 
 
6.7 The young generation 
The above could, in many ways, indicate that we are dealing with a quite closed religious 
community with a somewhat static and dogmatic worldview and way of life. The church 
indeed offers an almost complete society, a coherent self-identity, reciprocal relationships, 
and a high degree of autonomy, with no need for a discourse on traditional or modern, but 
it is situated in a context of deep and utter societal change. As mentioned earlier, the 
majority of church members have migrated to Luanda during the 27 years of conflict, 
which constituted Angola’s independent history until 2002. My conversations with young 
church members, who are either born in Luanda or have arrived in their early childhood, 
point towards a new generation of Tocoists who are in the process of repositioning 
Tocoism in the new post-conflict, urban, modern, and perhaps even global setting.  
As outlined above, three young Tocoists are the only ones who have explicitly 
positioned the church and its institutional significance for their lives in relation to the 
broader society of which they are a part. Their statements suggest that the church 
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substitutes a number of functions of traditional as well as modern society. But they further 
articulate a relationship to friends and other contacts outside the church, which seems 
rather harmonious. Despite their adherence to the strict rules of the church, which have 
driven some young Tocoists away from the church, they state that they do not, by any 
means, condemn others. Victor, at about 25, said that he tries to talk to his friends about it 
and tell them e.g. that it is a lack of respect to have more than one girlfriend or not to take 
them seriously, but that he accepts them as they are. Only, he states firmly, he does not 
want to be with them when they are drunk, because then they are not conscious. Silvia, 18 
years old, who felt ashamed of coming home late from a party, did so on her own account. 
When I asked if her parents let her stay out late, it was not even an issue for her. She and 
another young girl, Naima at 19, both expressed independently of each other, that their 
choice of studies was their own and they articulated their considerations leading to their 
choices in a highly reflective manner. Naima said she wanted to study public administration 
because she liked working with such things and that she wanted to finish her education and 
get a job before marrying. In that way, she also knew that she would get a husband who 
accepted that she wanted to work and have a carrier. Generally, young Tocoists seem 
independent and reflective towards their choices and opportunities and it is noticeably an 
attitude encouraged by their parents and elder church members.147 It seems that there is a 
high degree of confidence from parents and elders that the young people can manage their 
lives and decisions, which is supported by the mutual respect between them. There was no 
hesitation from Silvia in opposing the opinions of elder church members or saying no 
when someone tried to coerce her into a piece of work when she was busy with something 
else, but her rejection was always made in a calm manner and often with humour.  
There were, altogether, no signs of conflicts between younger and older 
generations and little tension was found among the youth between their faith-related values 
and those of an urban youth with modern trends and fashions.148 Silvia expressed that she 
                                                 
147
 I also observed a Bible class where the children had to stand up, one by one, in front of the class and cite passages from 
the Bible in loud and clear voices. 
148 This is of course, again, only a valid observation in relation to the young generation of Tocoists who participated in the 
work and were active in the church. There are most probably a large part of the children born into Tocoism who are either 
passive members or have left the church. Even this does, however, seem to be accepted as the free choices of the children. 
An elder woman told me that her children had joined another church because of the strict rules in Tocoism, and as I asked 
if she was sad about it, she answered that she was happy that they were still with God and had not chosen a lay life, perhaps 
leaving them to crimes and alcoholism. There does, however, seem to be a tendency in the church to favour harmony and 
peaceful coexistence as virtues to an extent, which could perhaps incite church members to downplay or hide conflicts. I did 
once overhear a group of women engaged in ‘good old gossiping’ about other members, which also included the mentioning 
of some interpersonal conflicts in one of the church committees. 
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was a little worried with some of the other young church members who sometimes had 
attitudes that did not show respect for the church and other people, but apart from this 
statement, nothing indicated contradictions between a ‘Tocoist’ and a ‘youth’-identity.  
None of my young informants ever spoke of participating in church activities in 
order to save their lives. The belief most probably exists implicitly within their faith, but the 
way they all spoke about the future in a pragmatic fashion and attributed significance to 
education and job opportunities, suggests that they may interpret the idea of the Kingdom 
of God and eternal life in a less literal manner than their parents. What was most 
articulated by them in relation to their faith was their moral responsibility towards God.     
Further studies with a particular focus on this point would, however, be necessary 
in order to be able to draw conclusions on whether Tocoism, represented by the younger 
generation, is really suited for an encounter with a radically changing environment with a 
variety of influences, and holds integrating potential. Firstly, will the church succeed in 
holding on to the youth and not ‘scare them off’ with their strict rules, which are seemingly 
not as easily integrated with modern life by all young Tocoists? Secondly, the interpretation 
of the youth may, as a consequence of the integration they are subjecting it to, be less 
radical in relation to the particular characteristics of the Tocoist profession; a feature that 
may weaken or may strengthen their agency.  
 
Finally, I want to return to Victor and his highly reflected opinions on the church in 
relation to society, which certainly represents a special level of abstraction, also among the 
youth. According to Victor, there is now an opening – abertura – of the church towards 
broader society, which has been brought about after the return of the prophet and the end 
of the war. Previously, the church was insular because of the persecutions it had suffered. 
Now the opening allows for relations to other churches and other countries – for 
interchange – for the Tocoists to teach the way of God and for them to learn from others 
as well, he says.  
 
6.8 The Church and Angolan society  
Finally, this leads me to the question about the position of the church in Angolan society. 
It seems beyond doubt that the church has been insular and, to a considerable degree 
continues to be so. Members other than Victor explain this by referring to the war 
environment and persecutions they have suffered. This condition started to change from 
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1992 onwards, but between 1984 and 2000 the church seems to have been rather caught up 
in its internal conflicts, and the lack of a leader further deprived it of outer representatives. 
After the return of the prophet in 2000, however, he entered immediately into contact with 
the political leaders.149 In 2003, an agreement with the government was reached on the 
school project, which promised that the state will finance the daily running of the school 
when it is finished. According to the prophet, the government is happy with the 
construction, and there are generally signs that the relationship and co-operation with the 
government is improving. “They did not recognise the errors of the past, but they accept us 
now and seem willing to collaborate. That is a good sign”, he says.150  
  Yet, how come the church has been so hesitant to enter into collaboration with 
other churches? It seems to have made its appeal for peace rather unilaterally and it is not a 
member of COIEPA or other ecumenical associations.151 Again, according to Victor, these 
organisations are not reliable partners because they are partisan. They are all supporting a 
political party in one way or the other and, as such, cannot pressure the government and 
cannot represent the churches, just as one cannot belong to two parties, he says (cf. the 
church as a party in 6.4).152 Generally, though, there is also a considerable scepticism 
towards the Catholic Church among Tocoists due to the historical heritage, which was also 
articulated by the prophet during my interview.              
  The church is, on the contrary, engaged in some international alliances, among 
these the Inter-religious Federation, which awarded the prophet with the title of ‘Peace 
Ambassador’ in 2004. On this occasion the prophet pronounced that “I have not been well 
understood in my country”.153       
Whether it is a lack of understanding, of interest or of accessibility, very little has 
been written on Tocoism from third party testimonies.154 The few references made to the 
Tocoists in church literature on Angola, always categorise them along with the 
Kimbanguists, and treat them scantily, objectively, and somewhat separately from other 
                                                 
149
 As expressed in box 3 and documented in several church records. 
150 See appendix 1 
151 The church did, however, participate in a huge ecumenical celebration on the 3rd anniversary of the end of the war, held 
on the 4th of April 2005 at the National Stadium.   
152 The church does, however, seem to have excellent relations to some political parties that are considered bakongo, i.e. 
come from the northern part of the country. These are the traditional bakongo party, FNLA, and a newer but prominent 
opposition party, PDP-ANA. I do not know whether there is a particular limit between a good relationship and a partisan 
affiliation.  
153 www.iifwp.org The Federation is based in South Korea and works with the principle of Ambassador’s of Peace generally, 
which apart from honouring the person receiving the title also places on him the responsibility to keep promoting peace.   
154
 I have not been able to locate any analyses or detailed descriptions on the church from external sources. Available 
newspaper articles regarding the church tend to describe events and activities in a very objective light. 
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churches. Only Henderson provided a critical and indeed less objective, but very brief, view 
on the ‘messianic current’ as treated in 5.2. Yet, Henderson’s view may reflect why the 
church, in addition to its self-established remoteness from other churches and associations, 
perhaps tends to be perceived by its surroundings as a rather isolated entity or community: 
The all-important notion of the African saviour does not easily integrate with other 
philosophies and may even appear challenging to other Christians. The recent reincarnation 
of the prophet in a new body is certainly not likely to mediate this circumstance.   
The subtle resistance and the interpolation of colonial Christian discourse with the 
narrative of the African prophet, as discussed in 6.6, may thus not only have supplied the 
Tocoists with a coherent and autonomous identity as a group, it may also have contributed 
to isolating this group from the rest of post-colonial Angolan society.  
 
6.9 Summing up 
What can be said, then, about the kind of agency at stake among the Tocoists?  
Apparently, the one, great force that drives the Tocoists to participate in the 
construction of the school is their belief that God will commend he who works hard on his 
demand. This creates, at worst, a picture of man as fundamentally thinking about his own 
well, or fundamentally unable of changing or influencing anything but his own individual 
destiny. Furthermore, Tocoists are not even able to serve their God when they do not have 
a direct intermediate – their prophet and father – amongst them. Then they become weak 
or un-concentrated and start focusing on mundane things and needs. Seen from a different 
perspective, the belief is a way to comply with a strong moral responsibility in life. To be a 
good person, to be good to others – amor ao proximo – is very commonly articulated as 
perhaps the most important of God’s demands. It is indeed a way of formalising and 
securing a set of social norms and codes of conduct in a society that for a very long time 
has suffered deep degradation of social bonds of trust and reciprocity and hence moral 
values, and has had no social regulatory system. But it is done with a deep humility; a 
recognition that man is small and largely incapable of coping with his own individual moral 
responsibilities; common guidelines are needed. 
Furthermore, if your own destiny is a direct consequence of your actions in life, 
this can be read as a great belief in agency. Nothing is given; before God you are 
fundamentally held responsible for your own actions and efforts in life and there are no 
shortcuts or easy ways out, no one else to blame or to save you. Yet, you have a deep 
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responsibility to guide others and do thus, indirectly, change their destiny too. Rationalities 
of faith thus promote agency to a considerable degree and may influence social change. 
The direct link to God is, however, crucial in order to ensure that Tocoists understand 
what God wants from them. If the Bible is their guideline on how to behave, the prophet is 
perhaps even more important, for he is their guideline on how to act. No concrete 
conditions change from behaving. As the prophet says; Faith without action is worthless.  
And the Tocoists certainly act. Being a part of the Tocoist society is hardly possible 
without engaging in numerous activities. If it is not the school construction, it is a choir, a 
committee or a thematic group, etc., and within these groups the members learn how to 
organise, to co-operate, to compromise, and to respect different opinions. This kind of 
agency is very valuable in creating skills that will increase each individual’s self-esteem and 
understanding of his own capacities as well as the power and dynamics of acting in a group.      
 
But what is the power of this kind of agency through collective action from a societal point 
of view, if Tocoists seem to care little about the fact that their actions supply their own 
society as well as the broader, Angolan society with a large school that will provide 
education for a considerable number of children? If they find their prayers more fruitful for 
influencing political issues? That is, if they care about this at all because they have enclosed 
themselves in their small, closed community and rejected the broader society, which they 
find it difficult to trust and cooperate with? Despite the great agency that the Tocoist 
rationalities of faith and their secure and solidarity-based society foster, the Tocoists hardly 
perceive of themselves as actors on a broader social scene. They do not see the strength of 
their unity as a force to create social transformation in a broad sense. On the contrary, they 
expect their leader to deal with such matters. They are but his work force, even if a 
reflective and conscious one.  
Yet, could it be that this kind of agency holds other potentials? The Tocoists have 
fought an intense fight all through their existence – not in order to influence social and 
political circumstances, but rather to defend their right to be Tocoists; to maintain the 
identity and integrity founded in the belief that their African prophet is showing them the 
right way to the good life. A big building made of voluntarily and collectively poured 
blocks cannot be the only sign of social change generated by the Tocoists. If a process of 
interpolation like the one I have located within the Tocoist Church, which is indeed 
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creating meaning and keeping hope alive, creates opportunities for social transformation on 
more subtle levels, as Ashcroft holds, how does this transformation manifest?  
  
6.10 Tocoist agency and social change in a broad perspective 
With the above sub-conclusion, it seems that I have set out to discuss the power of agency, 
which is neither reckoned nor valued as agency by its agents and takes place within an 
isolated and closed community? This is partly so. The starting point for my investigation 
was to reveal and analyse a set of existing resources for social transformation in the urban 
setting of Luanda. For this purpose I chose to work with the concept of collective action 
because it emphasises the dynamism of acting together for a concrete goal; and Ashcroft’s 
concept of agency, because it relates this dynamism to cognitive processes and seeks to 
capture capacity for creating social transformation on various levels. This means that 
people’s agency for social change may be largely unrecognised in contrast to the notion of 
empowerment, largely used in development discourse, which generally aims at making 
people realise their potential. But the fact remains that people always engage in collective 
action for some more or less conscious reason. And this reason will in one way or the other 
reflect a wish to change some kind of condition, but not necessarily of a social character. In 
the case of the Tocoist school construction it seems fairer to say that the conditions the 
actors wish to influence are of a spiritual character; the concrete goal of the collective 
action – the school and education – is of less interest to the actors. In other words, the 
reasons to participate in and the goal of the collective action are quite separate instances.  
There is, however, certainly an explicit articulation among the Tocoists of the need 
to influence social processes, but the capacity in this field is attributed to the leader, with the 
achievement of peace as the foremost example. And there is recognition and pride within the 
members that the church today, in sharp contrast to most of its history, is accepted by the 
national authorities as a partner in reconstructing the country. Even if it is not widely and 
explicitly articulated by the church members, there is no doubt that they all feel like a small 
but significant piece in this reconstruction puzzle qua their coherent identity as Tocoists. 
This connection is, however, secondary to the argument of agency in the first place.  
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6.10.1 An anti-power movement? 
In practice, the concrete construction work I had chosen as the target for my study, ended 
up occupying a less prominent place in the analysis, as this work is but one component in 
the understanding of work and hence the rationalities of faith that lead the Tocoists to act. 
As the analysis has shown, these rationalities stem from a coherent and organic worldview, 
where all activities, events and occurrences are deeply interconnected. My hypothesis that 
collective action as a concrete piece of work with a concrete output would reveal popular 
agency as generating social change, is left unconfirmed.  
The kind of social change I expected to trace via this connection between collective 
action and agency was in many ways dependent on at least a certain level of empowerment 
of the actors – that is, of a conscious realisation that their actions can transform social 
conditions for the better. What the Tocoists seek to change is a spiritual condition. This 
circumstance may exclude the group of active Tocoists from a range of definitions of social 
or popular movements. But their practices of defence of autonomy and collective identity 
may place them right in Amadiume’s category of anti-power movements (see 4.1.2). The 
characteristics of these anti-power movements were a struggle to preserve one’s right to 
maintain one’s habits, culture and traditional forms of organising, perhaps against colonisers, 
post-colonial war-lords or dictators, or simply in the face of modernity (Amadiume does not 
specify this matter). It may seem like a misrepresentation to compare Tocoist faith and 
practices with indigenous norms and organisational cultures. But if the anti-power notion is 
combined with Ashcroft’s interpolation, it becomes clear that neither indigenous nor 
Christian culture is necessarily traditional in a static sense, but is able to adapt to changing 
contexts and challenges in order to continue to offer a coherent self-representation to its 
subjects.155 In the case of the Tocoists, it is the whole, immense, universalist Christian 
discourse (perhaps the epitome of Western culture) which has been interpolated; not by 
indigenous culture as such, but rather by a new narrative; namely that of the African 
prophet. This narrative is, as I have noted, indirectly formed by indigenous discourses and 
practices of spirituality as proofs of the magic, inexplicable spheres in life, and the presence 
of evil spirits. In any case, it certainly upholds a coherent identity as Africans to its devotees, 
which has been defended intensively since its genesis. This, I suggest, makes it relevant to 
see the Tocoist community as an anti-power movement. In this perspective, it becomes 
                                                 
155 On the cover of a journal published by the Tocoist Church after the Congress in June 2005, the headline is: “The Church 
should be growing quantitatively as well as qualitatively because Christ is not static”. (I.N.S.J.C.M, 2005:1) See original 
Portuguese text in appendix 6.  
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evident how the agency generated by the church members influences social change by 
resisting co-optation into a government discourse seeking hegemonic control over Angolan 
social and political life through the creation of civil society and the celebration of national 
identity; phenomena constructed by discourses of modernity. This perspective further shows 
that agency for social change in a broader societal perspective is possible even within a 
somewhat isolated movement with few relations to, and collaboration with, other actors 
(state or non-state) on the social scene. 
 
6.10.2 An active contribution to social change? 
As mentioned, the Tocoists are, however, not only defending their rights to be Tocoists; 
they act consciously in order to promote change – spiritual change; and more indirectly also 
social change through their support of the prophet, their prayers, their social conscience, and 
through their duty to make all humans realise and comply with their moral responsibilities. 
The Tocoists indeed work for a cause. Many, mainly middle-aged women, who 
constitute an important part of the work force, articulated their own, individual, spiritual 
salvation as their main reason to participate in the work. But when digging a little deeper, 
they were all very aware of their responsibility to expand the message to others and of the 
moral responsibilities that God’s Word in general lays upon people. Solidarity and 
interdependency between them was strong. Others articulated the need to influence social 
change more directly through their support of the prophet and their prayers. The prophet’s 
prompt, biblical answer to why they are constructing the school (because the Bible says that 
faith and words without action are worthless), permits me to place the socio-political 
rationalities, which make the Tocoists act, within the framework set out by the rationalities 
of faith. Such a line of reasoning, supported by concrete action in the changed socio-
political, post-war setting, suggests that the church can become a much more important 
actor on the social scene and a partner to both government and other social actors.  
There is also a possibility that the cessation of the binary, military hostilities and the 
persecution of the church can gradually change the perception among the members that the 
prophet is the only outer representative of the church, through the opening towards 
broader society that seems to be under way. A kind of decentralisation of power in the 
church seems to be at stake, which may lead towards a greater realisation of agency among 
members and further the democratic features of the structure and the rationalities of faith. 
But it all takes time, as the Tocoists say. It is only six years since the prophet returned and 
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brought the fragmented church back together, and only four years since the war ended. It 
will probably take a while to overcome 56 years of living and believing with fear. Moreover, 
there are some indications that a kind of repositioning of rationalities of faith among the 
younger, urban-based, self-determined generation of Tocoists may lead Tocoism towards a 
more integral position within Luandan society. Finally, the Tocoists may eventually begin to 
realise the social potential of their common efforts to construct the school when the effects 
begin to materialise; when non-Tocoist students and teachers appear to benefit from their 
results and more children finish their education. Conversely, broader society may also 
recognise the effort of the Tocoist church in this way and begin to see them as possible co-
operation partners.  
 
6.11 Sub-conclusion 
It is now possible to locate the power and potential of Tocoist agency on different levels. 
The actions of the Tocoists based on rationalities of faith can be said to influence 
social/spiritual change on the individual level in that the Tocoists construct their life stories 
on a processual perspective; they invest strength and money in a game they cannot loose and 
which as such keeps hope and spirits high more or less constantly.  
At the local level, church members construct their own networks of solidarity and 
social security through rationalities which are partly based on faith, partly on the 
organisational structure in the church, and partly on more traditional, social forms of trust 
and organisation in a society which has never known a state in a modern sense to undertake 
these functions. At the same time, they achieve organisational skills through their 
participation in activities within the well-functioning institutional framework of the church 
and they most probably have a profound feeling of influencing conditions concerning their 
own lives when functioning as active constituents of an active community.  
At the broader societal level, the Tocoists seek to expand the message of the moral 
responsibility of all humans to obey God and thus be good to other people. Further, they 
seek to influence socio-political processes in this light directly through their prayers and 
indirectly through their support of the Prophet, their representative in society. Only at this 
indirect level can their physical efforts of constructing the school be seen as based in 
rationalities of a ‘social-movement character’; a recognition that ‘together we can change the 
world’. This conviction is again thoroughly dependent on their coherent identity and their 
unconditional faith in their leader as the representative of God’s will. There are, however, 
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several factors that point to an opening towards the broader society that, in combination 
with the institutional decentralisation, might give church members a feeling of participating 
more directly in activities with a social impact. It may also increase the actual impact of these 
activities as the church’s possibilities of co-operating with other actors expand.   
At the ‘universal’ level, the Tocoists construct a narrative of liberation which 
buttresses all the other levels. The narrative of the African prophet is so strong in the minds 
and wills of the church members that it has permitted them to yield subtle resistance to a co-
optation into different socio-political discourses, which have sought hegemonic power in 
Angola during the history of the church. The fact that the church has been repressed and 
persecuted by the colonial state and subsequently by the new nationalist regime, combined 
with my analysis of how the members have defended their faith towards both oppressors 
and now uses it to act constructively, confirms Ashcroft’s insistence that post-colonial 
subjects are not necessarily determined by a heavy legacy, but can act according to their own 
meaning-producing schemes or references. 
 
It is thus clear that the power and potential of Tocoist agency to influence and create social 
change in a broader societal perspective is neatly tied together with the religious worldview 
and rationalities of the church. This is perhaps not surprising, but it does to some extent 
leave my analysis subject to the theoretical vacuum mentioned in 2.5; the fact that the 
specifically religious characteristics of socio-religious actors have received very limited 
attention in social science and indeed in civil society studies. On the other hand, my results 
support the view that this vacuum is a rather problematic weakness, as some social scientists 
are beginning to claim, while calling for more theoretical as well as empirical research.156 In 
this case, however, my results are collected in order to discuss some particular, contested 
issues in the civil society debate in an empirical and context-specific perspective. This 
discussion will, as a consequence of my results, also question some of the issues related to 
churches and religious actors specifically. 
                                                 
156 E.g. Hall (2001), Herbert (2003), Berger (1999). See 2.5. 
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7. The Tocoist church and civil society - Discussion 
 
When I chose to concentrate my case analysis around the concept of agency in my search for 
existing Angolan resources for creating social change, it was in an attempt to emphasise an 
actor-perspective in a debate that has recurrently diagnosed Africa’s ‘civil society problem’ as 
institutional and structural weakness. Furthermore, the debate has largely ignored social 
actors which do not fit into the western idea of an adequate civil society actor; i.e. 
developmental NGOs functioning according to western standards for good and democratic 
organisational culture. My hypothesis was that this tendency could be challenged through a 
renegotiation of the concept of civil society with increased emphasis to local actors and their 
resources. Aid interventions aimed at supporting civil society could then build on the actual 
power and potential of existing African popular resources for social change, instead of 
seeking to replace these with imported models. I, therefore, chose to analyse an empirical, 
contextualised example of social, collective action, which fell outside the aid agendas’ 
blueprints, in order to point to the relevance of rejecting some of the assumptions on which 
these blueprints are designed and focusing on the actual empirical actors. I chose to focus on 
the issues of civil society as opposed to the state, the NGO as the only relevant actor, and 
the idea of the universal validity of these assumptions.  
 In choosing to work with a church as my empirical case-study, I automatically 
included some further assumptions about the right democratic behaviour and organisation 
of good civil society actors. I will start by discussing the leadership and vertical organisation 
structure of the church and relate it to the democratic premises generally attached to the idea 
of civil society. I will then move on to discussing the position of the church as an actor in 
relation to the Angolan government’s appropriation of civil society and how the church can 
be perceived as having a mediating effect on this appropriation. To this end, I will draw on 
social movement theory and apply a discourse analytical perspective. Finally, I will argue that 
the agency of the church and its mediating effect upon the government’s hegemonic project 
hold potential in generating a more pluralistic force of actors in Angolan civil society, which 
may be able to collaborate with the Angolan government in the long term. I will also argue 
that my empirical and context-specific approach mediates the normativity at stake in both 
actor- and structure-oriented perspectives. 
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7.1 Leadership, vertical organisation and universal democratic principles 
Faced with the challenge of arguing that the popular agency located in the Tocoist church in 
Luanda has relevance for an actor-oriented debate on civil society, the first things that 
appear problematic are the apparently conservative orthodoxy, the autocratic leadership, and 
the vertical organisation of the church. This appears so because of a combination of the 
supposedly universally valid issues discussed in chapter 2. First, the prevailing perception of 
civil society as the guarantor of democracy in its position as a counterweight to the state; this 
idea that Mamdani called “a one-sided anti-state romanticisation of civil society.” (see 2.1). 
This ‘romanticisation’ also attached to civil society the qualities of being progressive, 
pluralistic, and harmonious. When civil society is supposed to be the democratic 
counterweight to the state, it is further assumed that its representatives should function 
according to good democratic principles; the ones represented by the idea of the NGO.  
If we reject these assumptions as universal, the notion that a church structure is 
incompatible with civil society might further rest on the assumption that the only alternative 
to a democratically elected governing body is authoritarianism and repression. In a text on 
social movement theory, Thomas Hansen cites Alexis de Tocqueville for saying that the idea 
about equality and democracy is the most radical of all social ideas.  
Repression and huge social divisions is actually the historical normality, where 
resurrection and not least organised protest and revolution constitute absolute 
historical exceptions. Relations of superiority and inferiority, as in a patron-client 
network, are based on an unequal distribution of resources, which is corresponded by 
a certain degree of reciprocity. Protests and passive resistance within this system does 
not necessarily indicate that the peasants perceive the authority of the patron as 
illegitimate, as J. Scott suggests (Scott, 1985, 1990), but is often merely a sort of 
struggle about distribution between the involved parts. Only if we presuppose that all 
humans possess an inborn and irresistible strive for freedom can any relation of 
inferiority be regarded as illegitimate. (T. Hansen, 1991:56-57, my translation from 
Danish)          
 
T. Hansen does, nevertheless, seem to equate relations of superiority and inferiority with 
repression and turns on the notion of perceived legitimacy in the relation, which is arguably 
reasonable in a discussion about access to material resources. When it comes to spiritual 
resources, superiority relations are not necessarily repressive, as my analysis has shown.  
As outlined in chapter 2, the idea of civil society was conceived or at least shaped in 
a political-philosophical framework, where autocracy and a certain degree of repression was 
seen as indispensable in upholding civil order; in limiting the ‘uncivil’ impulses of human 
beings (see2.1). The Tocoist church society is a living example of such an organic 
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community where state and society are not seen as separate spheres, and where the citizens 
have given up some of their autonomy in return for the protection of the ‘sovereign’ in an 
almost Hobbesian sense. There is no doubt that the notion of leadership is the most 
paramount element in the Tocoist society, but the distinctive feature is that it is an autocratic 
leadership that is unconditionally supported by the members and therefore does not become 
repressive.  
As my analysis showed, the church leader, the ‘sovereign’, is reflectively chosen by 
each citizen in his society even though he is not democratically elected. They have all 
consciously come to a decision, firstly on his status as the right leader and secondly, on his 
reincarnation. Those who could not accept the idea of his new reincarnation had to leave. 
Thus, what I have called ‘the democratic features of the church’ (the decentralisation of the 
structure) leave no room for the representation of ‘political’ minorities within the society or, 
perhaps more adequate at this level, within the party. My point that the church society 
comprises a small society within a larger society supports the widely articulated notion of the 
church as a party in an organic sense. There is no room for factions within the party, 
minority opposition groups must find another party or create their own. But the party is not 
a political party, as it is not dealing with political matters in any direct sense, and has no 
intentions of becoming one. It is, therefore, inevitably a party in a broader civil society.157 
The fact that the ‘party’ also functions under an almost ‘political’ organisation and that all the 
members are more or less active in a range of different groups and councils, further mediates 
the picture of an absolute leadership taking decision power and initiative away from a passive 
crowd of subordinates.  
Understood as a party, the church’s direct influence on social processes will then 
obviously depend on its capacity to collaborate with other civil society actors and with the 
state. This capacity is in turn largely dependent on the leader and his diplomatic abilities and 
outlook because of the vertical structure and the members’ perception of the leader as their 
representative. The structure introduced at the first congress after the return of the prophet 
in 2000 aimed, at least formally, at decentralising certain responsibilities, including in the 
field of representation.158 The ‘opening’ towards society, as mentioned by one informant, 
                                                 
157
 It must obviously also be distinguished as a religious party due to the special conditions surrounding its leader’s 
unquestionable position due to his divine qualities and the rationalities of faith which are underlying the worldview and 
motivating the actions of its members. 
158 The creation of the Universal Secretariats of Interchange and of Public Relations. See appendix 5.  
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may increase the possibilities of this decentralisation to be more consolidated.159 Still, there is 
no denying the significance of leadership as a most crucial aspect of the contact to other 
institutions and the capacity to influence processes of social change on this account.  
My example of ‘bad governance’ in spite, or rather because, of the democratic 
election by the members in a well-established Angolan NGO (see 3.2) also suggested that 
the notion of leadership in Angola may be understood in vertical terms in some 
democratically founded institutions as well, or at least with a very different respect of 
authorities than in their Northern counterparts. In a conversational interview carried out 
with staff of Development Workshop in Luanda (se appendix 1), the notion of leadership 
was also recurrently articulated as paramount when working with civil society in Angola. In 
order to mobilise civil society groups, whether understood in a community perspective or as 
formalised NGOs, they affirmed, leadership is of utmost importance because horizontal 
organisation is, as yet, rather unfamiliar to many Angolans.  
My point here is not to advocate a vertical perspective to leadership as dynamic in 
general, and certainly not the idea of a leader which cannot be replaced if necessary, but 
indeed to point to the importance of taking these relational forms and structures into 
consideration instead of ignoring them or viewing them as bad per see and destructive to any 
democratic agenda of civil society. A strong leader might very well be the best at organising 
Angolan ‘social energy’ into a coherent body or voice, as I will return to below.  
 
7.2 The church, the government, and civil society as the guarantor of democracy  
Thomas Hansen’s above-quoted argument that the democratic idea of social and political 
equality is a recent, radical, western idea has a further point to it. This idea, T. Hansen 
argues, has come riding on an engrossing ideological wave, which has spread to the periphery. 
This ideological wave has given people a platform from which their old or new masters can 
be viewed as adversaries with no legitimacy to rule:  
The democratic revolution has diffused all over the world in time with the political 
and economical supremacy of the West. This ideological wave is an unpredicted 
consequence hereof, which has proved itself as ‘anti-waves’ from the periphery 
towards the centre in the shape of anti-colonialism, anti-western fundamentalism, etc. 
(T. Hansen, 1991:56-57, my translation from Danish)  
                                                 
159 The recent nomination of Afonso Nunes to Bishop may, however, indicate that he or other important members of the 
church wish to concentrate more power around his person as a real living church leader. On the other hand, this wish could 
also reflect a ‘diplomatic’ attempt at making the church and its superior direction more apt for cooperating with other social 
actors. In order to be a reliable social actor, an institution must obviously have a real living leader that represents it and not a 
re-incarnated prophet.  
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As chapter 3 showed, the Angolan government is currently engaged in maintaining its 
hegemonic power through the consolidation of a discourse of national unity and 
reconciliation. This discourse is constructed exactly on such a democratic ‘anti-wave’. The 
daily reiterations of the national anthem with its refrain of “Angola forward! Revolution! By 
the Popular Power. A United Motherland, Liberty, One people, One Nation.”160 on national 
television and radio is but one example of this. The anthem is one long proliferation of a 
vocabulary of a modernist discourse, which was produced as socialist propaganda, but which 
is just as insistent in its attempts at convincing the Angolans about the existence of the new, 
prosperous, democratic nation in peace; a peace achieved by its ditto government – with the 
great participation of ‘civil society’. At the same time, traditional Angolan culture is exalted 
to picture this Angolan nation as both unique and African. Within this schism the Angolan 
President has even found it legitimate to criticise western countries for imposing democracy 
and good governance on poor countries, which prevents them from solving their internal 
problems.161 In this sense, the politics of consolidating the hegemonic power of the Angolan 
government is drawing on a western democratic discourse, an ‘anti-wave’ which makes it 
difficult for western partners as well as local NGOs to argue against these politics.  
Alongside, and subtly opposed to, this discourse operates, however, a religious 
discourse promoted by the churches, which seems to make a great deal more sense to a 
substantial part of the Angolan population. The Angolan Government seems to be aware of 
this schism and it has, as mentioned in 3.5, done an active and ingenious effort to co-opt this 
subtly antagonistic religious discourse into its nationalistic project. In this project, civil 
society is continuously and increasingly constructed and controlled through the 
government’s very concrete production of formal associations from within its clientelist 
networks and through its strategy of co-optation. This attitude by the government does, to a 
certain degree, invalidate the idea of civil society as a non-state sphere ensuring a democratic 
equilibrium. Such a relationship is not possible when the state is not playing along 
democratic rules, but is merely using the discourse of the western democratic idea to 
consolidate its hegemonic position. Here the religious discourse reaches an important 
                                                 
160 My translation (see Portuguese letter in appendix 6). After the peace agreement in 2002, there was talk about changing 
the anthem as well as the national flag because they were inextricably associated with the MPLA. Today both anthem and 
flag are powerfully used by the government in its campaign for national unity and reconciliation along with the continuous 
promotion and erection of statues of the great symbol of revolution and liberty, Angola’s first president and MPLA’s first 
leader Agostinho Neto, who died in 1979.  
161 Panafrican News Agency (PANA), August 29, 2005 
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position exactly because it is not drawing on the democratic rationale and because it makes 
sense to, and succeeds in holding on to, ordinary people. Because, as my analysis of the 
Tocoist church has shown, the government’s endeavour of co-optation has not been 
successful among these religious actors. And this is exactly because the religious discourse, 
appropriated with the narrative of the African prophet, represents a coherent and 
continuous philosophy and framework for people to construct their lives in, in contrast to 
the government’s nationalistic discourse, contradictorily appropriated by the discourse of 
democracy. My analysis of the prophet as a father and soba and of Tocoist notions of 
spirituality as related to indigenous faith has also indicated that the Christian notion of a 
prophet is rather compatible to indigenous Angolan notions of leader roles. Democratic 
rationalities seem to make less sense to church members, but this does not mean that these 
could not be appropriated or interpolated to make sense in the Tocoist philosophy and 
worldview at some point. The structure and the statements of a few church members indeed 
demonstrated that such a process might have started.    
Hence, instead of ‘answering back’ with a new anti-wave of democratic rationale 
claiming the rights of the people against the state, the church has managed to hold on to its 
own religious rationalities through its subtle resistance, and to become a social actor on these 
premises. The church does not represent a counterweight to the state in any direct sense, but 
it does succeed in mediating its hegemonic power position.  
 
7.3 Social energy, plurality, and equilibrium  
As outlined in 3.4, Christoplos suggested the term ‘social energy’ as a more adequate 
analytical tool in Angola than the much fancied ‘social capital’. ‘Social energy’ seems to fit my 
analysis of Tocoist agency well, even if the term was first suggested to capture day-to-day 
physical survival, as I exemplified with the female vendors’ kixikilas. There is almost no limit 
to the energy the Tocoists present in order to work for their faith. And organised within the 
institutional framework of the church, much can certainly be achieved, as the school 
construction is a weighty example of. Even if I have emphasised an actor-oriented 
perspective to civil society as a condition of understanding the resources of ‘a given’ civil 
society in its specific context, the structures of that given context are obviously paramount 
when seeking to understand the capacities of these actors in promoting social change. 
Christoplos, advocating a highly actor-oriented approach, went on to connect the concept of 
social energy to his notion of civil society as ‘dynamic adhocracy’ rather than ‘equilibrium’, 
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with equilibrium understood as the romanticised idea of civil society as the democratic 
safeguard against the state. He does, nevertheless, seem to recognise that the idea of 
equilibrium might add to the strength of a civil society consisting of dynamic adhocracy:  
Analysis of these two normative concepts of equilibrium and adhocracy requires more 
empirical study. These two approaches are certainly not mutually exclusive, but we 
perhaps need to pair a certain humbleness with our normativity. Sustainable, trusting, 
and productive relationships may be able to be fostered, even if the linear 
developmentalist assumptions which usually accompany ‘sustainability’ and 
‘institutional development’ are put on the back burner. (Christoplos, 1998, p. 18)   
 
Let me try to situate my empirical study between these two normative ideas of equilibrium 
and adhocracy. 
In an attempt at such humbleness Christoplos adopted the Angolan term esquema. 
This notion of esquemas bridges the gap between social energy shaped into simple and 
perhaps immoral schemes that are applied for mere individual survival (or enrichment) and 
schemes of moral practices and behaviour applied in order to create responses to, and act 
towards, injustices within un-free or war-ravaged contexts. While the existence of the first 
kind of schemes is probably difficult to ignore, the latter kind seems to be less a matter of 
course. My ‘humble’ search for existing resources in Luandan social life sought to locate and 
analyse resources for social change, which seem rather akin to these latter esquemas of moral 
(and collective) practices and behaviour. For this purpose, I made use of the notion of 
agency exercised through subtle resistance and interpolation, and I found the concepts 
fruitful in describing and analysing the Tocoist ‘spiritual energy’ which triggered off social 
practices. My analysis clearly showed how this spiritual energy unfolds and at the same time 
develops into organisational skills and deeply meaningful everyday social practices within the 
well functioning institutional framework of the church. This capacity for creating social 
transformation was, at first glance, only really relevant internally in what I have called the 
church society. It turned out, however, that a most crucial point in this perspective was the 
church’s success in defending its autonomy and avoiding co-optation into the government’s 
hegemonic project. As outlined above, the church has avoided co-optation because it 
adheres to a more meaningful and consequently stronger discourse. As it seems, only social 
actors which succeed in maintaining their autonomous constituency can provide civil society 
with genuine plurality, which is perhaps the most paramount aspect lacking in the Angolan 
context at present, as chapter 3 showed. It is exactly this plurality of actors, which is 
normatively supposed to create a democratic equilibrium towards the state. 
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In Angola, subtle resistance has therefore, continued to be a necessary esquema for 
spiritual or mental survival after decolonisation, during the wars, and even seems to continue 
to be so in times of peace. Elections are approaching and the Angolan government is 
naturally doing anything in its power, which is quite a lot, to co-opt the largest possible part 
of social and popular actors in its hegemonic project. With elections concluded, a potential 
new government would naturally alter this setting. But the more probable scenario of a re-
election of the present government will supply it with a considerable portion of legitimacy, 
which may strengthen its hegemonic project. Yet, it may also generate a new space for this 
government to realise that it can co-operate with actors who are not co-opted into its 
networks, as its agreement with the Tocoists on the school is carefully suggesting. Such a 
scenario may seed the ground for civil society to represent a more pluralistic force in the face 
of the government and may thus open up for a more genuine dialogue and inclusion of non-
state actors in the political process. This contrasts the present unrealistic expectations to civil 
society organisations of fulfilling the vacuum of the state in social service provision and 
challenging the self-same state through pressure, lobby and advocacy activities at the same 
time. In this sense, the ‘adhocracy’ which has enabled the Tocoists to maintain their 
autonomy and to embark on social activities with ‘spiritual energy’ have been paramount in 
securing a kind of equilibrium towards the hegemonic project of the government. It is this 
equilibrium that donors seek to create by strengthening the structural capacity of NGOs. 
The normativity which may guide actor- as well as structure-oriented approaches can in this 
sense be mediated by ‘humble’ and context-sensitive empirical research.  
 
7.4 The actor-perspective on civil society: a methodological retrospect  
My emphasis to an actor-perspective to civil society, in the shape of considering local actors’ 
resources for creating social change, thus seems to have ended up supporting one of the 
assumptions that I have been criticising; namely the idea of civil society as a (democratic) 
equilibrium towards the state. This normative notion is, on balance, quite relevant in Angola, 
where popular agency independent of the state, otherwise would have very limited chances 
of influencing social change at the political level. The distinctive feature is that this 
equilibrium will neither be brought about by institutionally strong NGOs with lobby and 
advocacy capacity alone, nor by resistance movements claiming citizen rights. According to 
my analysis, it is subtle resistance, yielded by the church members, that makes the difference.  
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 The notion of subtle resistance came out of a post-colonial theoretical framework. 
According to Ashcroft, subtle resistance and interpolation were the means colonised subjects 
possessed that would allow them to overcome a heavy colonial legacy, which otherwise 
might subject them to a continuous position as powerless victims. In Angola, a colonial 
binary myth of ‘them and us’ is likely to have been reproduced in the civil war after 
independence, as I have analysed elsewhere.162 Even though subtle resistance has been at 
stake, it has not been able to cope with the binary myth. With the cessation of the military 
conflict, and hence the weakening of the binary myth, it does, however, seem that subtle 
resistance is as necessary as ever in order to mediate the power monopoly of the Angolan 
government, which constantly increases social inequality. This must inevitably raise the 
question: Is agency as a result of subtle resistance, in the end, anything other than a 
normative assumption about colonised societies as a harmonious group of like-minded 
people with the best intentions of creating an independent society that will benefit everybody 
equally? As it seems, the theory is not appropriate for coping with post-colonial societies 
where ‘the subjects’ are competing for power.  
As an analytical tool the framework has indeed proved itself valid, as it has 
permitted me to analyse how subtle resistance to a colonial regime has enabled the Tocoists 
to resist colonial discourse and to continue to hold on to their religious identity after 
independence, even in the face of a socialist state and, most recently, a strong democratic 
discourse. But as a theoretical argument, it seems to have some weaknesses, which may have 
to do with the fact that Ashcroft transfers his theory from literary studies to social science 
on flimsy grounds. In an attempt to reinforce this basis, I chose to combine Ashcroft’s 
notion of agency with the notion of collective action as concrete work with a concrete 
output. This connection has, however, turned out to be less direct, as my analysis showed 
that the Tocoists do not participate in the church construction out of a motivation to 
promote social change, but simply because their prophet tells them to. The power of their 
agency lies almost exclusively in their strong unity. Yet, the prophets’ reason for constructing 
the school – that words and faith without action are worthless – is indeed an expression of a 
high level of social consciousness, responsibility, and the will to constructive action within 
his interpretation of the Christian faith. This social consciousness is likely to spread to his 
devotees, even though none of them are yet quoting him for this reason when asked about 
why they are constructing the school. Perhaps, the different forms of agency of the Tocoists 
                                                 
162
 M. Hansen, 2003. See note 102. 
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are more appropriately revealed within a notion of subtle responses than subtle resistance. The 
notion of resistance inevitably appears defensive, even if we remember that subtle resistance 
includes creative processes of interpolation. The notion of responses more constructively 
embodies other practices and helps the analysis to move beyond the limitations of a 
framework designed for post-colonial theory. Responses may be much more important than 
resistance to a civil society that is not opposed to the state, but yet offers an equilibrium 
towards state domination.   
In sum, Ashcroft’s notion of agency has been a useful tool for my purpose of 
analysing the Tocoists’ abilities of influencing social change because their society is a very 
harmonious and unified community. At the macro level that Ashcroft’s theory aims at, his 
theory seems to be as normatively bound to an assumption of harmonious unity and 
coexistence just like the mainstream civil society debate. The difference is that Ashcroft’s 
theory harmonises a whole post-colonial society, where the civil society debate contrasts the 
state as the bad guy with civil society as the good guy. An actor-oriented perspective to civil 
society in general may, consequently, not advance a more realistic idea of third world actors’ 
actual resources in influencing the formation of more just and equal societies.  
Seeking Christoplos’ argument, a more humble attitude to civil society and more 
empirical research may lead towards more informed foundations from which to plan aid 
interventions. In this process, eclectic and interdisciplinary perspectives on both theory and 
practice may be fruitful contributions, as Amadiume’s and Thomas Hansen’s points from 
social movement theory, Christoplos’ practical approach from an emergency aid perspective, 
and indeed Ashcroft’s post-colonial conceptual framework have shown.  
 
7.5 Perspectives for religious actors in civil society 
The point that the distinctive feature of the African prophet is the aspect which has allowed 
the Tocoists to avoid absorption into the discourses of power, does not allow me to assume 
that other Angolan churches possess the same kind of agency. It seems likely, however, that 
the social and spiritual energy of other churches and religious movements may have found 
other or similar esquemas of survival.163 Their importance and continuous popular support 
from colony, over socialism to ‘peace and democracy’, as well as their important role in 
                                                 
163 Comerford’s (2005) analyses of different public spaces show how both the historical churches and the alliances in which 
they have engaged, as well as community church groups have applied different strategies which have generated autonomous 
responses or ‘peace narratives’ to the situation of continued conflict.   
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mobilising the peace movement (see 3.5) are but a few pieces of evidence to this. The 
Evangelical current representing new interpretations and practices, as mentioned by Berger 
(also in 3.5), is certainly visible in Angola. The Tocoist Church can, according to some 
features, be interpreted as being a part of this development. Even though it is very orthodox 
in many aspects, it also represents dynamic and anti-static perspectives in several matters.   
This study does not, however, allow me to classify or situate either the Tocoist faith 
or the social activities of the church in relation to other churches or religious currents in 
Angola or elsewhere. Nor is this the purpose of my research. But it does open a perspective 
for discussing and investigating the role of churches and religious actors as actors in civil 
society more generally and in relation to the specific religious characteristics of their agency.  
The point of departure for my empirical study was an observation of the strong 
popular support of the churches in Angola. Apart from this, my study has indicated some 
dimensions that may very well be general for churches in Angola, such as their mobilising 
and dynamic abilities, their efforts at promoting each individual’s moral responsibility 
towards his fellow human beings and his society, and their well developed institutional 
structures based on strong notions and respect of leadership. I find these dimensions to be 
extremely important components in seeking to understand the power of civil society that, 
after all, exists in Angola. An understanding of the social norms and values expressed 
through these components and of how they relate and respond to their changing socio-
political context (colonial, post-colonial, socialist, binary conflict, humanitarian disaster, 
centralised ‘co-opting’ state, etc.) might be key in efforts at strengthening the institutional 
capacity of civil society organisations and in integrating a more actor-oriented perspective 
into the effort – on the premises of the actors. 
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8. Conclusion 
 
Civil society in Angola has largely been created during the last 15 years; that is, if we decide 
to see it through the glasses of the ‘mainstream’ approach to civil society that has formed the 
basis for the design of blueprints for international aid interventions. Through these glasses 
civil society in Angola is only ‘emerging’ and is thus weak because its organisations still lack 
the institutional maturity to constitute a serious counterweight to an ill performing state. But 
if we take off the mainstream glasses and choose to contemplate civil society as a sphere of 
social life outside the state, but not necessarily in opposition to it, this sphere, inhabited by 
all sorts of actors who are tired of living in social misery, has a long history and innumerable 
experiences. In this understanding, civil society might already possess a range of resources 
which are relevant to the creation of a more just and democratic Angolan society. 
 Through discussion and critique of the history and present status of the idea of civil 
society, I have presented a possible reconceptualisation of the theoretical notion, with the 
purpose of opening up for the inclusion of actors other than NGOs and considering the 
resources that these actors – and people in general – possess. At the same time, I have 
emphasised the importance of understanding these resources in their specific socio-political 
context and through empirical research. Through such an approach, I have sought to locate 
some strengths of civil society in Angola instead of lamenting its weaknesses.  
 
My historical account of civil society has shown how the concept has developed from a 
broad theoretical field, seeking to explain human organisation and coexistence, into a highly 
operationalised, normative attempt at creating a democratic counterweight – in the shape of 
NGOs – to the state in developing countries. This status of the idea is empirically 
problematic. The state in Angola, or rather the regime that occupies state power, does not 
play according to democratic rules, but it has been able to create ‘its own’ civil society that is 
ready to document that it does. All other independent forces have been effectively 
neutralised. International donors have sought to equip some of the real Angolan NGOs with 
institutional capacity to challenge this power accumulation, but yet they have been given no 
voice in the debate. A reason which is seldom articulated could be that these organisations 
lack a weighty base of popular support; a base which is not likely to grow stronger when 
focus is on developing organisational professionalism according to schemes that ordinary 
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people find it difficult to understand. The contributions and resources of ordinary people 
have, however, been of remarkably limited interest to the civil society debate, mainstream as 
well as critiques. The great emphasis given to structural capacity seems to have drawn 
attention away from all other resources that local actors might possess.  
In Angola, brutal wars and a culture of fear have limited popular expressions of 
discontent. Yet, when looking underneath the surface, ordinary people indeed seem to come 
up with responses to their difficult situations. For this purpose, the churches have served an 
important role as independent public spaces and bases for relations of trust, social networks 
and moral values. Churches and religious actors have, however, primarily received 
unenthusiastic attention in the civil society debate due to notions of their vertical 
organisation, their conservatism, their rivalries, etc., which have largely excluded them from 
the ‘good company’ of democratic and progressive civil society.  
 
The Tocoist Church in Luanda is an example of an autocratically directed and vertically 
organised institution, which has indeed managed to mobilise its popular forces for action 
and creating visible and socially relevant results of the effort. My field study in the church 
has shown how the church members engage in collective action out of a variety of 
rationalities that are all based in their unconditional faith in God and in their African 
prophet. Within the small and relatively closed society that the headquarters in Luanda 
constitutes, everybody occupies their more or less important position in the community and 
their agency for change here is extensive. Everybody works in order to secure their own 
salvation, to expand the message of God and Tocoism, to secure the unity of the church, 
and to support their prophet unconditionally. With the prophets’ emphasis on the Biblical 
message that faith without action is worthless, considerable concrete output is identifiable. 
Yet, this does not seem to have given the church members an idea of themselves as social 
actors in a broader perspective. A new organisational decentralisation in the church, an 
opening towards the broader Angolan society as a result of the changed political 
environment, and a new generation of young, urban Tocoists do, however, suggest that this 
condition might be changing. Yet, the most important contribution of the agency of the 
church to influencing social change in Angolan society has, ironically, been its capacity to 
resist it. Throughout the history of the church, the strong faith and the presence of the 
prophet have enabled the devotees to resist repression and persecution from colonisers as 
well as the Angolan nationalist government, and to defend their identity as Tocoists. In a 
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political environment where hegemonic power is almost consolidated with the end of 
decades of binary conflict and the strongest means for domination is a strategy of co-
optation of independent actors, the Tocoist contribution to social change, or rather; against 
social regimentation, is of the utmost importance.  
 
By defining civil society loosely as a sphere of social life outside the state, but not necessarily 
opposed to it, whose different actors in one way or another hold an opportunity of 
influencing social change, I opened the concept towards an inclusion of actors such as 
churches that do not fit the normative assumptions conventionally attached to the idea. The 
basis of existence of the Tocoist Church rests on the sovereign leadership of the prophet 
and all important decisions are made by him through his divine contact. Obviously, the 
institution is in no sense democratic. Even so, it certainly allows for popular agency to 
unfold internally as it is in no sense repressive either; it is very much a voluntary association. 
Concrete collective action does, however, seem to be triggered off solely by the prophet’s 
emphasis on the biblical quotation that faith without action is worthless. The church has, 
however, adopted some democratic features in the shape of an organisational 
decentralisation that, at best, will allow the agency of the church members to unfold more 
broadly and enable co-operation with other social actors, state or non-state. At worst, it will 
only serve to organise the internal activities in the church more systematically. In any case, it 
will improve the organisational skills of the church members and their perception of how 
much can be achieved by acting collectively.    
I discussed how the fact that the Tocoist church is not drawing on democratic 
discourse has immunised it towards the co-optation strategy of the government in a way that 
would be impossible for democratically defined NGOs. This suggests that non-democratic 
actors in Angola might possess some resources as social actors that democratically defined 
civil society organisations do not have access to. One of these is to secure a plurality of 
voices – and actions. In this sense, actors such as churches may be able to constitute a kind 
of equilibrium towards the Angolan state, rather on the basis of their members’ active 
support and engagement – their social and spiritual energy – than on the institutions’ 
structural capacity, as presupposed in civil society aid strategies. In Angola, such an 
equilibrium turns out to be paramount in order to mediate the power of the hegemonic 
project of the government. In the future, it may even turn into more genuine forms of 
collaboration where the constructive energy of independent actors and what they can 
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accomplish will be recognised by the state as being of direct value to Angolan society, as the 
school-building project carefully suggests.  
In this perspective, my survey seems to support the idea of civil society as an 
equilibrium towards a dominant state or regime, which I have criticised, by suggesting an 
approach based on local actors’ agency. I have, therefore, been able to situate my empirical 
study according to its socio-political context and as a mediator between the normativity of a 
civil society approach primarily concerned with structural capacity in democratic institutions 
and an actor-oriented perspective idealising the power of agency and ignoring internal 
differences and structural constraints. Both perspectives assume the harmonious unity of 
their objects. In Angola, it seems that it is exactly a plurality of actors with different 
orientations that hold the best chances of influencing social change on the political level, by 
constituting a balance to the hegemonic state-civil society construction of the government – 
via a variety of ‘subtle responses’ to unsatisfying social conditions.  
My results show how a more modest attitude to civil societies as empirical 
phenomena, combined with context-sensitive empirical research, and reinforced by different 
theoretical and practical perspectives, may offer a more adequate platform from which to 
design strategies for civil society aid interventions in developing countries. From this 
platform, the normative ideas of local actors’ natural power for change and the necessity of 
building their structural capacity can yet be relevant, when balanced against careful attention 
to empirical circumstances. 
 
My survey also suggests some interesting perspectives on future research relevant to a 
broadened approach to civil society in Angola and in general. My analysis has focused on the 
specific agency of one single church in Angola. The very direct connection between 
rationalities of faith and agency has, however, underlined the relevance of studying religious 
versus secular actors’ contributions to social processes more systematically. Obviously, it is 
not only in Angola that such research is relevant. Also Maina’s research on civil society in 
Kenya calls for such elucidation, as the Church proved to be the most trusted grassroots 
organisation (see 2.5). Such a perspective would also allow for an investigation of how closer 
networks and co-operation between churches, religious groups, and secular civil society 
actors could be an option worth supporting for international donors, as the Angolan Rede da 
Paz – Peace Network – initiated by church organisations, is a very clear example of. 
Furthermore, my study pointed to a particularly interesting perspective in this field of 
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investigation by tracing among the young generation in the church, particular schemes for 
integrating their faith with an urban, modern, and more socially conscious lifestyle. This 
suggests that more research on youth, modernity, and religion in post-colonial, post-conflict, 
and urbanising developing societies would be relevant to such a perspective. 
 
Finally, an integrating perspective on churches in the civil society debate might suggest more 
operational ways for aid programmes to work with popular resources. A few donors have 
tried to work with civil society in a community-perspective in Angola, but it has proved 
difficult because little solidarity and unity was found among neighbours. Comerford, on the 
other hand, found that community organisations have deeper roots in Angolan society than 
NGOs and close bonds to local churches, the latter serving as ‘places of interpretation’ and 
‘centres of civic education’ (see 3.5). My analysis indeed supports and substantiates these 
points. A way to proceed with research on such a combined church-community approach to 
civil society could be through analyses of the relations between community organisations 
and churches. Increased knowledge on these relations might permit us to locate more 
concrete and operational forms of the responses to unsatisfying social conditions expressed 
through rationalities of faith. If the agency located in my case study was an important 
contribution to social change due to the subtle resistance of the church members, perhaps 
subtle responses found at the community level will more directly lead to strategies for activating 
local actors’ creative resources.  
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Appendix 1: Informal conversational interviews prior to the field study 
 
During the preparation for my field study I carried out a number of informal, conversational 
interviews with people representing different institutions in Luanda. I refer to the following 
in the report: 
 
1) 3.2.2005: Conversational group interview with four Angolan staff members of The 
Peace Building Programme (PCP) in the Canadian NGO Development 
Workshop. This unity has worked with civil society activities on various levels, 
including community level (see also the publications: Robson and Roque, 2001 
and Aegisson, 2001). The organisation, present in Angola since 1982, is said to 
have been the first international NGO in the country.   
The interview was conducted at an early stage of my research process and aimed at 
achieving an understanding of the organisation’s civil society approach, as the apparently 
only donor organisation in Angola that has worked with civil society in a broader sense 
than as capacity building of local organisations.  
 
2) 14.3.2005: Conversation with the general secretary of COIEPA, Reverend Daniel 
Ntoni-Nzinga.  
The conversation was a spontaneous introduction to COIEPA that the general secretary 
gave me when I contacted the committee in order to get help to create contacts to 
possible church projects for my field study.  
 
3) 12.4.2005: Conversation with the Bishop of the Methodist Church in Luanda, 
Reverend Gaspar Domingos. 
The conversation was a result of the contact created to the Methodist Church through 
COIEPA and CICA. The Bishop wished to have this meeting with me to understand my 
research objectives before he allowed me to carry out research in the church and in order 
to help me to get in contact with the most appropriate church project.  
(In the end, I chose not to work with the Methodist Church, cf. chapter 4.2) 
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Appendix 2: Leadership and democratic premises in an Angolan NGO  
 
In the fall of 2003, I worked as an intern in Ibis - a large Danish development NGO – on an 
extensive civil society programme. In the last period of my internship I worked directly with 
one of the beneficiaries/partner organisations of the programme in their daily activities. The 
organisation was primarily working with human rights, and had been assessed as one of the 
most developed organisations in the programme in terms of organisational maturity. It had 
recently managed to expel a corrupt general secretary, who had been the founder of the 
organisation and a very strong personality, and elect a new one at an extraordinary general 
assembly. The management team of the organisation consisted of at least a few well-
acquainted, experienced people, who knew their way around the development world, the 
terminology, donors’ expectations, etc.  
The new general secretary was rather inexperienced, though, and had been elected 
because of his personal relations and quite intense campaigning, mainly among the 
organisations’ younger members.165 He seemed, up to a certain point, willing to accept that 
he lacked some experience in relation to the rest of the management team, but in the short 
period of time I was with them he became more and more insistent on his role as the leader 
and began, among other things, to enhance individual and spontaneous contacts to possible 
donors, hence gambling the organisations’ good name and reputation. It was clear to 
everyone in the management team to whom I spoke that he was mostly interested in the title 
and the power of this position and in the future salary he saw coming up with future 
funding. Some even stated that he would turn out to be worse than his expelled predecessor, 
as his lack of knowledge of donor relationships etc. was much more damaging to the 
organisation than a leader who would unscrupulously pay himself huge sums from the 
organisations’ cash box.  
Yet, everyone formally treated him with respect, always addressing him as ‘chefe’, 
even if they would laugh at him behind his back. They would perhaps try to argue with him, 
but in the end accept, because he was the boss. At the end of my stay with them he suddenly 
‘fired’ two board members, whom he did not feel were living up to their responsibilities. 
One of them was the only one who spoke English and had the current contact to an 
important US donor. It was clear to anyone that this move was taken as an expression of 
power and because he felt challenged by these members.  
                                                 
165 This latter information comes from his main ‘competitor’ to the title, though, but anything I observed to the effect 
supports his statement, as I will elaborate.  
 117 
 
My point is not that a similar scenario is impossible to find in a northern NGO. My point is 
that it is appearing in this situation solely because of the basic democratic associational 
feature – the election of a board by the members at a general assembly. In most Angolan 
NGOs it is per se the founder who is the general secretary (consider the youth of NGOs in 
Angola) and the act of holding a ‘real’ general assembly is something which usually appears 
only at a quite late stage in an organisations’ life, usually re-electing the same leader, as the 
organisation is in a sense understood as ‘his’. The organisation in the example indeed seemed 
better geared to function according to such a structure. At the same time, the example 
suggests that the situation appeared because of the members’ lack of understanding of the 
democratic associational rules of law – and lack of knowledge (or transparency) about the 
management members and their abilities. Again, this is a possible scenario for a northern 
NGO as well, but it is certainly not in line with the ideal type of associational life. And as I 
mentioned, this NGO had been highlighted in the assessment as at a high stage of 
organisational development and maturity. Finally, I want to suggest with the example that 
the concept of leadership and the respect of authorities differ from those of the northern 
ideal type to a degree that plays a crucial role in the relationship between the donors’ 
expectations to, and the actual performances of, many Angolan NGOs.  
 118 
Appendix 3: Focal questions for the field study 
 
The field study was concentrated around a set of focal questions I carried in mind in order to 
guide my observations and unstructured, conversational interviews with the participants: 
 
1. The initiative/activities: What are the objectives, the strategy and methods used? Why 
do the participants participate in it? What do they expect to achieve from it – at a 
personal and an altruistic/philanthropic level, and at the level of concrete social change?    
2. Key aspects of their religious belief: What is most important in the belief/ the role of 
God in people’s lives? The role of God in the course of history/social reality? 
3. Key aspects of the importance of the church in their everyday life: As a space for 
social contacts, solidarity, identification, unity - and for social organisation and activities 
for change?  
4. Key aspects of societal view: What do the participants think is wrong in Angolan 
society and why? How do they find that this can be changed and by whom? 
5. Idea of the future:  What are the participants hopes and beliefs in the future? 
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    Appendix 4: Interview with the leader of the Tocoist Church 
  
For the interview I prepared a few specific questions that I would like the interviewee to 
comment and beyond these I let the interview function as an informal conversation. The 
interview took about an hour and it was not recorded. The answers quoted below are my 
brief summary according to my notes. During the interview, the church leader referred 
recurrently to Bible passages and made me read them out loud in order to substantiate his 
answers. 
  
How do you see the role of the Church in relation to the Government and politics?  
The Church should speak out in political matters. When something is wrong, the church should counsel the 
politicians – and I have been doing that a lot. The Government is happy with the work we are doing, and 
they will be providing the payment of the teachers of the school. That is a good sign! They did not recognise the 
errors of the past, but they accept us now and seem willing to collaborate to a certain point. The church has 
the responsibility to act/construct when the Government is not doing it. He refers to the Bible, James 
2:14-26, saying that faith is useless without action in practise. He also mentions the great 
importance of providing services for the church members and the people because they 
should live well and not suffer. He talks a lot about the importance of preparing yourself for 
the transformation and eternal life through working and sacrifices in this life.  
 
Will the collaboration become greater in the future? 
With the will of God. (My questions trying to figure out how things are different today than 
before, “the political climate” bring little concrete answers of any relevance.)  
 
What is the vision of the Church upon democracy? 
(Hesitating) It is good, if it is well directed… If it is not, as there are so many examples of here in Africa, 
it will end up in chaos, fraudes etc. Africa still has a lot to learn from Europe. In your countries there is 
benção! The politicians have benção! The politicians are supposed to represent the will of the people in a 
democracy – as democracy means the power of the people. A little more hesitating he reaches a point of 
the will of the people as being a valid parameter for choosing politicians to deal with the 
earthly matters, and the will of God as leading the Church (I might have put the words a 
little bit in his mouth though, in order to make him understand the point with my question).  
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What about the internal democracy – the Church seems to be structured in a 
somehow democratic way? 
He asks me to elaborate what I mean, and I mention the directions and secretariats as 
resembling those of a democratic non-religious organisation. He still seems a little surprised, 
but confirms that the different organs are meant to take decisions and implement superior 
decisions according to their way. A decentralisation is necessary and is going on – also to 
provincial and local church levels.  
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Appendix 5: Organisational Structure of the Tocoist Church 
 
Section I: On the decisive organs 
 
A: Organs of deliberative decision 
a) Congress, at the universal level; 
b) Body of the Twenty-four Elders, at the universal level; 
c) National Councils (Body of the 120 Elders); 
d) Provincial Councils; 
e) Local Councils; 
f) Body of the 48 from the Tribes. 
 
B: Organs of executive decision 
a) Universal, National, Provincial and Local Directions of the Tribes, Classes, and Areas; 
b) Universal, National, Provincial and Local Secretariats of the Tribes, Classes, and Areas; 
c) Body of the 80 Elders, National; 
d) Body of the 80 Elders, Provincial; 
e) Body of the 80 Elders, Local; 
 
Section II: On the consultative and executive organs 
 
a) Universal, National, Provincial and Local Tabernacles of the Tribes, Classes, and Areas; 
b) Universal Sacerdotal Council 
c) Universal, National, Provincial and Local Pastoral Councils. 
 
Section III: On the executive and autonomous organs 
 
a) Women’s Universal, National, Provincial and Local Directions of the Tribes, Classes, and 
Areas; 
b) Youth Universal, National, Provincial and Local Directions of the Tribes, Classes, and Areas; 
 
 
Section IV: On the executive organs 
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a) Universal, National, Provincial and Local Secretariats of Culture of the Tribes, Classes, and 
Areas; 
b) Universal, National, Provincial and Local Secretariats of the Tabernacles of the Tribes, Classes, 
and Areas; 
c) Universal, National, Provincial and Local Secretariats of the Pastoral Councils 
 
Section V: On the support organs  
 
a) Universal Secretariat of Administration, 
b) Universal Secretariat of Finance, 
c) Universal Secretariat of Interchange,  
d) Universal Secretariat of Protocol, Public Relations, and Transports, 
e) Universal Secretariat of Health and Social Assistance, 
f) Universal Secretariat of Technical Support and Construction Works, 
g) Universal Secretariat of Decoration, Ornamentation, and Embellishment, 
h) Universal Secretariat of Fiscals [Safety and Protection]  
i) Single Paragraph: The organs a) – h) function on Universal, National, Provincial, Local, 
Tribe, Classe, and Area levels. 
 
I.N.S.J.C.M: Estatutos da Igreja (Statutes of The Church), available at www.tocoitas.com  
My translation from Portuguese. 
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Appendix 6: Original Portuguese quotations  
 
Page 54:  
”uma Comunidade Cristã, sem fins lucrativos, políticos, nem subversivos, constituída por homens que 
dentro da Doutrina Cristã, professam o Tocoísmo, anunciam a Mensagem de salvação, a Luz da Bíblia 
Sagrada, transmitida através do Espírito Santo, por Sua Santidade, o profeta Simão Tôco. (…) A Igreja 
do Nosso Senhor Jesus Cristo no Mundo, sempre existiu desde o tempo dos Patriarcas e Profetas. É a 
Igreja que Cristo lembrou e estabeleceu aquando da descida do Espírito Santo em Jerusalém no dia de 
Pentecostes, S. Mateus 16:18, Actos 2:2-4. É a mesma Igreja que o Venerável Profeta Simão Gonçalves 
Tôco, relembrou em África em 25 de Julho de 1949, …” (Estatutos da Igreja, 2000: Capitulo 1, Artigo 
1&2) 
 
 Page 56: 
““porque Moisés disse: O SENHOR VOSSO DEUS LEVANTARÁ, DE ENTRE OS VOSSOS 
IRMÃOS, UM PROFETA, SEMELHANTE A MIM; A ELE OUVIREIS, EM TUDO QUANTO 
VOS DISSER. E ACONTECERÁ QUE TODA A ALMA QUE NÃO ESCUTAR ESSE PROFETA 
SERÁ EXTERMINADO DE ENTRE O POVO, Actos 3:22-23” (…) Dentro desta contextura, 
coloca-se a seguinte grande questão: Será que SIMÃO TÔCO é um profeta que DEUS suscitou em 
Africa? Para uma resposta sólida e consistente, a leitura do livro que tendes em suas mãos contribuirá 
grandemente na busca da compreensão e tiragem de conclusões.” (Quibeta, 2002, p. 10) 
 
Page 72, footnote 136: 
“... sendo por inerência a entidade máxima da Igreja de NSJCM no plano ecuménico, Espiritual e 
Administrstivo. Esta decisão foi tomada no decorrer do II Congresso Universal da Igreja em 
conseqüência de todo o trabalho que tem levado ao cabo no plano nacional e internacional.” 
(I.N.S.J.C.M, 2005, p. 3) 
 
Page 95: 
“Angola Avante! Revolução! Pelo Poder Popular  
Patria Unida, Liberdade, um só povo, uma só nação.”  
 
Page 87, footnote 155: 
“A Igreja deve crescer na quantidade e na qualidade porque Cristo não é estático” 
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